{"id":11490,"date":"2013-12-20T06:00:30","date_gmt":"2013-12-19T19:00:30","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=11490"},"modified":"2014-03-31T14:37:02","modified_gmt":"2014-03-31T03:37:02","slug":"the-abbott-strategic-trifecta-4-the-value-of-values","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-abbott-strategic-trifecta-4-the-value-of-values\/","title":{"rendered":"The Abbott strategic trifecta (4): the value of values"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n The diplomatic calendar is going to help Tony Abbott work through the current period of diplomatic pain with China. Australia is chairing the G20 and China is the APEC chair as the group celebrates its 25th<\/sup> birthday. Beijing shouldn\u2019t spend too much time beating up Canberra if it is putting energy into the theme it chose for its APEC year<\/a>: \u2018Shaping the Future through Asia-Pacific Partnership.\u2019<\/p>\n Both the G20 and the APEC chairing jobs will focus on shared economic interests, cooperation and the search for consensus. That will aid an Abbott effort to shift the spotlight from his bilateral bother with Beijing, and perhaps help the Prime Minister to do some reframing of his strategic trifecta<\/a>\u2014the alliance, interests and values that Australia shares with Japan and the US.<\/p>\n In setting out that trifecta on the East China Sea, joining values and interests in the one phrase, Abbott broke the John Howard rule that talking about interests would bring Australia and China together, while values could drive them apart. Plus, he deviated from Howard\u2019s proclamation that Australia\u2019s approach to China would, necessarily, be different from that of the US. As an example of the mantra, here’s Howard in June 1997<\/a>, in full recovery mode from the diplomatic death of a thousand cuts that Beijing had inflicted on his new government the year before:<\/p>\n I don’t disguise the fact that China is a very illiberal, undemocratic country. Of course it is but my responsibility is to look to the national interest and it’s in Australia’s national interest to build a sound relationship with China. We are a different country from the United States. We are much smaller. Symbolic gestures mean different things for different countries according to their size. I think what we have done over the last few months is build a relationship with China which is to our advantage. It is to the advantage of Australia that we have a close economic relationship. It is to the advantage of Australia that we have an honest political relationship. I haven’t gone overboard about some special relationship with China…<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Versions of that mantra marked almost every Howard comment on China (minus the illiberal bit) for the rest of his period in office. If taking his lead from Howard, Abbott would avoid running the \u2018values and interests\u2019 line for the same reason he vowed to go quiet on the Anglosphere<\/a>:<\/p>\n Whenever that term [Anglosphere] is used it tends to prompt a Pavlovian reaction and it’s best not to prompt Pavlovian reactions if you can avoid it.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Abbott\u2019s \u2018values and interests\u2019 argument betrays a certain hankering for the starkness of the Cold War, that era of odium theologicum<\/i><\/a> and the sharp hatreds of Communism confronting Capitalism.<\/p>\n The questions always multiply when that simple word \u2018values\u2019 skips onto the political and diplomatic stage. What values to value? And who belongs to the \u2018our\u2019 in our values? This is the moment when Bertrand Russell strides on from stage left to observe that there’s no nonsense so absurd that it can\u2019t be turned by government propaganda into a majority creed: \u2018I am persuaded that there is absolutely no limit to the absurdities that can, by government action, come to be generally believed\u2019. The 20th<\/sup> Century provides ample evidence of the validity of Russell\u2019s rumination on Intellectual Rubbish<\/a>.<\/p>\n This is no admonition for our leaders to eradicate discussion of values. The caution offered is about being too emphatic about making them \u2018our\u2019 values in a way that excludes a lot of other people. The exclusion point brings us to the \u2018Asian values\u2019 debate of the 1980s and 1990s.<\/p>\n The \u2018Asian values\u2019 arguments mounted by Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew<\/a> got plenty of backing from Suharto and formed a point of unusual unity between China and Vietnam. At its strongest, \u2018Asian values\u2019 formed a club that excluded Australia; Mahathir hammered away at the idea that Australia didn’t belong (in Dr M\u2019s Asian Caucus, there\u2019d be no Caucasians). Among the many things consumed by the firestorm of the Asian Financial Crisis was a lot of Asian values furniture, but Australia does well to remember when values were used to veto its regional ambitions.<\/p>\n