There’s no end in sight to the nightmare of Russia’s assault on Ukraine. Scores were left dead and injured across Ukraine last week when Russian missiles struck Kyiv and other cities. One even tore through the country’s largest children’s hospital.

Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong called the attack abhorrent and condemned the ‘targeting of civilian infrastructure, including hospitals.’

It’s a laudable sentiment, but Wong’s fine words can’t conceal the massive China-shaped hole in Australia’s response to Russia’s brutality.

The Albanese government has said ^[1] that ‘those who provide material support to Russia’s illegal and immoral war will face consequences.’ Australia has accordingly sanctioned a range of North Korean ^[2] and Iranian ^[3] entities and individuals supplying the Russian military.

Yet Canberra hasn’t fully followed through with its pledge to punish those who materially aid and abet Moscow. More than two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Beijing continues to support ^[4] Moscow diplomatically by amplifying ^[5] Kremlin-friendly messages and undermining ^[6] Kyiv’s negotiating position. China has also offered an economic lifeline to Russia in the form of surging ^[7] bilateral trade.

But worse than all of that, China has backed Russia on the battlefield. Although China might not be sending lethal military assistance, its technology exports ^[8] are critical to Russia’s ability to wage war against Ukraine and its people. According to analysis ^[9] from Nathaniel Sher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, every month China supplies ‘over [US]$300 million worth of dual-use products identified … as “high priority” items necessary for Russia’s weapons production.’

These essential Chinese inputs to Russia’s defence industry include machine tools, microprocessors, navigation devices, optical equipment and other items. Chinese companies have also acted as intermediaries by transhipping ^[10] foreign-made dual-use goods to Russia. Many of the Russian missiles, drones and tanks targeting Ukraine and its citizens depend on Chinese technology and supply chains to kill and maim.

It’s possible that Chinese companies even had a hand in the manufacture of the missile that slammed into the children’s hospital in Kyiv last week.

Despite the recent announcement of more Australian military assistance, Canberra could still be doing more to directly support ^[11] Ukraine. Among other things, the Albanese government could reestablish the Australian embassy in Kyiv, deepen intelligence sharing with Ukraine and elevate the Ukrainian struggle in Australia’s regional diplomacy.

But the hard truth is that efforts to defend Ukraine and its people will be hamstrung without also tackling China’s support for Russia’s belligerence. As NATO’s Washington Summit Declaration plainly stated ^[12]: China ‘has become a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine through its so-called “no limits” partnership and its large-scale support for Russia’s defence industrial base.’

Some of Australia’s closest allies and partners have already acted to meet this challenge. The US, EU, Britain and Japan have all levelled sanctions against Chinese companies exporting dual-use products to Russia.

Although the Albanese government has been a prolific user ^[13] of sanctions against Russia, Myanmar, North Korea, Iran and others, it still hasn’t moved against the Chinese companies supplying Russian defence industry.

Imposing such sanctions on Chinese companies wouldn’t be entirely risk free for Australia. Beijing could delay the expected removal of the final trade restrictions on live lobster and red meat if Canberra threw the hammer down on Chinese companies. China might even threaten to impose new coercive measures on other Australian exports or freeze some forms of diplomatic contact with Canberra.

But if China’s so-far fairly boilerplate rhetorical response ^[14] to Japan’s recent sanctions is a reliable guide, then there’s every chance Beijing won’t retaliate.

And as unhappy as Beijing might be with Canberra for imposing such sanctions, China would still have many compelling reasons to keep ties with Australia broadly stable. China likely doesn’t want to reverse the last few years of ongoing relationship repair with Australia and again suffer the costs of excluding valuable Australian commodities from its market.

Of course, there’s no guarantee that sanctions will persuade China to stop supplying Russia with dual-use technology. The US, EU, British and Japanese sanctions on Chinese companies haven’t yet staunched the flow of the technological inputs that Russia’s defence industry needs. And the long history of sanctions points to their patchy record ^[15] of changing targeted countries’ behaviour.

But if Australia really is ‘resolute ^[16] in [its] support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,’ then it’s hard to see how the Albanese government can avoid imposing such sanctions.

To give China extra reason to wind back its support for Russia, Australia could also quietly encourage regional allies and partners like New Zealand, South Korea and Singapore to take similar measures. Beijing might not be swayed even if Canberra could build a coalition of regional capitals willing to act against the Chinese companies supplying Russia’s war machine. And yet such an approach still stands a better chance of changing China’s calculus than the verbal objections ^[1] that the Albanese government has offered to date.

Speaking last month at the Summit on Peace in Ukraine, Minister for the National Disability Insurance Scheme Bill Shorten called for a world ‘where no country dominates and no country is dominated.’

This is a noble goal. But Australia can’t hope to build that kind of world if it isn’t willing to take concrete action against China’s material support for Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine.