{"id":12395,"date":"2014-02-21T06:00:30","date_gmt":"2014-02-20T19:00:30","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=12395"},"modified":"2014-02-24T10:20:41","modified_gmt":"2014-02-23T23:20:41","slug":"chinas-sea-lines-of-communication-implications-for-the-south-pacific","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-sea-lines-of-communication-implications-for-the-south-pacific\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s sea lines of communication\u2014implications for the South Pacific?"},"content":{"rendered":"

As commentators continue to assess the significance<\/a> of the Chinese Navy\u2019s recent \u2018Christmas Island cruise<\/a>\u2019, a sub-strand of anxiety focuses on Beijing\u2019s growing influence in the South Pacific.<\/p>\n

The NZ Herald<\/a>, for example, worries that China\u2019s development and expansion of ports in Tonga and PNG gives it unprecedented presence in our neighbourhood. That concern appears to partly reflect a far-from-mainstream view<\/a> that Beijing wants to establish a second \u2018string of pearls\u2019, this time across the Pacific Islands, in order to complement the seemingly more tangible network of military and commercial facilities<\/a> along its crucial Indo-Pacific energy sea lines of communication. Still, the ever-sober Radio National\u2019s<\/a> attention to the implications of the Chinese exercise for the Pacific suggests the topic deserves a look.<\/p>\n

Last May, I suggested Jenny Hayward-Jones\u2019 Lowy paper Big Enough for All of Us: Geo-Strategic Competition in the Pacific Islands<\/a> would become the essential starting point for any following survey of what China\u2019s increasing diplomatic reach and economic clout may mean for the region.\u00a0The PLA-N steaming three vessels through the Sunda and Lombok Straits, conducting standard military training in international waters (they\u2019d seemed more provocative in disputed parts of the South China Sea earlier in the cruise<\/a>), or developing capabilities commensurate with China\u2019s stake in global maritime security doesn\u2019t change my view of what Beijing\u2019s up to near its own shores.\u00a0I still think Jenny\u2019s right to say China doesn\u2019t have aggressive designs in the South Pacific, but from a strategic perspective, I think that\u2019s rather beside the point<\/a>: its growing local presence and clout can complicate our interests even it doesn\u2019t try, or even want, to supersede us. The Christmas Island cruise illustrates that point.<\/p>\n

David Wroe got a bit carried away in the Fairfax press, describing the three vessels as a \u2018flotilla<\/a>\u2019, referring to an earlier sortie \u2018breaching\u2019 the first island chain when no-one was trying to contain it, and suggesting a Chinese naval drill has never come so close to Australia. The RAN and PLA-N conduct joint passage exercises and modest confidence building activities when Chinese vessels visit Australian and NZ ports. But he\u2019s right on the mark to suggest that the voyage crystallises \u2018Australia\u2019s new defence reality\u2019 of Beijing\u2019s growing military might. Foreign Minister Bishop also recognised we\u2019re in a \u2018very different world<\/a>\u2019 with a \u2018changing landscape\u2019. Hugh White argues that response suggests she\u2019s \u2018got the message\u2019 from Beijing, and that it\u2019s possible she\u2019s pulling her diplomatic punches. But it\u2019s just as likely she sees a qualitative difference between a voyage carried out under accepted norms and the aggressive way Beijing announced its ADIZ, which she protested.<\/p>\n

Should we, then, worry that Chinese involvement in major South Pacific transport infrastructure is intended to provide a strategic \u2018foothold<\/a>\u2019? The evidence suggests not. The most obvious candidate for concern would be the quarter of a billion dollar major redevelopment of Lae Port<\/a> by the state-owned China Harbour Engineering Company in PNG\u2019s economically critical city and the gateway to the populous highlands. But as Hayward-Jones shows, such investment and work tends to be driven by individual provinces or state owned companies intended first and foremost to make profits and deliver jobs for Chinese workers<\/a> rather than systematically advance China\u2019s strategic interests. (In Lae Port\u2019s case, the project has mainly been funded by the Asian Development Bank<\/a>, with the PNG Government providing additional funds and significant oversight.)<\/p>\n

China\u2019s aims are no doubt complex, aren\u2019t easily divined, and could obviously change. But a look at the map shows the port project a long way east of China\u2019s crucial energy and major trade routes or supposed \u2018string of pearls\u2019 facilities. The port also sits well inside a region that still contains a large, permanent and scalable US, Australian, NZ and French military presence, and where many host governments have longstanding close security partnerships<\/a> with those \u2018traditional\u2019 powers.<\/p>\n

\"Chinese<\/a><\/p>\n

But strategists sometimes worry less about intent<\/i> and more about capability<\/i>. So, even if we conclude that activities such as major infrastructure projects are conducted for mainly commercial reasons, what might the Christmas Island cruise say about Beijing\u2019s capability to project military power into the South Pacific? In most senses, not much we didn\u2019t already know, though the voyage brings China\u2019s capacity into sharper focus. To keep things in perspective, the new Type 71<\/a> amphibious ship at the centre of the exercise, the Changbai Shan<\/i>, is nearly a third smaller than the LHDs we\u2019re acquiring. And as White reminds us<\/a>, \u2018what navies can do in peacetime is a poor guide to what they could do in a war\u2019. But Beijing intends to commission six or more of the class and build more capable vessels in the future, while the Type 71s have a potent reach for contingencies short of war between major powers\u2014not what we\u2019re really worried about in the South Pacific\u2014carrying a battalion of Marines, four large transport helicopters, and medium assault craft.<\/p>\n

So while there\u2019s no need to hyperventilate, China\u2019s growing reach does complicate our strategic calculus. Scenarios that seemed outlandish a few years ago, such as the PLA evacuating\u00a0 its nationals if they were targeted in civil strife, while still unlikely, no longer seem so far-fetched and will soon be technically feasible. We\u2019d rescue our own people if we had to. But what would we do if a friendly country in crisis sought our help to prevent a Chinese military led evacuation they weren\u2019t comfortable with? And how would we react if Beijing sortied a real flotilla into the region to signal it was unhappy with us?<\/p>\n

To avoid having to answer such questions, we need to further lift our game, harnessing all our trade, aid, security, and other instruments of national power, as well as our relationships with regional countries, to prevent friction arising in the first place.<\/p>\n

Karl Claxton is an analyst at ASPI.<\/em> Map (c) ASPI 2014.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n
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As commentators continue to assess the significance of the Chinese Navy\u2019s recent \u2018Christmas Island cruise\u2019, a sub-strand of anxiety focuses on Beijing\u2019s growing influence in the South Pacific. 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