{"id":10682,"date":"2013-11-12T14:30:05","date_gmt":"2013-11-12T03:30:05","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=10682"},"modified":"2013-11-14T11:04:24","modified_gmt":"2013-11-14T00:04:24","slug":"australias-alliance-addiction-after-afghanistan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australias-alliance-addiction-after-afghanistan\/","title":{"rendered":"Australia\u2019s alliance addiction after Afghanistan"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>As with Vietnam, so with Iraq and Afghanistan; Australia is avoiding any alliance blowback over evident disasters and misjudgements. Here’s one of the advantages of being the small ally\u2014usually only a small part of the blame sticks.<\/p>\n Australia\u2019s alliance habit of going big on rhetoric while sending a small force seems to work well in the blame stakes. When the post-war recriminations arrive, it\u2019s Australia\u2019s small force that governs the size of its responsibility, not the size of the arguments Australia contributed to the initial alliance judgements.<\/p>\n During Vietnam, there were a few American remarks about the vehemence-versus-volume mismatch between the strength of Australia\u2019s rhetoric on this vital war and the actual size of Australia\u2019s military contribution. Post-Vietnam, though, the US post-mortem tended to be an American soliloquy. While allies complain that the US is often a world unto itself\u2014doing international policy discussions as a domestic monologue\u2014American self-absorption can be useful when blame’s being allocated.<\/p>\n The Australian aim after Afghanistan, as after Iraq, is to avoid too much negative responsibility and foster the alliance. We avoided any blame after Vietnam, even though we had been one of the prime urgers. This time, we can argue that we didn\u2019t urge, merely followed; it doesn\u2019t do much for Australia\u2019s self-respect but it seems to be effective alliance management.<\/p>\n The downside, as\u00a0Owen Harries noted on Iraq in 2006<\/a>, is that it\u2019s extremely dubious whether \u2018uncritical, loyal support for a bad, failed America policy\u2019 will enhance Australia\u2019s standing as an ally. And then he delivered one of those masterful judgements which are his mark: \u2018A reputation for being dumb but loyal and eager is not one to be sought\u2019. Amen to that, but the alliance addiction is a powerful drug.<\/p>\n On Afghanistan, Australia can argue that it provided loyal support to a long and troubled US campaign that\u2014at the moment of our withdrawal\u2014isn’t a defeat. At great cost, the alliance emerges unscathed, even enhanced. This is a US alliance management equation that Canberra has followed with remarkable consistency through five wars since WWII\u2014Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan.<\/p>\n At the key moments of decision and commitment, Australia always seeks to go through the sliding door right behind the US, while minimising the size of the military commitment entailed. Love the alliance but always check the cost. In the wonderful phrase Coral Bell made the title of a great book, being a \u2018dependent ally<\/a>\u2019 is a complex affair full of ambivalence because of Australia\u2019s<\/p>\n \u2026persistent national addiction to a usually comfortable dependence, a conscious and even sometimes Machiavellian adoption by policy makers of the easiest and least costly way out of assumed strategic dilemmas.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Translation: embrace the alliance with passion and persistence but keep a firm hold on your wallet.<\/p>\n Coral Bell\u2019s Dependent Ally<\/em> is about to pass the 30th\u00a0birthday of its first publication, yet if you want to think about the psychology as well as the strategy that drives Australia\u2019s alliance addiction, this is a 200-page gem. It\u2019s what you always got from Coral<\/a>, combining the gentle manners of Miss Marple, a pen as fluent as Agatha Christie, and a mind as sharp as Henry Kissinger’s.<\/p>\n I thought of Coral\u2019s explanation of the alliance addiction when reading Paul Kelly\u2019s magisterial judgement<\/a> that Australia had not the slightest influence on US policy in Afghanistan, while the bipartisanship overlaid a sense of disengagement from a war far away, in distance and emotion:<\/p>\n The Afghanistan war is the latest manifestation of the Australian way of war. It means fighting in coalitions, US-led or UN-sanctioned or both, that are political decisions where Australia makes a limited contribution, hopefully worthwhile in its own domain, as part of a large war effort based on a ruthless calculation to maximise political gain and minimise national cost. This reflects Australia’s identity as an allied nation, international citizen and apostle of realpolitik. There is no sign it will change.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n The alliance addiction will endure but its terms are shifting in almost fundamental ways. As Australia heads home\u00a0<\/a>it finds the US pivoting in our direction; with all the similarities that can be drawn from Vietnam and Afghanistan, this post-war alliance effect is a huge difference between the two conflicts.<\/p>\n