{"id":14027,"date":"2014-05-26T06:00:45","date_gmt":"2014-05-25T20:00:45","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=14027"},"modified":"2014-05-29T06:23:32","modified_gmt":"2014-05-28T20:23:32","slug":"the-canberra-officer-6-cdf-atop-the-diarchy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-canberra-officer-6-cdf-atop-the-diarchy\/","title":{"rendered":"The Canberra officer (6): CDF atop the diarchy"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>The headline gives you the guts of the idea. In the diarchy that runs Defence, the military man sits atop the civilian: the chief of the Australian Defence Force now looms above the secretary of the Defence Department.<\/p>\n Forty years ago, the situation was reversed. The civilian Secretary then mattered more than CDF in the power and precedence hierarchy. Saying that the Chief of the Defence Force out-equals the other half of the diarchy is offering a judgement about both relative and absolute shifts in the power of the two jobs that sit, co-joined, atop Defence.<\/p>\n The Secretary still matters hugely, not least because of his considerable statutory powers, especially over money. The current Secretary, Dennis Richardson, is one of the great public servants of his generation and I\u2019ve written a couple of posts (here<\/a> and here<\/a>) to that effect.<\/p>\n For all his formidable smarts and bureaucratic savvy, I suspect even Richardson would admit that the service side of the diarchy now has a standing with ministers that he can\u2019t match. It\u2019s more than just the mystique of the slouch hat. Politicians have changed the power settings; that has meant the relative clout of the Secretary has declined considerably from the high point achieved by Arthur Tange<\/a>. The Secretary\u2019s ability to faze or out-face his minister has declined as sharply as his capability to dominate the CDF. Indeed, the Secretary\u2019s ability even to hold onto his job has changed dramatically.<\/p>\n Consider five factors in CDF\u2019s diarchy dominance:<\/p>\n The Secretary\u2019s dominance of the diarchy has clearly declined since it was created. Under the Tange model, the Secretary alone gave policy advice to the minister and the Secretary and his senior people tended to have much more time at the peak than ministers or the senior military. Bob Lowry gives a succinct view<\/a> of how the system started out: \u2018Tange was the constant star of the diarchy, partnered by a changing parade of military chiefs, and was therefore able to maintain primacy in areas of defence policy over which some military officers thought they should have more influence\u2019. Tange\u2019s office had the walnut panelling and the carpet; the Chief got more austere quarters with serviceable gyprock walls.<\/p>\n Des Ball wrote in a 1979 article on Australian Defence decision-making that<\/p>\n \u2018the Permanent Head is clearly the single most powerful individual in Australian defence decision-making. He has extraordinary capability not only to influence the Minister but also to resist his wishes or even his demands.\u2019<\/p><\/blockquote>\n The two words \u2018Permanent Head\u2019 tell the tale. Nothing permanent about that job now. \u00a0The Commonwealth did away with permanent heads in 1984 and introduced fixed-term contracts for secretaries in 1994. Fixed term is a misnomer. Secretaries serve at the government\u2019s pleasure\/displeasure; the incoming Howard and Abbott governments beheaded some secretaries both to announce their arrival and encourage the rest.<\/p>\n Look at the previous half dozen Defence Secretaries<\/a>. One was sacked and three were flicked elsewhere by ministerial fiat. The average term of an Australian company CEO is 4.4 years; none of the half dozen Secretaries made that mark.<\/p>\n What has happened in Defence is what has happened across Canberra. Peter Shergold, head of the public service as the PM\u2019s Department Secretary (2003-08), argues<\/a> that politicians cut down the mandarin class, of which Tange was one of the last great examples.<\/p>\n For Shergold, the golden age of the mandarin immortals was \u2018marked by intense territorial warfare, the exercise of monopoly power, weak collegiality and\u2014by contemporary standards\u2014a lack of public accountability. To the extent that the departmental secretaries were stronger, ministers were weaker\u2019.<\/p>\n Today, ministers are stronger and secretaries are weaker. And in Defence, the services have taken advantage.<\/p>\n\n