{"id":13199,"date":"2014-04-04T14:00:39","date_gmt":"2014-04-04T03:00:39","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=13199"},"modified":"2014-04-07T13:09:42","modified_gmt":"2014-04-07T03:09:42","slug":"why-there-is-no-new-maritime-dispute-between-indonesia-and-china","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/why-there-is-no-new-maritime-dispute-between-indonesia-and-china\/","title":{"rendered":"Why there is no \u2018new maritime dispute\u2019 between Indonesia and China"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n In the last two weeks, there have been a number of articles circulating (including here<\/a>, here<\/a>, here<\/a> and here<\/a>) that Indonesia has formally recognised a territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea.<\/p>\n This discussion has originated from statements (see here<\/a>, and here<\/a> for example) attributed to Indonesian Navy Commodore Fahru Zaini, an assistant to the first deputy of the\u00a0Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and\u00a0Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam<\/em>):<\/p>\n China has claimed Natuna waters as their territorial waters. This arbitrary claim is related to the dispute over Spratly and Paracel Islands between China and the Philippines. This dispute will have a large impact on the security of Natuna waters.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Commodore Zaini is also quoted as saying \u2018\u2026we have come to Natuna to see firsthand the strategic position of the TNI, especially in its ability, strength and its deployment of troops, just in case anything should happen in this region\u2019.<\/p>\n This might give the overall impression that Indonesia\u2019s defence modernisation and deployment plans are driven by China\u2019s recent assertiveness in the South China Sea, and that now Jakarta has officially staked out its policy to challenge Beijing.<\/p>\n This impression is false for several reasons.<\/p>\n First, officially, there\u2019s\u00a0no\u00a0maritime \u2018dispute\u2019 between Indonesia and China. Following the statement by Commodore Zaini,\u00a0Indonesian foreign ministry spokesman Michael Tene\u00a0said<\/a>\u00a0that \u2018Indonesia has no maritime border with China\u2019 and that Indonesia isn\u2019t a claimant state to the South China Sea dispute. Indeed, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa clarified\u00a0<\/a>further on\u00a0March 19,<\/p>\n We have to be absolutely clear about this\u2026There are three seemingly related but separate issues. Firstly, there is no territorial dispute between Indonesia and China,\u00a0especially about\u00a0the Natunas. In fact, we are cooperating with China in possibly bringing about foreign direct investment plans in the Natunas. Second, we are not a claimant state in the South China Sea. Third, on the nine-dash line,\u00a0it is true that we do not accept that. This is why we have asked for a formal explanation from China\u00a0regarding their claims\u2019 legal basis and background.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n This policy is of course not new.\u00a0Jakarta lodged a complaint with the UN in 2010 regarding the nine-dash line. In fact,\u00a0Indonesia has consistently argued for the importance of the Natunas and how it should handle the South China Sea since the mid-1990s. I\u2019ve described Jakarta\u2019s key interests in the Natunas elsewhere<\/a>. Daniel Novotny\u2019s\u00a0book<\/a>\u00a0also has a long list of quotations from various Indonesian policymakers since the 1990s that basically echoed\u00a0Commodore Zaini\u2019s sentiments: Indonesia is concerned that the Natunas and its EEZs could be endangered by China\u2019s nine-dash line, but it will never officially admit a dispute with China because that would give credence to Beijing\u2019s claims. Former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas perhaps said it best, \u2018the repetition of an untruth will eventually make it appear as truth\u2019.<\/p>\n We can debate the merits of this position, but ultimately, there\u2019s no significant policy shift on the matter. I would add a caveat however that the status quo between China and Indonesia over the Natunas might remain until the day Beijing publicly challenges Indonesia\u2019s rights to explore the natural resources within the Natunas and its EEZs.<\/p>\n Second, on the military build-up, the Natunas area has been a central feature in Indonesia\u2019s external defence thinking since the 1990s. The largest ever\u00a0tri-service military exercise under Suharto\u2019s tenure in 1996 was based on a scenario in the Natuna islands. This has been the pattern for subsequent exercises since; though there\u2019s an additional \u2018Ambalat component\u2019 to it recently.<\/p>\n The statements that the TNI leadership has been making lately about \u2018flashpoint defense\u2019 and how its latest military assets would be deployed in the Natunas should be taken with a grain of salt.<\/p>\n For one thing, the \u2018flashpoint defense\u2019 (and the role of the Natunas in it) and the military modernisation plans have been on the books since the mid-2000s and publicly described<\/a> in 2010.<\/p>\n For another, the procurement of advanced platforms like the Sukhois and Leopard\u00a0MBTs and others is part of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) concept that has\u00a0been around since mid-2000s. The MEF was\u00a0designed less for a China threat and more for an organisational and technological revamp and to meet existing operational requirements. The urgency becomes salient when we consider that the TNI lost numerous men due to accidents and platform decay in the past decade.<\/p>\n Indonesia isn\u2019t <\/strong>building up its military power against a resurgent China, but the current political climate does provide the TNI leadership with\u00a0the opportunity to further push for their pre-existing plans and to deflect criticisms from civil society activists arguing against expensive weaponry.<\/p>\n Finally, we can speculate whether Commodore Zaini was speaking for the Indonesian government. The clarification from the Foreign Ministry, however, suggests he wasn\u2019t. Does this mean Commodore Zaini was speaking for the TNI? One of my contacts close with the\u00a0defence establishment\u00a0in Jakarta suggests that wasn\u2019t the case either. There haven\u2019t been any significant changes or plans made regarding the Natunas and the South China Sea at TNI headquarters.<\/p>\n We should also consider the fact that the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs isn\u2019t a decision making body like the Ministry of Defense. They coordinate policies, they don\u2019t formally make them.<\/p>\n Why Commodore Zaini\u00a0made the arguments\u00a0isn\u2019t clear. What is clear, I think, is: (1) he wasn\u2019t authoritatively tasked with announcing a major policy shift (nor is there actually a policy shift), and (2) he was merely echoing long-held Indonesian policy sentiments.<\/p>\n For these reasons, I think the articles that have suggested an official policy change from Indonesia on the Natuna Islands and South China Sea\u00a0may have\u00a0taken things out of their proper context.<\/p>\n Evan A. Laksmana is currently a Fulbright Presidential PhD Scholar in political science with the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. He is also a researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta. Image courtesy of\u00a0Wikipedia<\/a>.<\/em><\/em><\/p>\n
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