{"id":13933,"date":"2014-05-21T06:00:03","date_gmt":"2014-05-20T20:00:03","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=13933"},"modified":"2019-07-18T17:04:25","modified_gmt":"2019-07-18T07:04:25","slug":"will-indonesias-new-president-reshape-its-future-strategic-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/will-indonesias-new-president-reshape-its-future-strategic-policy\/","title":{"rendered":"Will Indonesia\u2019s new president reshape its future strategic policy?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n As Indonesia prepares for the presidential election in July, one of the big questions concerns defence and security: in particular, to what extent will Indonesia\u2019s new president reshape Indonesia\u2019s future strategic policy? Here, I\u2019m not going to debate what \u2018strategy<\/a>\u2019 or \u2018strategic policy<\/a>\u2019 [PDF] is. Rather, I want to provide an answer to the question outlined above. Drawing from Kenneth Waltz\u2019s<\/a> theoretical analysis, I\u2019ll explore those factors shaping Indonesian strategic thinking at the international, regional, national, sub-national (domestic), and individual (personal) levels.<\/p>\n At the international level, the big question is obviously where Indonesia stands in relation to the more intense geopolitical competition unfolding between China and the US\u2014with China potentially drawing increased support from Russia and US allies supporting its rebalancing to Asia. While Washington has consistently said that its rebalancing strategy is anything<\/a> but containment<\/a>, China is increasingly sceptical<\/a> about such claims. Caught in between, Indonesia seems to know better what it stands against than what it stands for.<\/p>\n For instance, Jakarta\u2019s initial reaction to the announcement of the US Marines deployment in Darwin was revealing\u2014suspicious<\/a> at best and conspiratorial<\/a> at worst. But it\u2019s also worried<\/a> that China might be bent on changing the status quo and undermining America\u2019s stabilising presence in the region. While \u2018hedging<\/a>\u2019 can aptly describe such an attitude, it seems at the moment Indonesia is more intent on dodging a critical strategic question<\/a> that it must answer sooner rather than later.<\/p>\n In its hedging strategy<\/a> [PDF], Jakarta puts a lot of diplomatic (and emotional) investment into ASEAN at the regional level. It sees the grouping as a cushion<\/a> against the potentially bruising impact of major power competition. The ASEAN-centric architecture has evolved into three supra-regional institutions (the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers\u2019 Meeting Plus), each expected to tie the major powers into regional norms and institution-building efforts, and mitigate their predatory power-politics behaviours. The goal isn\u2019t to avoid competition\u2014some is inevitable\u2014but to prevent competition sliding into conflict.<\/p>\n But, has that approach been successful? One measure of success is ASEAN\u2019s unity and centrality<\/a>, with Indonesia at its bedrock. ASEAN has been the \u2018cornerstone<\/a>\u2019 of Indonesia\u2019s foreign policy and will remain so. But the importance Jakarta accords to ASEAN is nuanced<\/a> from time to time. And the utility of ASEAN to further Indonesia\u2019s regional interests has its limits, as demonstrated in the 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting<\/a>. Moreover, ASEAN hasn\u2019t really succeeded in diluting escalating major power rivalries in Asia. And Indonesia itself, well on its way to becoming a major power<\/a>, might be surreptitiously engaged in a strategic competition that it has been trying to avoid.<\/p>\n A growing regional profile means little, however, if it doesn\u2019t align with Indonesia\u2019s national interests at the national level. The history of Indonesia\u2019s use of force beyond its national borders from Konfrontasi<\/i> to East Timor has demonstrated that regionalism doesn\u2019t trump nationalism and national interests. Growing concerns over its increasingly unstable strategic environment led Jakarta to come up with unilateral initiatives, such as the concept of dynamic equilibrium<\/a> and the Indo-Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation<\/a> [PDF]. At the heart of the matter are the South China Sea disputes. While those are largely confined to Indonesia\u2019s far north<\/a>, they\u2019ve prodded Indonesia to become more diplomatically<\/a> and militarily<\/a> assertive.<\/p>\n Seen in this light, a critical question is whether Indonesia would abandon the non-alignment stance<\/a> as embodied in its free and active (bebas aktif<\/i>) foreign policy. Growing competition between major powers could undermine Indonesia\u2019s non-alignment stance. But being strictly non-aligned<\/a> [PDF] wouldn\u2019t be in Indonesia\u2019s best interest either. Interestingly, bebas aktif<\/a><\/i> can be defined more loosely and flexibly. While a formal alliance is absolutely out of the question, anything short of it is possible. That allows Indonesia to build a set of bilateral defence and military relationships with partner countries that differ in both quantity and quality, as best suits Indonesia\u2019s interests.<\/p>\n The manoeuvring room in constructing those relationships isn\u2019t great, not least because it\u2019s contingent upon factors at the sub-national or domestic level. In democracies, all politics, including international politics, is domestic<\/a>. Democracy allows more voices from within Indonesia to be heard, with nationalism<\/a> and Islam<\/a> being two dominant ones. As can be seen from Indonesia\u2019s recent election campaigns, both are laden with anti-Western sentiment, which militates against<\/a> Indonesia\u2019s becoming too close to the West. That factor is sometimes aggravated by intense bureaucratic politics and turf battles. The TNI and the Foreign and Defence Ministries harbour different views<\/a> on Indonesia\u2019s strategic policy, which may or may not be bridged.<\/p>\n