When a post-colonial country with little or no democratic tradition escapes a brutal dictatorship, it rarely becomes a democracy. Instead, it is likely to be confronted by political chaos and foreign actors jostling for strategic advantage. That’s what occurred in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and in Libya after Muammar Qaddafi was ousted. Is Sudan destined for the same fate?

So far, the answer seems to be yes. When long-time Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir was removed in a military coup in 2019, the same foreign powers that have made Libya their strategic playground saw an opportunity to gain a foothold at the crossroads of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

To be sure, a sovereignty council was quickly established to lead the country through a transition to civilian leadership. But last month—just over a year before the transition would be complete—Sudan’s military chief, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, dissolved ^[1] the council and had the civilian prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, arrested ^[2]. A deal was reached on Sunday ^[3] to reinstate Hamdok, but the news was met by large protests against what many Sudanese pro-democracy leaders see as a betrayal of their cause.

The coup’s perpetrators all served under al-Bashir. Moreover, al-Burhan has ordered the release from prison ^[4] of high officials from al-Bashir’s now-dissolved National Congress Party, as well as Islamist leaders. This has raised fears in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates that Sudan’s new leadership shares the fallen dictator’s sympathies for their nemesis, the Muslim Brotherhood—a friend of Qatar and Turkey.

Yet military coups are rarely driven by ideology. Instead, they are usually bids to protect corporate and economic interests. Sudan’s military leaders were probably focused on safeguarding ^[5] their gold-mining, construction and oil businesses. The coup-makers are probably also hoping to shield themselves from international war crimes charges. After all, al-Burhan was among the architects of the Darfur genocide ^[6].

But this doesn’t mean that countries like Egypt can rest easy. Turkey’s relationship with al-Bashir brought major strategic benefits, including a 99-year lease ^[7] on Suakin island, strategically located on the Red Sea.

While Turkey has repeatedly claimed that it plans only to restore Suakin for tourism purposes, the establishment of a military outpost on the island seems likely. Al-Burhan’s government will not only uphold that lease but also add to it, leasing vast amounts of Sudanese land to Turkey for agricultural development ^[8].

Russia also has its eye on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Last year, it signed a deal with the sovereignty council that would allow it to keep up to four navy ships at Port Sudan ^[9]. Russia, which has not had a naval base in Africa since the end of the Cold War, is keen for any Sudanese government to reaffirm the agreement.

One country that seems largely to have lost interest in Sudan is China. Unlike Libya, Sudan is not a major oil producer. It lost that position when South Sudan seceded in 2011, taking 80% ^[10] of the country’s proven oil reserves with it. This probably explains why, from 2011 to 2018, China granted ^[11] Sudan just US$143 million in loans—far less than the nearly US$6 billion provided, largely for power and transport projects, between 2003 and 2010.

In fact, China’s interests in Sudan overlap significantly with those of the West. Given the Horn of Africa’s strategic location, both sides would prefer to see Sudan become politically stable and economically self-reliant.

Then there’s Israel, for which al-Burhan’s takeover is good news, at least in theory. Last year, it was al-Burhan and his associates in the military who backed the agreement to recognise the State of Israel and establish formal diplomatic ties, making Sudan the fifth Arab country ^[12] to do so.

Sudan’s nationalist civilian leaders were less than enthusiastic about the deal, though the promise from US President Donald Trump’s administration to remove Sudan from America’s list of state sponsors of terrorism ^[13] undoubtedly sweetened it. And Sudan’s warring parties remain acutely aware of Israel’s value as a conduit to America’s heart and wallet.

This awareness began with al-Bashir. Despite being a friend of Israel’s nemeses, Hamas and Hezbollah, he also courted Israel. He believed that diplomatic normalisation would win him US support and perhaps halt his indictment ^[14] by the International Criminal Court. Libya’s rebel warlord, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, has reportedly ^[15] now also approached Israel, with similar intentions.

But America’s interests in Sudan extend well beyond securing support for Israel, and far exceed its interests in Libya. For starters, following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, the US is under pressure to avoid another resounding defeat for democracy abroad. And the consolidation of a Russian and Turkish—and, potentially, Chinese—presence in the strategically sensitive Horn of Africa is the last thing the US needs.

Moreover, whereas the conflict in Libya has done little to erode stability in the Maghreb, a war in Sudan would upend a precarious regional order. Neighbouring Ethiopia is already mired in a civil war that threatens to morph into a border war ^[16] with Sudan, which would disrupt oil exports from South Sudan. And Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile represents an existential threat to Egypt.

To avoid a regional conflagration, the US must use its leverage to harness the support of Israel, Egypt and the UAE for a transition to civilian leadership in Sudan. This would require reining in the Muslim Brotherhood and ensuring that any Sudanese government respects the agreement with Israel. To secure a resolution over the Nile waters’ dispute, the US has already threatened to withhold development funds ^[17] to Ethiopia.

Sudanese civil society is doing its part, mounting a powerful resistance campaign, despite brutal repression ^[18] by security forces. This mobilisation has much in common with that which triggered al-Bashir’s fall. (No such campaign can be seen in Libya.)

Sudanese protesters are not alone. The African Union has ramped up political pressure on al-Burhan, and Western countries and the World Bank have suspended aid. But more must be done. Only with the West—led by the US—on its side can Sudan avoid Libya’s fate and resume the path towards civilian rule.