{"id":11865,"date":"2014-01-23T13:00:22","date_gmt":"2014-01-23T02:00:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=11865"},"modified":"2020-05-03T16:53:29","modified_gmt":"2020-05-03T06:53:29","slug":"graph-of-the-week-the-high-cost-of-high-costs","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/graph-of-the-week-the-high-cost-of-high-costs\/","title":{"rendered":"Graph of the week: the high cost of high costs"},"content":{"rendered":"
Just before Christmas, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) put out an interesting report Process over platforms: a paradigm shift in acquisition through advanced manufacturing<\/i><\/a> <\/i>(PDF) by Aaron Martin and (expat Australian) Ben FitzGerald. It looks at the potential impact on the acquisition of military capability of new and emerging technologies such as 3D printing (additive manufacturing<\/a>) and robotics.<\/p>\n The authors recommend a move towards systems that are more mission specific (less multi-role) and which have a shorter overall lifetime, to allow for more rapid technological refresh of fielded capabilities. In this they echo the views in one of my favourite papers on defence acquisition<\/a> (PDF) which argues for more R2D2 type systems and fewer Death Stars:<\/p>\n After watching the climactic battle scene in Return of the Jedi for the first time, my 8-year-old daughter said, ‘They shouldn\u2019t build those Death Stars anymore. They keep getting blown up’. She may be a little short for a stormtrooper, but the kid\u2019s got a point.<\/p>\n Yes, the Empire should stop building Death Stars. It turns out the DoD shouldn\u2019t build them either, metaphorically speaking. What sort of system fits into this category? I\u2019ll resist the urge to give specific examples and instead will simply point out that any enormous project that is brain-meltingly complex, ravenously consumes resources, and aims to deliver an Undefeatable Ultimate Weapon is well on its way to becoming a Death Star, and that\u2019s not a good thing.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n The CNAS report points out that existing advanced platforms (such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter) are extremely resource intensive to develop and produce. This not only makes them expensive to procure, but it means that it can take years for a single item to move from initial parts fabrication to final assembly, which limits the ability of the United States to rapidly boost its numbers in the field.\u00a0 It also has the effect of making any sort of ‘war of attrition’ deeply unappealing.<\/p>\n We’ve had a number of posts here on the Strategist about the decline in the size<\/a> and the ageing of<\/a> the USAF inventory. Both of those issues have important implications for the future of western air power. That’ll be especially true as the technological advantages on which it’s currently based erode\u2014a process that’s already underway and which can only be exacerbated by keeping platforms in inventory longer.<\/p>\n But the problem also exists for sea power. Analysts have started to worry<\/a> about the impact of the higher than expected (though not by everyone<\/a>) cost of the new Ford class carriers on America’s ability to maintain the size of its overall fleet. Aircraft carriers have proven to be a tremendously powerful and versatile tool of hard power for more than half a century (even if other CNAS researchers worry that they might be looking a bit more like Death Stars<\/a> these days). But if they become unsustainably expensive to acquire and operate, the net benefit won’t be there.<\/p>\n