Interests, values, and relative strength, however, obviously evolve over time. Canberra\u2019s anxiety level about its diplomatic quarrel with Jakarta probably partly reflects Prime Minister Abbott\u2019s assessment, before the crisis, that \u2018it probably won\u2019t be very long before Indonesia\u2019s total GDP dwarfs ours<\/a>\u2019. Other relationships are more unpredictable or prone to miscalculation and mismanagement.<\/p>\n The US National Intelligence Committee (NIC) approximates future global power<\/a> on the basis of countries\u2019 predicted GDP, population size, military spending, and technology, combined with some less obvious elements such as health, education, demography, and governance, and even intangibles of soft power sway. Among these, military muscle can occasionally still allow one party to compel another to take a particular course without a more transactional exchange but economic strength seems the key enabling ingredient for even that clout\u2014it\u2019s \u2018the foundation of national power<\/a>\u2019.<\/p>\n Caveats abound when one dusts off the crystal ball. We are warned to avoid straight-line extrapolation<\/a>, resist mistaking GDP performance for wealth<\/a> (which accumulates and ebbs in human capital, investment, and national resilience over decades); expect strategic surprises<\/a>, and generally beware predictions as a graveyard of reputations. But simple tennis-ladder rankings can provide a starting point for exploring where power lies and may be heading. And although being above the middle of a table of 200 countries \u2018isn\u2019t setting the bar very high<\/a>\u2019, looking at just the top 20 or 30 places might even begin to bring the slippery concept of middle power<\/i> into focus (click to enlarge):<\/p>\n Figure 1 compiled from Wikipedia tables<\/em><\/p>\n Looking ahead, a PricewaterhouseCoopers forecast<\/a> of the crucial economic variable projects China overtaking the US as the world\u2019s largest economy in terms of nominal GDP at market exchange rates just before 2030, and Indonesia overtaking Australia before then (click to enlarge):<\/p>\n Beside Indonesia, other regional countries, such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, may also have the potential lent by the combination of large populations and growing economies and human capital.<\/p>\n So what does this mean for Australia\u2019s future defence and security? In 2009, Hugh White<\/a> suggested that in view of the erosion of American power associated with the rise of China \u2018we cannot afford the capabilities to achieve the objectives that would help us manage emerging strategic risks at 2% of GDP\u2019 (noting we spent around 3.2% on defence during the 1950s and 60s). In 2011, Ross Babbage<\/a> argued there was a case to \u2018boost defence expenditure quite significantly\u2019 above 2%. In contrast, Paul Dibb<\/a> has just proposed the next Defence White Paper revisit the relevance of and timetable for Joint Strike Fighters, submarines, and other major components of the Defence Capability Plan, in the absence of a clear imminent threat and in view of the period of austerity we\u2019re entering.<\/p>\n I\u2019d be inclined to stick with a middle-of-the-road approach, unless China\u2019s declaration of its ADIZ<\/a> in the East China Sea marks an intent to contest rather than signal territorial claims (it\u2019s arguably already meant Japan\u2019s insistence there\u2019s no dispute looks pretty shaky<\/a>). Although nearer neighbours\u2019 growth will also make it harder, in the long term, to \u2018keep up with the Jonses<\/a>\u2019, or rather stay ahead of them via our accustomed hi-tech edge, the complexity and cost of key inputs to capability<\/a> means the gap will narrow slowly. The ADF\u2019s ability to overmatch any nearby country that tried to project power directly against us should remain sustainable<\/a>, with modest investment, for quite some time. And while economic clout provides the<\/i> central component of national power, it\u2019s still just one measure: our GDP was larger than ASEAN countries\u2019 combined<\/a> until the early 1980s but Australia\u2019s greatest post-World War II perils occurred in the early 1960s with Konfrontasi, Indonesia\u2019s acquisition of modern Soviet weapons, and its expansion into West Papua, as well as the escalation of the Vietnam conflict (resulting in the order of submarines, destroyers, and F-111s whose \u2018raison d\u2019etre<\/i> had evaporated<\/a>\u2019 by the time they entered service but which provided strategic reassurance for decades to come).<\/p>\n In this broad setting, ASPI colleagues have set out a range of cost-effective capability<\/a>, warning-time<\/a>, alliance<\/a>, and regional engagement<\/a> strategies to help maintain the ADF\u2019s edge, enmeshment with nearby militaries, and ability to conduct likely regional tasks.<\/p>\n Karl Claxton is an analyst at ASPI.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Ideas about the future lie at the heart of strategic thinking. As major capability acquisitions often take years to decide or implement, and countries are stuck with the results for decades, strategy is partly governed …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":100,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11283","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-general"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/12\/Karl-flags.jpg\")
<\/a><\/figure>\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/12\/Slide1.jpg\")
<\/a><\/figure>\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/12\/line-graph.jpg\")
<\/a>And looking beyond relative affluence alone, the NIC suggests seven \u2018tectonic shifts\u2019\u2014growing middle classes; wider access to new (including lethal\/disruptive) technologies; aging populations; demand for food and water; urbanisation; shifting economic power; and US energy independence\u2014will interact with the fiscal, demographic, military and technological drivers of national power<\/a> to shape the future:<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/12\/karl-graph.jpg\")
<\/a>Figure 4 source: National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds<\/a> report<\/em><\/p>\n