Europe is well ahead of Australia in its understanding of hybrid threats—harmful tactics below the threshold of war. Australia views these acts as isolated attacks across diplomatic, military, economic and technological domains, whereas European governments see them as part of a cohesive strategy aimed at undermining the defence capabilities of the target country and its partners.

Australia’s fragmented perspective poses a challenge because, by the time hybrid threats escalate into conflict, it may be too late to develop the necessary coordinated defences.

To be better prepared, Australia must widen its focus beyond government and facilitate collaboration among domestic stakeholders and external partners. It must also gather both civilian and military resources that enable a proactive response to hybrid campaigns.

It is understandable that European countries are bolstering their capacity to deter and defend against hybrid threats, given the war in Ukraine on their continent. Russia’s efforts to disrupt European support for Ukraine stop short of direct military conflict. Instead, Russia is undermining regional security through information manipulation, cyber attacks, economic coercion, instrumentalisation of migrants and sabotage—all tactics central to hybrid warfare.

There are indications that Moscow orchestrated ^[1] arson attacks in Riga in February, London in March and Warsaw in May and attempted to set off explosions mid-year in Germany, France and Czechia. This fits Russia’s broader strategy of using proxies to test Western defences, together with disinformation ^[2] campaigns, cyber attacks ^[3] and espionage ^[4]. Attacks on European infrastructure doubled from the last quarter of 2023 to the first quarter of 2024.

This enables a comprehensive security approach in which the state’s vital functions are secured through collaboration among authorities, citizens and business communities. Examples include: Finland’s efforts to improve national and regional situational awareness by establishing the Hybrid Centre of Excellence ^[5] (an international hub of experts on hybrid threats) and intensifying joint training; France empowering its media watchdog to fight destabilisation attempts by TV channels controlled by foreign states; and Britain tasking its 77th Brigade ^[6], a unit combining regulars and reservists with specialist skills to combat new forms of warfare, to use non-lethal engagement and legitimate non-military levers as a means to counter malicious behaviour.

Regionally, the EU issued a Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats ^[7] in 2016, which provides guidelines for member states to identify and respond to hybrid threats, including a protocol playbook ^[8]. This framework supports closer coordination with NATO and secondment of personnel to the Hybrid Centre of Excellence to facilitate research, training and information sharing among EU and NATO states. In 2022, the European Union formulated the EU Hybrid Toolbox (EUHT) to gather all civilian and military instruments that can counter hybrid threats. The EUHT brings together key response mechanisms such as the Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference toolbox and the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox. More than 200 additional tools and multifaceted measures will be further explored.

Europe’s robust approach to hybrid threats raised awareness of Russian disinformation operations that sought to influence the June 2024 European Parliament election. The influence campaigns, conducted via social media accounts and fake doppelganger websites, targeted at least seven ^[9] European countries, sharing inaccurate claims, misinterpretations of policy and inflammatory political ads. These campaigns had a significant impact ^[10], especially in Poland and the Baltic states, encouraging anti-government protests and inciting inter-ethnic hatred. It was assessed by Euractiv ^[11] that these influence campaigns helped far-right parties’ win big in the 2024 EU election.

Influence networks also targeted elections held a few weeks later to elect members of the French National Assembly. They framed the Assessment of the campaign by Insikt Group ^[12] recorded minimal public engagement, although the National Rally won the highest votes in the first round. The second round was similarly targeted by disinformation ^[13] operations. Since February, the French government has been accusing Russia of operating online manipulation campaigns against countries backing Ukraine, including making a website that mimicked the French Foreign Ministry. France has asked Brussels to impose sanctions against disinformation actors in Europe and beyond.

At the EU level, the European External Action Service plays a crucial role in coordinating the response to hybrid threats, working closely with NATO and other multilateral organisations. So far, the EU has enacted sanctions against entities and individuals involved in hybrid operations against its members, to punish and deter actors with a longer aim to protect democratic institutions, maintain stability and ensure citizens’ security. In May, the EU began to establish Hybrid Rapid Response Teams ^[14] to assist member states and partner countries countering hybrid threat campaigns by providing assessment, recommended actions and resources.

Australia can draw valuable lessons from Europe’s highly coordinated approach to incorporate civil preparedness, educate the wider public and work closely with international partners. The current Australian approach to hybrid threats involves various policies each managed by specific government departments and units. This poses challenges when it comes to working with action directed by other countries against hybrid threats.

For example, the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 provides a regulatory framework for managing risks to critical infrastructure, overseen ^[15] by the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre under the Department of Home Affairs. The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018, implemented ^[16] by the Attorney-General’s Department, enhances transparency regarding foreign influence on governmental processes. The Electoral Integrity Act 2018 includes measures to combat disinformation and foreign interference, with a taskforce chaired ^[17] by the Australian Electoral Commission.

A Counter Foreign Interference Coordination Centre ^[18] was established in 2018 under the Department of Home Affairs to counter foreign powers interfering within Australia. Meanwhile, the Espionage and Foreign Interference Act 2018 is implemented ^[19] by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, which works with the Australian Federal Police and other government bodies in the Counter Foreign Interference (CFI) Taskforce. Additionally, in 2019, the University Foreign Interference Taskforce was established to develop protection guidelines ^[20] addressing interference in education and research.

However, questions remain about how Australia can address hybrid operations originating from outside its territory. Examples include foreign influences in 2022 in Pacific Island countries that framed Australia as colonialist and belligerent ^[21], as well as obstruction of trade in retaliation against inquiries into the origin of Covid-19. Internationally, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has undertaken bilateral and mini-lateral cooperation ^[22] to counter hybrid threats. However, aside from the 2023 Joint Declaration Against Trade-Related Economic Coercion and Non-Market Policies and Practices issued with Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Britain and the United States, little public information is available on how Australia is addressing economic coercion.

To avoid being caught off guard by hybrid threats, Australia needs to adopt a more cohesive policy approach and facilitate collaboration among domestic stakeholders and external partners such as the Quad, AUKUS, Five Eyes, Five Power Defence Arrangements, NATO and ASEAN.

Australia must also gather both civilian and military resources to counter hybrid campaigns proactively and It should establish a central organisation that facilitates research, training and information-sharing among government departments, private sector entities and international allies, akin to Europe’s Hybrid Centre of Excellence. This central organisation should foster dialogue among stakeholders and offer capacity building for relevant partners. Such information-sharing is key to strategic warning ^[23] and building situational awareness ^[24] on hybrid threats.

Additionally, Australia needs to step up as a leader in addressing hybrid threats in the Indo-Pacific region, an area increasingly targeted by malicious actors employing hybrid tactics. Other countries in the region, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan and South Korea, have been experiencing hybrid attacks without knowing how to address them. By taking a proactive role, Australia can support its partners and help maintain regional stability when dealing with points of contention in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the East China Sea and on the Korean peninsula.