At a 6:30pm talk with reporters at the (now old) Officers Club in Guam on the 25 July 1969, President Nixon changed Australian defence policy. He announced that in future countries fighting internal threats should …
Articles by: "Peter Layton"
Money it would seem really is the root of all evil, or at least the lack of it! Many defence commentators would agree with George Bernard Shaw in that judgement. The problem for Australian defence—and …
When talking about current defence and security matters there seems strong agreement on at least one characteristic: that the future is uncertain. Of course that’s true, and many things could potentially happen but, even so, …
There has been quite a spirited debate (here and here) about the meaning behind the largest ships ever built for the Royal Australian Navy. In thinking about this further, maybe we should return to more …
At the state and company level the objectives a defence industry strategy might seek to achieve look different to those at the federal level that were discussed earlier (here and here). They’re broader in scope, worry more …
The Queensland government has recently appointed a defence envoy to bolster defence industries in the state. In this it joins other states and the federal government in actively adopting defence industry sector strategies. But for …
The latest Defence White Paper and the co-released Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan mark a distinct sea-change (pun intended) in the relationship between Defence and Industry, at least in the field of shipbuilding. If all …
In simple terms, defence budgets comprise funding for new equipment, for people or for operating costs, and can alternate between them. Since the early 1990s, a series of reform initiatives have been undertaken based on …
The combination of the rise of China, interest in new submarines and debates on the Army’s future role has sparked a renewed interest in maritime strategy. There are several alternative maritime strategies in play, often …
Graeme Dobell makes some contentious arguments about Australia’s decision-making processes when determining our involvement in the American-led Iraq war of ten years ago. They are contentious because many of Canberra’s mandarins remain in place, people …
Earlier posts (here, here and here) have looked at force structure from an Australian perspective, but in reality the American alliance dominates all our defence discussions. So our thinking about future force structure alternatives and …
Marcus Fielding’s response to my force structure post raises several interesting points, in particular, that ‘…it’s entirely appropriate for Australia to restructure to be able to lead and provide force-level support to regional coalitions.’ In …