Hirsh argues that AQ is moving from the 9\/11 spectacular type attacks on iconic targets to more lone wolf opportunistic strikes, like the Tsarnaev brothers at the Boston marathon. Hirsh describes how Abu Musab al-Suri (a nom de guerre<\/i> that means \u2018the Syrian\u2019) has emerged as an increasingly influential jihadist leader, and how al-Suri has long argued for lower-level attacks.<\/p>\n
In his post, Klee states that bulk data gathering won\u2019t always identify and thwart the \u2018lone wolves\u2019, with lower levels of organisation and competence. But Hirsh argues that the NSA\u2019s seemingly indiscriminate scouring of phone data and emails is \u2018precisely what intelligence officials say they need to detect the kinds of plots al-Suri favors\u2019.<\/p>\n
Hirsh cites Michael Hayden, former NSA Director, as saying these kinds of attacks will be harder to track and that the US should expect more, less lethal attacks than in the past. Hirsh also quotes Mike Rogers, chairman of the US House Intelligence Committee pointing out that AQ\u2019s capabilities for a strike in the US are more dangerous and numerous than before 9\/11. Also cited is a US government official ‘well versed in NSA practices’ who says that trying to tie specific intelligence ‘tidbits’ to specific foiled plots is too simplistic:<\/p>\n
That entirely misses the point. It doesn’t account for the reality of how intelligence works. It’s not that pods or cells are disrupted by one piece of information from one authority. It’s a complex endeavor that puts different pieces together to rule things out.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Hirsh\u2019s answer to Klee\u2019s question on the effectiveness of big data is that if we\u2019re to find the needle of al-Suri style plots, then we\u2019ll probably need the \u2018whole haystack\u2019 approach to phone and email data for some time: \u2018for better or worse, the only hope to track them all is an exceptionally deep, organized, and free-ranging intelligence apparatus\u2019.<\/p>\n
Klee’s post concluded by pointing to big data’s cost to privacy. If Hirsh\u2019s judgement is right about the need for a big data approach, then we\u2019re going to need to devote much greater efforts to developing a coherent privacy doctrine that addresses the challenges of our enhanced ability to collect, analyse and distribute personal information.<\/p>\n
Anthony Bergin is the deputy director at ASPI.<\/i><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Thanks to Ed Snowden, the whole world now knows about the NSA\u2019s surveillance capabilities. In his thoughtful and timely piece on The Strategist, Klee Aiken asks if the mass surveillance of big data really keeps …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":23,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[273,170,301,127],"class_list":["post-10829","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-general","tag-counterterrorism","tag-intelligence","tag-national-security-2","tag-terrorism"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Reader response: the risks of restraining big data | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n