{"id":13522,"date":"2014-04-24T06:00:33","date_gmt":"2014-04-23T20:00:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=13522"},"modified":"2014-04-29T08:58:53","modified_gmt":"2014-04-28T22:58:53","slug":"chinas-emerging-undersea-capability-and-the-implications-for-australias-future-submarine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-emerging-undersea-capability-and-the-implications-for-australias-future-submarine\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s emerging undersea capability and the implications for Australia\u2019s future submarine"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"KINGS<\/a>At ASPI\u2019s recent Submarine Conference<\/a> the strategic rationale for Australia\u2019s Future Submarine (FSM) was only lightly discussed. Presenters stated that the FSM worked best as an \u2018offensive platform\u2019 and \u2018up threat\u2019. But that issue deserves a more detailed debate: it\u2019s central to answering the question about what we want the submarines to do. A hidden assumption of the 2009 Defence White Paper, which provided the vision for 12 new and large diesel-electric submarines, was that the boats would be able to operate for extended periods as far away as Northeast Asia, including off the Chinese mainland. Some analysts, including here<\/a> on The Strategist<\/i>, support such a view.<\/p>\n

But the future undersea environment off the Chinese coast will be markedly different from what it is today. A key reason for that is China\u2019s emerging submarine and anti-submarine (ASW) capability. To be sure, the current undersea balance between the US and China is still very much in favour of our major ally.<\/a> Beijing is catching up though, and by the time Australia\u2019s new generation of submarines goes to sea that balance might have shifted. As a recent report<\/a> by the US Congressional Research Service points out, while China\u2019s current submarine force is now quantitatively smaller than it was in 1990, it has \u2018greater aggregate capability than it did in 1990, because larger numbers of older, obsolescent boats have been replaced by smaller numbers of more modern and more capable boats\u2019.<\/p>\n

A staff report for the US\u2013China Economic and Security Review Commission<\/a> puts the trend towards a more formidable Chinese submarine fleet by 2020 into a table:<\/p>\n

China\u2019s Submarine Fleet, 1990\u20132020<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Type<\/b><\/td>\n1990<\/b><\/td>\n1995<\/b><\/td>\n2000<\/b><\/td>\n2005<\/b><\/td>\n2010<\/b><\/td>\n2015<\/b><\/td>\n2020<\/b><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Diesel Attack<\/b><\/td>\n88<\/td>\n43<\/td>\n60<\/td>\n51<\/td>\n54<\/td>\n57-62<\/td>\n59-64<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Nuclear Attack (SSN)<\/b><\/td>\n4<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n6-8<\/td>\n6-9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Nuclear Ballistic<\/b>(SSBN)<\/b><\/td>\n1<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n1<\/td>\n2<\/td>\n3<\/td>\n3-5<\/td>\n4-5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Total<\/b><\/td>\n93<\/td>\n49<\/td>\n66<\/td>\n59<\/td>\n63<\/td>\n66-75<\/td>\n69-78<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

The report also notes the ongoing modernisation of the fleet, defining \u2018modern\u2019 submarines as those able to launch ballistic missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).<\/p>\n

China\u2019s Submarine Fleet, 1990\u20132020, approximate percent \u2018modern\u2019<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n
Type<\/b><\/td>\n1990<\/b><\/td>\n1995<\/b><\/td>\n2000<\/b><\/td>\n2005<\/b><\/td>\n2010<\/b><\/td>\n2015<\/b><\/td>\n2020<\/b><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Diesel Attack<\/b><\/td>\n0%<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\n7%<\/td>\n40%<\/td>\n50%<\/td>\n70%<\/td>\n75%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Nuclear Attack<\/b><\/td>\n0%<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\n0%<\/td>\n33%<\/td>\n33%<\/td>\n70%<\/td>\n100%<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

That assessment is underlined by recent Congressional testimony from the US Navy\u2019s Office of Naval Intelligence<\/a> (ONI). The ONI also expects that by 2020 the \u2018vast majority\u2019 of China\u2019s submarine force will be armed with \u2018advanced, long-range ASCMs\u2019. Moreover, apart from the possibility that a new Type 095 SSN could be equipped with a land-attack capability, the testimony reiterates the Pentagon\u2019s expectation that the JIN-class SSBN will become operational in 2014, marking \u2018China\u2019s first credible at-sea second-strike nuclear capability\u2019 against the continental US, Hawaii and Guam. Should the Chinese Navy (PLAN) increase its JIN-class boats from three to five it could sustain a continuous SSBN presence in the Western Pacific or the Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n

Finally, the PLAN has started to address more seriously its notorious shortfalls in ASW capability. For example, a recent article<\/a> in the US Naval Institute\u2019s Proceedings Magazine (subscribers only) analyses China\u2019s deployment of a fixed ocean-floor acoustic network off its coast to monitor foreign submarine activities in its \u2018Near Seas\u2019. While the authors note that it\u2019s not yet clear to what degree the \u2018generally weak\u2019 Chinese ASW capability will benefit from that network, they also stress that the PLAN is undoubtedly putting more effort into strengthening its ASW capabilities. As my colleague Andrew Davies points out<\/a>, major advances in ASW could greatly complicate Australia\u2019s future submarine operations close to China\u2019s shore.<\/p>\n

Of course, it\u2019ll take time for the PLAN to turn its new platforms into actual capabilities. For instance, as I\u2019ve discussed elsewhere<\/a>, effective command and control in SSBN operations will be a major challenge. But two decades from now the PLAN will be more proficient in undersea warfare as well as ASW. This will not only increase the detection risk for Australian submarines. As well, the undersea land-attack options canvassed in the 2009 Defence White Paper will become even more questionable. And while China\u2019s \u2018Near Seas\u2019<\/a> will remain the primary operational focus of the PLAN for the time being, Chinese submarines will increasingly patrol in waters close to Australia\u2014requiring attention of the ADF\u2019s ASW capabilities, including submarines.<\/p>\n

We might be thus better off leaving the increasingly crowded undersea space off the Chinese mainland to our US ally whose nuclear submarines (like the USS Maryland, pictured) are faster and better armed. Moreover, expect non-nuclear submarines of partner nations like Japan, South Korea or Vietnam to also operate in this space given their geographic proximity to China. As Peter Jennings <\/a>argued at our conference, Australia should consider adopting a more modest assessment as to how far \u2018up threat\u2019 our submarines should operate in the future. In my view, this implies a focus on operations in the Eastern Indian Ocean and maritime chokepoints in the Indonesian archipelago. While this could mean fewer and smaller boats, they would still make critical contributions to Australia\u2019s security and to allied operations by posing a credible threat to hostile surface and subsurface systems.<\/p>\n

Benjamin Schreer is a senior analyst at ASPI. Image courtesy of Department of Defence.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

At ASPI\u2019s recent Submarine Conference the strategic rationale for Australia\u2019s Future Submarine (FSM) was only lightly discussed. Presenters stated that the FSM worked best as an \u2018offensive platform\u2019 and \u2018up threat\u2019. But that issue deserves …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":41,"featured_media":13528,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[465],"tags":[788,52,130,223],"class_list":["post-13522","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-submarine-choice","tag-anti-submarine-warfare","tag-china","tag-naval-capabilities","tag-submarines"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nChina\u2019s emerging undersea capability and the implications for Australia\u2019s future submarine | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-emerging-undersea-capability-and-the-implications-for-australias-future-submarine\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"China\u2019s emerging undersea capability and the implications for Australia\u2019s future submarine | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"At ASPI\u2019s recent Submarine Conference the strategic rationale for Australia\u2019s Future Submarine (FSM) was only lightly discussed. 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