Almost seven decades after it was created as the first Islamic republic of the postcolonial era, Pakistan is teetering on the edge of an abyss. The economy is stagnant, unemployment is high, and resources are scarce. The government is unstable, ineffective, and plagued by debt. The military—along with its rogue Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, comprising the country’s spies and secret policemen—is exempt from civilian oversight, enabling it to maintain and deepen ^[1] its terrorist ties.

Nuclear-armed Pakistan is now at risk ^[2] of becoming a failed state. But even if it doesn’t fail, the nexus between terrorist groups and Pakistan’s powerful military raises the spectre of nuclear terrorism—a menace so large that the United States has prepared a contingency plan to take out ^[3] the country’s fast-growing ^[4] nuclear arsenal should the need arise.

Make no mistake: Pakistan is ‘ground zero’ for the terrorist threat the world faces. The footprints of many terrorist attacks in the West have been traced to Pakistan, including the 2005 London bombings and the 2015 San Bernardino killings. Two key actors behind the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States—Osama bin Laden and Khalid Sheik Mohammed—were found ensconced ^[5] in Pakistan. In the recent Manhattan and New Jersey bombings, the arrested suspect, Ahmad Khan Rahami, was radicalised in a Pakistan seminary ^[6] located near the Pakistani military’s hideout for the Afghan Taliban leadership.

But it’s Pakistan’s neighbours that are bearing the brunt of its state-sponsored terrorism. Major terrorist attacks in South Asia, like the 2008 Mumbai strikes ^[7] and the 2008 and 2011 assaults on the Indian and US embassies in Afghanistan ^[8], respectively, were apparently orchestrated by the ISI, which has reared terrorist organisations like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and the Haqqani network to do its bidding. This is no hearsay; former Pakistani military dictator Pervez Musharraf has largely acknowledged ^[9] it.

In India, in particular, the Pakistani military—which, despite being the world’s sixth largest ^[10], would have little chance of winning a conventional war against its giant neighbour—uses its terrorist proxies to wage a clandestine war. This year alone, Pakistani military-backed terrorists have crossed the border twice to carry out attacks on Indian military bases.

In January, Jaish-e-Mohammad struck India’s Pathankot air base, initiating days of fighting that left seven Indian soldiers dead. Last month, members of the same group crossed the border again to strike the Indian army base at Uri, killing 19 soldiers and prompting India to carry out a retaliatory surgical strike ^[11] against militant staging areas across the line of control in disputed and divided Kashmir.

Afghanistan and Bangladesh also accuse ISI of undermining their security through terrorist surrogates. They blame Pakistan for the recent grisly attacks in their respective capitals, Kabul and Dhaka, in which a university ^[12] and a café ^[13] were among the targets.

Such activities have left Pakistan isolated. Just recently, its regional neighbours—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka—pulled the plug on a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit that was scheduled for early next month in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad. Sri Lanka’s prime minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, has warned ^[14] that ‘cross-border terrorism’ imperils the very future of SAARC.

But diminished international standing and growing regional isolation have been insufficient to induce Pakistan’s dominant military to rethink its stance on terrorism. One reason is that Pakistan retains some powerful patrons. Beyond receiving financial support from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has, in some ways, become a client of China, which provides political protection—even for Pakistan-based terrorists—at the United Nations Security Council.

This month, China torpedoed, for the fifth time in two years, proposed UN sanctions on Masood Azhar, the Pakistan-based head of Jaish-e-Mohammed, which the UN designated as a terrorist outfit years ago. The sanctions were backed by all other members of the Security Council’s anti-terror committee ^[15], not least because India had presented evidence linking Azhar to the terrorist killings at its two military bases.

In terms of financial aid, however, it’s the US that serves as Pakistan’s biggest benefactor. Yes, even after finding the likes of Bin Laden on Pakistani soil, the US—the country that has spearheaded the so-called War on Terror—not only continues to deliver billions of dollars in aid ^[16] to Pakistan, but also supplies it with large amounts of lethal weapons ^[17]. US President Barack Obama’s administration also opposes a move in Congress that would officially brand ^[18] Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism.

This approach reflects Obama’s commitment to using inducements to coax the Pakistani military to persuade the Taliban to agree to a peace deal in Afghanistan. But that policy has failed. The US remains stuck in the longest war in its history, as a resurgent Taliban carries out increasingly daring attacks in Afghanistan with the aid of their command-and-control structure in—you guessed it—Pakistan. No counterterrorism campaign has ever succeeded when militants have enjoyed such cross-border havens ^[19].

Achieving peace in Afghanistan, like stemming the spread of international terrorism, will be impossible without making the Pakistani military accountable to the country’s civilian government. The US has a lot of leverage: Pakistan has one of the world’s lowest tax-to-GDP ratios, and is highly dependent on American and other foreign aid. It should use that leverage to ensure that the Pakistani military is brought to heel—and held to account.