The New Zealand-US component of ANZUS was suspended in the 1980s because Wellington refused to admit American Navy vessels that were nuclear-powered, or that might be carrying nuclear weapons, into its ports. 

Buried in paragraph 21 of today’s joint statement ^[1] between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon is a moment in history that many might miss—a rare reference to the continued importance of the ANZUS Treaty to the Australia-New Zealand alliance:  

‘In the event of a cyber-attack that threatened the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of our nations, Australia and New Zealand would consult together under the ANZUS Treaty to determine appropriate options to address the threat. They also affirmed that a cyber-attack on either nation could constitute an armed attack under Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty. A decision on whether such a cyber-attack would constitute an armed attack would be made on a case-by-case basis through close consultations between Australia and New Zealand.’ 

ASPI experts unpack the significance. 

 

Justin Bassi, executive director 

This is significant for multiple reasons. First, confirmation that a cyber-attack on either nation could constitute an armed attack under the ANZUS Treaty provides useful clarity.  

But even more significant is the acknowledgment by Luxon of the ANZUS Treaty itself. After the breakdown of the ANZUS Treaty as a trilateral alliance in 1985 with the downgrading of the relationship between the United States and New Zealand, the Treaty has rarely been named by the New Zealand political class, despite being the source of its bilateral alliance with Australia.  

When Australia and the US celebrated ANZUS’s 70th Anniversary in 2021, neither the NZ Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern nor her defence or foreign ministers referred to it at all.  

The reference to ANZUS continues Luxon’s foreign policy reset. He has been bolder than his predecessors, laying out a role for New Zealand within a global strategic outlook that is based on core partnerships. In a world of conflict, with wars in Europe and the Middle East and China creating tensions in the South China Sea and over Taiwan, New Zealand is messaging that it wants to be involved in the discussions on how to regain stability and deterrence, and that it has a role to play.  

This latest backing in of ANZUS comes off the Luxon government’s public support for the Five Eyes group—which was downplayed by the previous New Zealand government—and his attendance at the recent NATO Summit in Washington, where he said: ‘The intensifying military relationship we see between Russia and North Korea and China’s role in supporting the rebuilding of Russia’s industrial base demonstrates the indivisibility of issues between Europe and our part of the world.’ 

 

Bart Hogeveen, acting director of cyber, technology and security 

The recognition that a cyber-attack could constitute an armed attack against the territorial integrity of either state under the ANZUS treaty is a welcome step that brings the Australia-New Zealand alliance into alignment with other liberal alliances. 

AUSMIN, NATO and the US-Japan security treaty have all indicated that a cyber attack could constitute an armed attack that warrants a collective response. Today’s statement by Albanese and Luxon is arguably the strongest ANZUS reference to collective cyber defence, noting it was made at the leaders’ level and connects to Article 4, the main collective defence clause of ANZUS.  

It shows a growing acceptance by the New Zealand and Australian governments that the digital domain is also a domain of warfare. It builds on recent attributions by Canberra and Wellington, independently and collaboratively with other Five Eyes partners, of malicious cyber operations affecting national and economic security, and electoral processes.  

Cyber threat assessments from New Zealand’s signals intelligence and cybersecurity agencies have become more alarming in recent years. Recognising that such state-sponsored operations and campaigns may—at some point and in certain circumstances—amount to an armed attack serves as an important deterrent. It also paves the way for Canberra and Wellington to set boundaries to when, where and how international law applies to state conduct in cyberspace, including the laws of armed conflict. 

 

Euan Graham, senior analyst 

New Zealand has endorsed AUKUS’s contribution to regional security and stability, while also registering its interest in participating in Pillar II in future. The fact that there are no explicit caveats attached to Pillar I in the Joint Statement further suggests that the Luxon government will approach Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, under AUKUS, pragmatically and in a low-key manner in spite of Wellington’s prevailing anti-nuclear policies. 

The mutual embedding of senior ADF and NZDF officers into the joint commands of each other’s armed forces will make it easier for Australia and New Zealand to conduct military operations together, and is a sign of their willingness to integrate at a deeper level. 

The reference to ‘combined procurement’ in an ‘ANZAC’ context is also a welcome indication that interoperability remains important to New Zealand—a point underscored by New Zealand’s induction into service of the P-8A, as a high-end maritime surveillance and anti-submarine platform that can operate seamlessly alongside the ADF and US forces.  

It also leaves the door open for New Zealand to join Australia’s general-purpose frigate acquisition in future, although Wellington is not quite at that point yet. Australia would be likely to support this ‘ANZAC redux’ option, for reasons of interoperability, but also to generate an economy of scale that could bring down the costs of its own acquisition process.  

While the main significance of the joint statement is in the revival of ANZUS and its explicit invocation in the scenario of a cyber attack, New Zealand and Australia remain military partners in Southeast Asia, though the Five Power Defence Arrangements, as well as close partners in the Pacific. Hence the nod towards close defence co-operation will also be read into these regional commitments where the ADF and NZDF have existing commitments and close habits of cooperation. 

 

Malcolm Davis, senior analyst 

The important recognition of the challenge posed by cyber threats in the Luxon-Albanese joint statement is an opportunity for both Australia and New Zealand to work more closely together on another increasingly important domain—space. In reality, the two domains cannot be decoupled. 

Both countries will increasingly depend on constellations of satellites to support a full range of national activities, and to ensure national security and prosperity. Space is a contested and congested operational domain with satellites—and the ground stations that manage them—being ideal targets for an adversary to threaten with cyber attacks.  Such a ‘soft kill’ produces no space debris but denies access to vital space support. In this sense, the dependency of both countries on the space domain, and the threat posed by cyberwarfare, sees the boundaries of space and cyberspace increasingly blurred. 

Working together on space could provide a pathway for New Zealand to engage with AUKUS Pillar 2 in cyber—in which New Zealand Defence Minister Judith Collins has shown an interest. Space is also becoming relevant to Pillar 2, with the announcement that the Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) will be established under AUKUS. 

 

Alex Bristow, senior analyst 

When New Zealand refused to admit into its ports US Navy vessels that were nuclear-powered or might be carrying nuclear weapons, Washington’s view was that if its allies wanted protection—including shelter under the nuclear umbrella—they had to accept some of the risks associated with extended deterrence. Freeriding was not an option. With America First shaping US politics today, that view has only hardened. 

Today’s announcement has not reset the nuclear clock. While there has been some restoration of US-New Zealand defence co-operation since the 1980s, including port visits to New Zealand by conventionally powered and armed US Navy ships, anti-nuclear sentiment remains embedded in New Zealand. Wellington’s nuclear ban will extend to the conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines that Australia will acquire through AUKUS, as Luxon’s predecessor Jacinda Ardern made clear after AUKUS was announced.  

While anti-nuclear sentiment was also significant in Australia in the 1980s, Canberra used nimble diplomacy to mitigate the blowback it felt from the fracturing of ANZUS. By signing the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985, which established the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, Canberra mollified Wellington and its wider Pacific partners. But Canberra also inserted caveats into the treaty that made visits by US nuclear forces exempt from the prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons within the SPNFZ—a policy that has allowed nuclear-capable US bombers to rotate through Australia for decades. 

Today’s announcement deals with cyber, but it refocuses minds on the continued importance of ANZUS for wider deterrence. At some point, that discussion must include the US and must cover extended nuclear deterrence. The conversation will become more complicated as the US develops a more conspicuous forward presence for its nuclear forces in the Indo-Pacific and expects more burden-sharing from allies to support this. 

 

Raji Rajagopalan, resident senior fellow, ASPI 

Luxon has attached special importance to India in the speech, stating that he is determined to broaden and deepen New Zealand’s relations with India. Clearly, there is interest on both sides in enhancing the relationship even though, traditionally, India and New Zealand have not been significant partners.  

This is changing with the increasing frequency of visits and contact between the two countries. India’s President Droupadi Murmu was in New Zealand earlier this month, while New Zealand’s Foreign Minister Winston Peters was in Delhi a few months back.  

There is talk of a free trade agreement even though, according to the Indian foreign ministry, it remains aspirational at this point. India is also establishing a new consulate in Auckland. There are now about 8,000 Indian students in New Zealand, and the two countries signed an air services agreement to facilitate direct flights. 

New Zealand has a high-technology base that could help India. For example, India used a chip manufactured by a New Zealand company in its Chandrayaan space mission.  

Underlying this desire for closer ties is concern about the growing instability in the region and the world, which Luxon highlighted in his Lowy speech. There are likely to be some disagreements on Russia and Ukraine, but this is common to India’s relations.

What is more pertinent is the concern about China in the Indo-Pacific. A recent survey in New Zealand showed that India has now overtaken Singapore as the third most important Asian country, while concern about China continues to grow.  

Prime Minister Luxon supported the expanding scaffolding security architecture in the region, including the Quad, which New Delhi will appreciate.

There is a potential for future co-operation between Quad countries and New Zealand in areas such as space technology, cyber warfare and intelligence. Another area of potential co-operation is the South Pacific because of the large Indian diaspora in the region. Indeed, the Indian President went to Fiji before arriving in New Zealand.