{"id":12300,"date":"2014-02-17T14:15:31","date_gmt":"2014-02-17T03:15:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=12300"},"modified":"2014-02-18T07:59:59","modified_gmt":"2014-02-17T20:59:59","slug":"sacre-bleu-lalliance-essentielle","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sacre-bleu-lalliance-essentielle\/","title":{"rendered":"Sacr\u00e9 bleu! L’alliance essentielle?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n At the end of January, ASPI hosted a 1.5 track defence and industry dialogue between Australian and French defence officials and think-tank and industry representatives. Why France and why now? Only the most one-eyed of Australia’s ‘Asia only’ foreign policy Red Guard could have failed to notice France’s remarkable re-emergence as a global strategic player. On Syria, France’s socialist President Fran\u00e7ois Hollande out-muscled wobbly Washington and would have been prepared to launch strikes<\/a> after Assad’s chemical weapons atrocities. France was a leading force in NATO’s action in Libya; intervened decisively in Mali<\/a> (with a little help from Entente Frugale ally Britain); has resisted cutting defence capabilities too deeply, and is looking to build closer strategic ties with a slew of countries, from India and Japan to China.<\/p>\n In the Pacific, France’s position has gone full circle from the unhappy nuclear-testing, insurgency fighting 1980s to a point where the French territories are now the model of stability and the envy of the region. France is a net contributor to Pacific Island security and one of very few countries prepared to do more to support more regional cooperation.<\/p>\n In many respects French defence policy showcases what Australia would like more of: highly capable deployable forces and a willingness to use them; a shrinking but sustainable industry base; growing credibility and respect in Washington and bipartisan popular support for a strong military. France has more than its share of economic woes, but in terms of strategic policy settings it has a good hand. That’s a good basis to think about closer cooperation with Australia.<\/p>\n In 2013 both countries produced defence white papers. (France’s is here<\/a>.) We’re among a relatively small group of countries that take these policy statements seriously (more or less). It’s interesting to note the similarities and differences between the two statements. Both papers start with the proposition that neither Australia nor France faces a credible external conventional threat, but both judge that the wider strategic environment is less stable, becoming more competitive and that the level of risk is rising. Both white papers see the Indian Ocean region as becoming of greater strategic interest, identify a higher priority for cyber security, stress a stronger national security framework for defence and identify the need for savings and reform. At base the white papers set out a similar concept for the use of military forces which are joint, deployable and able to operate at a range of conflict levels on their own, although there are differences of scale in the size of forces planned for deployment.<\/p>\n As for differences, the French White Paper has a much sharper focus on Africa and the Middle East\u2014geography still matters. Arguably it has a more mature assessment of China: it worries about the growth of ‘aggressive nationalism’ and has a more candid assessment of Chinese strengths and weaknesses than one reads in the Australian White Paper. On cyber security, the French paper put more emphasis on cyber within its defence framework, whereas Australia’s 2013 paper took tentative steps in the opposite direction by renaming the Defence Signals Directorate<\/i> the Australian Signals Directorate<\/i>.<\/p>\n