{"id":13737,"date":"2014-05-08T14:30:22","date_gmt":"2014-05-08T04:30:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=13737"},"modified":"2014-05-09T09:15:03","modified_gmt":"2014-05-08T23:15:03","slug":"is-dfat-doing-more-strategy-than-we-think","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/is-dfat-doing-more-strategy-than-we-think\/","title":{"rendered":"Is DFAT doing more strategy than we think?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n In asking why Australia\u2019s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade doesn\u2019t do strategy, Peter Jennings has posed<\/a> an important question. But the question begs at least two assumptions. The first is that the government agency responsible for Australian diplomacy isn\u2019t in fact already doing strategy. The second is that we know what it looks like when strategy is being done. Those two assumptions are related\u2014and problematic.<\/p>\n To know why this is the case it\u2019s necessary to get to the heart of the ASPI Executive Director\u2019s logic for the significant question he\u2019s posing. He tells us that DFAT isn\u2019t doing strategy because it lacks the interest and capacity for \u2018strategic planning\u2019. It doesn\u2019t see \u2018long-term planning as routine business\u2019, and it\u2019s \u2018disinclined to commit big planning frameworks to paper\u2019. You can see the common theme here. Strategy is synonymous with planning, especially the long-term, big-picture, formally-documented variety.<\/span><\/p>\n This planning view of strategy is then contrasted by Jennings with the non-strategic work he sees diplomats doing. Strategy isn\u2019t \u2018the intelligent management of events\u2019 which \u2018produces good crisis managers, but poor long-term planners\u2019. Strategy is more likely to be found in Departments of Defence whose managers are confronted with \u2018long-term investment decisions\u2019 (i.e. in relation to big military capabilities) rather than with the \u2018short term contracting arrangements\u2019 that running an aid program requires.<\/span><\/p>\n It\u2019s true that many people and organisations view strategy in this way. But almost all the worthwhile literature on strategy that I\u2019m aware of makes the point that strategy and planning aren\u2019t nearly as synonymous as Jennings suggests. For example, under the provocative sub-heading \u2018<\/span>Why a Strategy is Not a Plan<\/a>\u2019, <\/span>The Economist<\/i> recently offered a review of by far the most magisterial of those writings: Lawrence Freedman\u2019s <\/span>Strategy: A History<\/a><\/i>. On page 611 of that major work, Freedman concludes that:<\/span><\/p>\n what turns something that is not quite strategy into strategy is a sense of actual or imminent instability, a changing context that induces a sense of conflict. Strategy therefore starts with an existing state of affairs and only gains meaning by an awareness of how, for better or worse, it could be different. This view is quite different from those that assume strategy must be about reaching some prior objective. It may well be concerned with coping with some dire crisis or preventing further deterioration in an already stressful situation. So the first requirement must be one of survival. This is why as a practical matter strategy is best understood modestly, as moving to the \u201cnext stage\u201d rather than to a definitive and permanent conclusion.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n That means there\u2019s probably a good deal more strategy going on in DFAT than we might first think. It\u2019s an organisation that has to deal with Australia\u2019s overseas partners and its potential competitors, and that\u2019s precisely where issues of conflict often present themselves. Rather than being found in the lofty words of a Foreign Policy White Paper, strategy may be present in a richer sense in the small unseen adjustment to one of Australia\u2019s external relationships. Jennings himself offers some support for that idea with his comment that \u2018the business of diplomacy must involve quick reactions to events that evolve outside of Australia\u2019s control\u2019. But that\u2019s not, as he suggests, a reason why strategy isn\u2019t being done. It\u2019s probably a sign that it is.<\/span><\/p>\n Strategy therefore becomes more of a state of mind than a formal process. Its necessary resources are intellectual more than material. Good strategy can be done with what appear to be slim resources. As <\/span>F.L.W Wood\u2019s wonderful study<\/a> shows, a great deal of valuable diplomatic strategy was done by New Zealand\u2019s government during the Second World War with the help of one major adviser (C.A. Berendsen), a tiny Department of External Affairs (established in 1943) and just a couple of overseas posts. A larger DFAT and a bigger overseas network won\u2019t necessarily result in better strategy.<\/span><\/p>\n Does that mean nothing should change? Of course not. Like their counterparts around the world, Australia\u2019s diplomats spend too much of their days on events management and logistics. It\u2019s not good for strategic thinking when the only diplomatic conflict being worried about is the one in the diary of the next visiting delegation. But long-term planning isn\u2019t the recipe for strategy in the diplomatic arena (or any other). What\u2019s needed is something far less tangible but much more critical: the encouragement of a specific intellectual climate. That\u2019s one where both short and long-term events in Australia\u2019s overseas relations are being consciously connected to a sharp appreciation of Australia\u2019s interests, and where that appreciation is kept in mind as both big choices and the smallest of adjustments are being made.<\/span><\/p>\n Robert Ayson is professor of strategic studies at Victoria University of Wellington. Image courtesy of DFAT<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" In asking why Australia\u2019s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade doesn\u2019t do strategy, Peter Jennings has posed an important question. But the question begs at least two assumptions. The first is that the government agency …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":25,"featured_media":13738,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[477],"tags":[89,21],"class_list":["post-13737","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-strategy","tag-dfat","tag-strategy-2"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n