{"id":12548,"date":"2014-03-03T06:00:18","date_gmt":"2014-03-02T19:00:18","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=12548"},"modified":"2014-03-06T10:26:10","modified_gmt":"2014-03-05T23:26:10","slug":"chinas-rise-the-strategic-climate-is-getting-colder","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-rise-the-strategic-climate-is-getting-colder\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s rise: the strategic climate is getting colder"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Colder<\/a><\/figure>\n

Last week I spoke at a conference on \u2018Peace and Security in East Asia\u2019 in Taipei, jointly organised by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Chengchi University. The main topic discussed was China\u2019s announcement<\/a> in November last year of the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over parts of the East China Sea. My speech focused on the strategic implications of the ADIZ for regional stability and on possible responses. As I’ve argued here<\/a> on The Strategist<\/i>, the ADIZ adds fuel to an already volatile security situation. And the conference reinforced my impression that China\u2019s rise is leading us to a colder strategic climate in East Asia, and possibly Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n

There are three particularly worrying, interrelated trends. Firstly, China appears to have abandoned its foreign policy doctrine of a \u2018peaceful rise\u2019. Instead, the ADIZ can be regarded as just one element in a larger strategy of trying to assert sovereignty in the East China Sea and vast parts of the South China Sea, as reflected in Beijing\u2019s ‘nine-dashed line’.<\/p>\n

Since declaring the ADIZ, China hasn’t stood still. It has imposed new ‘access rules’<\/a> for foreign vessels in disputed maritime zones in the South China Sea\u2014a move heavily criticised by the other claimant states, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines, as well as the US. Beijing also moved to establish permanent military structures in the Scarborough Shoal, an area also claimed by the Philippines. Finally, there are signs<\/a> that Beijing plans to set up an ADIZ in the South China Sea, which would seem logical from a Chinese military point of view as a means to extending air cover for the Navy\u2019s growing operational radius in these waters. But it would also deeply rattle most Southeast Asian nations.<\/p>\n

Secondly, Sino-Japanese strategic relations have reached a new low. The Senkaku\/Diaoyu Island dispute has become almost a structural impediment to meaningful dialogue between the two nations, fuelled by growing nationalism on both sides. While the problem of Chinese nationalism<\/a> has long been recognised by international scholars, a participant at the conference made the interesting observation that Japan\u2019s new National Security Strategy<\/a> can also be seen as a tool to create a ‘crisis mentality’ amongst the Japanese population about China\u2019s strategic challenge. In the face of competitive nationalism, Sino-Japanese rivalry<\/a> is becoming increasingly harder to manage.<\/p>\n

Thirdly, China\u2019s increasing push to test established international norms when it comes to solving territorial disputes as well as its willingness to challenge the regional order creates a dilemma for the United States. Washington finds it more and more difficult to reconcile the two key pillars of its Asia-Pacific grand strategy: stable US\u2013China\u00a0relations on the one hand, and reassuring allies and partners about the credibility of American deterrence in the face of China\u2019s \u2018creeping expansionism\u2019. American analysts warn<\/a> that this precarious balance will become increasingly harder to sustain. In short, Washington is required to signal stronger resolve to deal with China\u2019s intimidation of its neighbours.<\/p>\n

Indeed, in recent months the US has stepped up the rhetoric in combination with some limited action to send a message to Beijing and the region. Washington has<\/p>\n