{"id":14312,"date":"2014-06-11T14:52:33","date_gmt":"2014-06-11T04:52:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=14312"},"modified":"2014-06-12T07:56:03","modified_gmt":"2014-06-11T21:56:03","slug":"chinas-military-the-pla-comes-of-age","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/chinas-military-the-pla-comes-of-age\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s military: the PLA comes of age"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>The development of the Chinese People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) is of the utmost importance for Australia\u2019s strategic policy. There\u2019s a growing realisation in Asia and the United States that the PLA is gradually coming closer to developing a comprehensive \u2018counter intervention\u2019<\/a> capability, better known in Western strategic debate as \u2018anti-access\/ area denial\u2019 (A2\/AD). Beijing\u2019s aim is to raise the costs of US military intervention in a conflict with one of its neighbours in East or Southeast Asia to a prohibitively high level\u2014with potentially enormous ramifications for a regional security order long based on uncontested US military power in the Western Pacific. The newly released US Defense Department report on China\u2019s Military<\/a> is further testimony to China\u2019s becoming a major military power in Asia.<\/p>\n Each year, the Pentagon is asked to provide the US Congress with a comprehensive, realistic assessment of the PLA\u2019s evolution. Analysing the military capabilities of a player as opaque as China is always challenging and earlier reports sometimes appeared a bit alarmist regarding certain PLA capability areas. But overall, the reports struck a balance between progress and shortfalls. This year\u2019s version comes amidst growing regional anxiety about China\u2019s growing maritime assertiveness (such as its recent <\/span>oil rig dispute with Vietnam<\/a>) and <\/span>fierce exchanges between US and Chinese defence officials<\/a> at the Shangri-La Dialogue.<\/span><\/p>\n Three findings of the report are particularly noteworthy.<\/p>\n First, the report reflects a growing frustration in Washington with China\u2019s strategic behaviour. Despite referring to regional uncertainties caused by PLA modernisation, <\/span>last year\u2019s report<\/a> (PDF) generally struck a positive tone in the context of the rather constructive <\/span>\u2018Sunnylands\u2019 summit<\/a> between President Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, in June 2013. Now the 2014 report bluntly states that \u2018China\u2019s expanding interests have led to friction between some of its regional neighbors, including allies and partners of the United States\u2019. It also details the PLA\u2019s provocation in the 2013 <\/span>USS COWPENS incident<\/a> and reiterates that the US \u2018neither accepts nor recognizes\u2019 China\u2019s new <\/span>Air Defense Identification Zone<\/a> (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. The report is thus in line with <\/span>Washington\u2019s increasing preparedness to confront China<\/a> over its unwillingness to abide by established international norms of behaviour.<\/span><\/p>\n Second, the Pentagon notes that the PLA has a \u2018growing ability to project power at increasingly longer ranges\u2019. It\u2019s increasingly \u2018preparing for contingencies other than Taiwan, including potential contingencies in the South and East China Seas\u2019. Importantly, the 2013 \u2018MANEUVER-5 exercise<\/a> in the Philippine Sea, which included participation from all three PLAN fleets\u2014the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet\u2014was the largest PLAN open-ocean exercise seen to date\u2019. Critically, the PLA is now emphasising \u2018training under \u201crealistic combat scenarios\u201d and the ability to execute long-range mobility operations\u2019.<\/p>\n Third, the report highlights that China continues to modernise and increase its arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles. It states that the \u2018majority of China\u2019s missile programs, including its ballistic and cruise missile systems, is comparable to other international top-tier producers\u2019. As a result, US \u2018bases on Okinawa are in range of a growing number of Chinese MRBMs (medium-range ballistic missiles), and Guam could potentially be reached by air-launched cruise missiles.\u2019 In this regard, a <\/span>new study by the National Defense University<\/a> also highlights the growing sophistication of China\u2019s cruise missile capability. In combination with ballistic missiles, these systems pose a growing challenge to US ability to intervene in a regional crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n To be sure, the Pentagon acknowledges that the PLA still faces \u2018several shortcomings in a near-term conflict\u2019. Those include capability gaps in deep-water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and doubts over the PLA\u2019s ability to strike targets at sea beyond the so-called \u2018<\/span>first island chain\u2019<\/a>. Moreover, the PLA Navy\u2019s operational reach beyond East Asia continues to be restrained by limited logistical support, particularly in the Indian Ocean. But it\u2019s reasonable to assume that over the next decade or so, the PLA will work to address those weaknesses. For instance, there are signs that China is investing <\/span>more systematically in ASW capabilities<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n China\u2019s military is becoming more powerful and that gives Beijing more options to throw its weight around. Of course, China isn\u2019t a military superpower like the US, capable of global reach. But Beijing <\/span>doesn\u2019t need military parity with the US<\/a> to contest critical parts of East and Southeast Asia. What matters is that it\u2019s seen to be able to impose significant costs on US forces deployed in the region and that it appears to be more self-confident in its ability to deter Washington in regional crises.<\/span><\/p>\n Some believe a stronger, more assertive China increases the possibility of serious miscalculation between China and the US. That\u2019s not clear. But pressure is growing on the US and its allies and partners to develop a deeper understanding of what to do about the broader Asian power shifts. In the case of the Australia-US alliance it\u2019s more important to move toward practical defence cooperation across the whole spectrum of military capabilities rather than to engage in more discussions of defence spending and \u2018strategic choices\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n