Which country is Singapore’s ‘special and most-trusted partner’, according to Prime Minister Lawrence Wong? For a globally networked city state that excels ^[1] in ‘multi-alignment’ and spurns formal alliances, the crop of potential candidates is abundant. But the answer may surprise.

The answer matters because Singapore is widely seen as a strategic bellwether, a place from which to assess the direction the geopolitical winds are blowing. It is a significant source of military capability, capital and technology within Southeast Asia, a region that is palpably experiencing geopolitical stresses. The identity of the country that the city state trusts the most should therefore be of interest to more than just its 5.6 million inhabitants.

Could it be China, for example? Singapore prides itself on its close partnership with the People’s Republic, recently highlighted by Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan’s upbeat description of Singapore and China as ‘two forces for stability ^[2]’, whose relations are a ‘bright spot’ in a volatile world.  Then again, Beijing isn’t always so flattering or obliging. In 2010, China’s then Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi famously told ^[3] his Singaporean counterpart that, ‘China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.’

As if to prove the point indirectly, in 2016, Hong Kong’s customs authorities impounded ^[4] some of Singapore’s military vehicles as they transited through the port on the way back from exercises in Taiwan—a coercive move widely attributed to Beijing. There is also former Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew’s timeless advice that Singapore should beware of being taken for a Chinese proxy. It’s a warning that remains pertinent as Beijing increasingly throws its weight around in Southeast Asia, even though the region’s elites appear won over.

Then how about the US? Washington’s deep defence and security bonds with Singapore give it a comparative edge over Beijing. Singapore invests heavily in the US, while corporate America is densely represented, with 6,000 US companies ^[5] headquartered in the city state. Yet it goes against Singapore’s DNA to side with one major power over another, especially when their competition is hotting up and turning zero sum. Democracy is not necessarily in the US’s favour either, when Singaporeans perceive America’s politics as driving polarisation at home and unpredictability abroad. Diplomatic equidistance therefore remains the name of Singapore’s US-China game.

Australia might think it has a decent shout. The ground-breaking 2016 comprehensive strategic partnership ^[6] will next year be upgraded to new heights of policy co-operation. Australia has the closest two-way defence relationship with Singapore after the US. Access for Australian forces to Singaporean facilities is underpinned by the Five Power Defence Arrangements, while Singapore trains its armed forces in Australia on an unparalleled and expanding ^[7] scale, and pays Canberra for the privilege. Singapore sources energy, food and other vital commodities in large volumes from down under, and reciprocates as an exporter of refined fuels and economic gateway for Australian businesses. Australia and Singapore are more interpersonally intertwined than many regional partners. Close but no cigar, mate.

Taiwan and Singapore once enjoyed exceptionally close government-to-government ties. Singapore maintains a discreet military training relationship through the Starlight Program ^[8]. But Taiwan’s star in Singapore is waning, outshone in international status by a rising China that aims to eclipse Taipei.

What of special friends further afield? Singapore values its British heritage more than many Commonwealth countries, in spite of Britain’s chequered history as the island’s former security guarantor. But only so far. Germany is probably Singapore’s favourite European economic partner and defence supplier. But it is too far away to win the accolade of being the city state’s preferred partner.

Israel could be considered a long-range contender. From independence, in 1965, Singapore studiously modelled its defence strategy on the Israeli experience. Israeli defence advisers flew to Singapore under the guise of being ‘Mexicans ^[9]’, while Singaporean tank crews trained secretly in the Negev desert. But Wong wasn’t describing Israel either.

Nor was he describing Japan, India ^[10], South Korea, or even New Zealand—however popular Kiwis are in the ‘Red Dot’ ^[11].

Which leaves Singapore’s fellow ASEAN members. It can’t be Malaysia, obviously. The inter-familial bonds there are too close for comfort. Likewise, Indonesia is a stone’s throw away. There’s too much neighbourly baggage and troublesome proximity from both of these countries for real trust to develop. Thailand perhaps, or Vietnam? No dice there.

Singapore’s special and most-trusted partner is in fact the small Southeast Asian sultanate, Brunei ^[12].

While Brunei appears starkly different to cosmopolitan Singapore—physically, socially and politically—their congruent interests and strategic outlook heave into view on closer inspection. Brunei is another small state, which shares the island of Borneo with Malaysia and Indonesia. It’s far enough away to pose no threat to Singapore, yet close enough to share the neighbourhood dynamics. Singapore’s networks extend globally, but its threat perceptions are more localised.

Singapore and Brunei co-operate closely in foreign policy and hold similar positions on important issues, including freedom of navigation. Defence ^[13] and finance links are particularly well developed: Singapore conducts jungle warfare training in Brunei’s eastern district, Temburong, where Wong himself served. Since 1967, Singapore and Brunei have operated a mutually stabilising interchangeable currency agreement, ^[14] the only arrangement of its kind within ASEAN. Brunei’s stock of hydrocarbon-funded investment in Singapore is considerable. Leadership ties are cultivated assiduously. It has become a tradition that Singapore’s prime ministers and presidents make Brunei their first overseas visit, while the long-reigning Sultan and his heir are regular callers to the city state.

It’s easy to overlook Singapore’s all-weather relationship with Brunei, as one bilateral strand in Southeast Asia’s burgeoning international relations. But its conspicuous endurance and depth is worth reflecting on. As with politics, geopolitics has a strong local dimension too. In designating Brunei as its most-trusted partner, Singapore perceives not simply an echo of its strategic circumstances but a not-too-distant reflection of itself.

The problem for Singapore is that Brunei counts negligibly in the strategic balance. In normal times, this would matter less, but with the Indo-Pacific in a heightened state of tension and Southeast Asia at its epicentre, Singapore’s exquisitely balanced brand of non-alignment appears less tenable as a strategy, as the fence becomes an increasingly uncomfortable place to sit.

The city state’s cozy, low-risk relationship with Brunei has a comparison point in Australia’s strategic debate, where some—like Trade Minister Don Farrell ^[15]—judge New Zealand to be their closest ally. However, for Singapore and Australia alike, the partner that is most comfortable to deal with is not necessarily their most important international relationship for the challenges ahead.