{"id":14186,"date":"2014-06-03T06:00:58","date_gmt":"2014-06-02T20:00:58","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=14186"},"modified":"2014-06-10T20:45:53","modified_gmt":"2014-06-10T10:45:53","slug":"obama-after-west-point","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/obama-after-west-point\/","title":{"rendered":"Obama after West Point"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>President Obama\u2019s explanation of his foreign policy<\/a> has come and gone, but he has won few converts. True, he tells a credible story about continuing US leadership, exceptionalism, and the intermeshing of unilateral and multilateral approaches. But that\u2019s largely a story about mechanics\u2014about how<\/i> the US acts in the world. And it\u2019s a story told at a time when allies and partners aren\u2019t just anxious about the how, they\u2019re also worried about the when, where, and why.<\/p>\n Obama\u2019s presentation shows he\u2019s someone who fits naturally in the Joseph Nye-John Ikenberry school of international relations. No surprises there. He doesn\u2019t rush to use of hard power, he accepts unilateral use of force is justified in defence of core interests, and he\u2019s interested in using multilateral institutions and regimes as a means of promoting and extending US leadership.<\/p>\n He didn\u2019t just talk about his academic settings, though, but his emotional ones as well, presenting himself as a figure \u2018haunted\u2019 by the deaths and injuries of US soldiers in wars. The Obama of 2014 is a less assured figure than the Obama of 2008, and it comes across even in the style of his speeches: the oratory is less sweeping, the practical limitations on grand designs are more pronounced. (As an oratorical exercise, Obama\u2019s commencement speech at West Point can\u2019t hold a candle to this one<\/a>.)<\/p>\n The overall effect is that Obama\u2019s foreign policy is less a clarion call and more a wavering trumpet. Allies and partners will be scratching their heads attempting to figure out what US strategic policy will look like for the next 30 months. Ok, there isn\u2019t an existential threat to the US; yes, NATO and the UN are worthy multilateral organisations, albeit somewhat dated; true, Russia isn\u2019t now the threat it was in Cold War days; and agreed, most Ukrainians still want democracy and a market economy. Moreover, the US economic picture looks better in 2014 than it did in 2009.<\/p>\n But Russia doesn\u2019t need to be the threat it was in Cold War days to make Western and Central Europeans nervous. It doesn\u2019t need an ideology of global domination or a Warsaw Pact to coerce its neighbours. On the other hand, China\u2019s a much stronger power now than it was in Cold War days\u2014and it\u2019s challenging the existing security order in Asia, not embracing it. The mood of triumphalism in Beijing isn\u2019t a manifestation of Chinese satisfaction that they\u2019re finally going to be admitted to the current security order. On both sides of Eurasia, authoritarian great powers are pressing their claims.<\/p>\n In short, there\u2019s an edginess in the current international strategic environment that Obama\u2019s speech will have done little to quell. Clearly, the US president can\u2019t be responsible for every sparrow that falls. But institutions and regimes are built by victors\u2014that\u2019s why Germany and Japan weren\u2019t permanent members of the UN Security Council when it was first designed.<\/p>\n For Australian policy-makers, there\u2019s a big question and a set of smaller ones. The big question is \u2018Why has Obama done this?\u2019 Does the speech signal a new coherency in US foreign and defence policy? Or is it the defensive speech of a US president feeling the pressure on that front? So far, the second view looks more accurate than the first, though it\u2019s always interesting to see how presidents stitch together the disparate parts of their strategic framework. Smaller questions swirl around the place of the \u2018rebalance\u2019 in US strategic policy (not addressed at all in the speech), and the relative weighting of the different US alliances. The different structures of the US-European and US-Asian alliances seem to matter in Washington more than we might have thought. NATO, for example, is seen as a key component of the global multilateral structure, in a way that the hub-and-spokes arrangements of Asia aren\u2019t.<\/p>\n Perhaps just as important for us is the question of how the speech will be read elsewhere, including within the US. So far, the response has been muted. The Editorial Board of the Washington Post<\/i> didn\u2019t seem to like it much<\/a>, and reactions elsewhere among the US commentariat<\/a> were comparatively negative. Chinese and Russian reactions are more opaque, but it\u2019s likely Beijing and Moscow both see the speech as a president trying to answer his domestic critics, and not aimed at them. Other countries may have a similar view, and count the speech as merely one more straw in the wind of US foreign policy. In a few, perhaps, forensic analysis may lead to a novel interpretation or two. But the key message of the speech is there for all to see; Obama is explaining his policy, not rewriting it\u2014and that suggests he doesn\u2019t intend to change course in the last couple of years of his presidency.<\/p>\n