{"id":14219,"date":"2014-06-05T12:45:28","date_gmt":"2014-06-05T02:45:28","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=14219"},"modified":"2014-06-10T20:43:04","modified_gmt":"2014-06-10T10:43:04","slug":"modis-triple-bottom-line","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/modis-triple-bottom-line\/","title":{"rendered":"Modi’s triple bottom line"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>The growing India-chatter within foreign policy circles has recently intensified after the election of the most \u2018Indian\u2019 of Indian Prime Ministers in decades. Many have speculated whether Modi\u2019s cultural-nationalist past will define his foreign policy. The new PM had previously criticised Congress\u2019 approach as \u2018weak\u2019. And his new External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj, had made hawkish comments on Pakistan. But, in terms of actual policy, Modi is likely to continue the centrist drift we saw during the election.<\/p>\n India\u2019s foreign policy has long been determined by a triple bottom line\u2014interests, values and public opinion. All three are relatively impervious to changes of government. Each BJP policy will adhere to at least one of those drivers, and the degree of change from previous policy will be determined by how the government interprets each driver and how readily changes can be pushed through a strong-willed foreign service.<\/p>\n When it comes to China, Modi will put interests first. In recent years, the growing economic relationship has acted as an anchor to more erratic strategic relations. As Gujarat Chief Minister, Modi himself visited China several times to build trade ties.<\/span><\/p>\n But long-simmering tensions\u2014based on border disputes and Chinese support for Pakistan\u2014hold back positive relations. That balance of interests won\u2019t shift much, but the government\u2019s rhetoric may be stronger due to the BJP\u2019s compulsion to raise India\u2019s international status. During a campaign speech in a part of Indian territory claimed by China, Modi called for Beijing to shed its \u2018expansionist mindset\u2019. Closer relations with Japan will also irritate China.<\/p>\n For its part, Beijing will be keen to further normalise relations, preferring to focus on challenges to its east. Modi\u2019s reputation will also give Beijing more certainty that they\u2019re dealing with someone in charge who has little to prove.<\/p>\n In America there\u2019s excitement about Modi\u2019s potential to re-energise flagging relations\u2014especially given the BJP\u2019s pro-West\/pro-business orientation. Despite the recent dip, strategic and economic relations are still on a positive longer-term trajectory. But India\u2019s unlikely to ever become a US \u2018ally\u2019; the two\u2019s core long-term interests don\u2019t sufficiently align. Furthermore, the BJP\u2019s values-driven quest for India to achieve great power status entails maintaining a proudly independent foreign policy.<\/p>\n Still, public opinion may prove a vehicle for better relations with the West. Modi can count on the support of an Indian diaspora who identify with the BJP\u2019s twin pillars of entrepreneurism and pride in Hindu culture. That diaspora will encourage Modi to strengthen economic ties with their adopted Western countries. Furthermore, Indians constitute America\u2019s wealthiest and best educated minority, making them a powerful lobbying force for pro-India policies.<\/span><\/p>\n Despite past BJP rhetoric suggesting hawkishness on Pakistan, Islamabad might also have reason for cautious optimism. Modi doesn\u2019t need to prove his \u2018firm on Pakistan\u2019 credentials. So the strategic interest of normalising relations can be pursued without being hindered by appeals to the public gallery. Evidence of that can be found in the unprecedented invitation to PM Sharif to attend Modi\u2019s inauguration, and reports that Modi will visit Pakistan.<\/span><\/p>\n Elsewhere in South Asia we\u2019ll see strategic continuity with Delhi seeking to check China\u2019s growing influence in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. The BJP\u2019s quest for national prestige will drive efforts to promote Delhi\u2019s regional leadership role.<\/span><\/p>\n Perhaps the most innovative change is Modi\u2019s move to allow states more say. State governments are likely to push for policies that adhere to short-term, local public opinion. We saw that under Congress when Delhi\u2019s acquiescence to Tamil Nadu\u2019s demands harmed national strategic interests by driving Sri Lanka further toward China.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n India\u2019s \u2018Look East Policy\u2019 will continue to further relations with Southeast Asia, underpinned by strategic concerns regarding Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean. In turn, some ASEAN members\u2019 territorial disputes with Beijing will accelerate cooperation with Delhi. In terms of values, Modi will seek to further India\u2019s soft power by highlighting civilisational links with Southeast Asia, including cultural exports like Hinduism, Buddhism, Sanskrit and the Brahmi script.<\/p>\n Senior BJP leaders have rejected the idea of removing the \u2018no first use\u2019 (NFU) policy from India\u2019s nuclear doctrine. NFU\u2019s strategic benefit is equal to the tiny amount of trust target countries (China and Pakistan) have in it. Instead, values will likely determine the preservation of NFU. India seeks to maintain an image of non-violence and high global standing. Modi himself said that NFU reflects the country\u2019s cultural heritage.<\/span><\/p>\n And what of Australia? All elements of Delhi\u2019s foreign policy triple bottom line point toward a strengthening partnership. Complementarity between our two economies will pique Delhi\u2019s interest, particularly in terms of uranium given the BJP\u2019s nuclear focus. Strategically, there are few contradictory interests between India and Australia. We share objectives in Indian Ocean security and maintaining good relations with both the US and China. We have common values of democracy, pluralism and tolerance. And Indians are becoming one of Australia\u2019s fastest-growing migrant groups.<\/span><\/p>\n Out of all of Australia\u2019s major relationships, our ties with India have the most growth potential. A strong, decisive new administration in Delhi may provide an avenue to do just that.<\/span><\/p>\n Kadira Pethiyagoda is a former Australian diplomat whose\u00a0PhD investigated Indian foreign policy.\u00a0 He was a visiting scholar at University of Oxford. Image courtesy of Flickr user Narendra Modi<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The growing India-chatter within foreign policy circles has recently intensified after the election of the most \u2018Indian\u2019 of Indian Prime Ministers in decades. Many have speculated whether Modi\u2019s cultural-nationalist past will define his foreign policy. …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":235,"featured_media":14220,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,601,285,69,135,356,251,31],"class_list":["post-14219","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-foreign-affairs","tag-foreign-policy","tag-india","tag-japan","tag-nuclear-weapons","tag-pakistan","tag-united-states"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n