{"id":10186,"date":"2013-10-21T12:30:20","date_gmt":"2013-10-21T01:30:20","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=10186"},"modified":"2013-10-22T09:03:26","modified_gmt":"2013-10-21T22:03:26","slug":"indonesia-and-the-next-defence-white-paper","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indonesia-and-the-next-defence-white-paper\/","title":{"rendered":"Indonesia and the next defence white paper"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>The Abbott government has promised to write a new Defence White Paper within 18 months, and one of the key challenges it will face is considering the place of Indonesia in Australian defence thinking. As the fear of a direct Indonesian threat retreats into the past, it is being replaced by a view of Indonesia as a potential \u2018buffer\u2019<\/a> separating Australia from the vagaries of the East Asian system. But when the new government considers Australia\u2019s defence options in the next century, it’d do well to remember that Indonesia gets a vote in the role it plays in defending Australia.<\/p>\n Historically, Indonesia has comprised an important, though unclear, element in Australia\u2019s strategic environment. When Australia looks at its neighbourhood in isolation, Indonesia\u2019s proximity and strategic potential makes it appear as a liability. But if the lens is widened to encompass the entire Asia-Pacific strategic system, a strong Indonesia looks more like an asset. During the Cold War Australia\u2019s security concerns about Indonesia revolved around threats associated with K<\/em>onfrontasi<\/i>, communism and state collapse, with the prospect of a nuclear-armed Sukarno regime menacing briefly in 1965. But as early as the 1970s, Defence was also conducting studies of possible regional contingencies which involved Indonesia as an ally in achieving regional security. So recognition of our mutual strategic interests coexisted with security concerns about Indonesia.<\/p>\n In a recent Security Challenges<\/i> article Stephan Fruehling argued<\/a> that the 2013 Defence White Paper is Australia\u2019s first \u2018post-Indonesia\u2019 strategic guidance document since the 1950s. By that he means that the document doesn\u2019t even mention the possibility that relations between Australia and Indonesia might worsen, let alone gesture towards the \u2018Indonesia threat\u2019 of yore. Instead, it casts a pretty firm vote in favour of the \u2018Indonesia as asset\u2019 conception. This shift reflects not only Australia\u2019s growing comfort with Indonesia as a neighbour, but also the prevailing uncertainty of the Asia-Pacific strategic environment and the attendant need for Australia to build partnerships in the region.<\/p>\n But Australians should be careful not to read this increasingly rosy picture of Indonesia\u2019s strategic significance as a linear trend. While a stable Indonesia acts as a buffer regardless of its policy preferences, assisting it to play the role that we may need it to requires policy coordination. An effective joint response to contingencies involving regional defence against a hostile major power, for instance, requires planning premised on a shared view of Asia\u2019s major power politics. Despite the shifts that have taken place in the bilateral relationship, a convergence of strategic perceptions at this level hasn\u2019t happened, and is unlikely to happen in the near future. There are several reasons for this.<\/p>\n While Indonesia has warmed to the US security presence in Asia<\/a>, in part because it helps to restrain China, it has also been careful to keep its distance from the US<\/a> out of regard for China. As Indonesian defence thinkers look out at their archipelago from Java, a complex risk environment stares back at them. While a potentially hostile China is an important risk to be mitigated, overtly pushing against China heightens many other serious risks, not the least of which being major power war. Doing so would sacrifice Indonesia\u2019s development goals for little net security gain.<\/p>\n