{"id":14513,"date":"2014-06-26T06:00:15","date_gmt":"2014-06-25T20:00:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=14513"},"modified":"2014-06-27T09:28:47","modified_gmt":"2014-06-26T23:28:47","slug":"what-australia-should-do-in-the-south-china-sea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-australia-should-do-in-the-south-china-sea\/","title":{"rendered":"What Australia should do in the South China Sea"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n China continues to try changing the status quo in the South China Sea (SCS) through bullying its smaller neighbours and creating more facts on the ground. After moving an oil rig into an area contested by both China and Vietnam last month, Beijing is apparently planning<\/a> to send a second one into the area. Meanwhile, it\u2019s apparently constructing an airstrip and sea port on Fiery Cross Reef<\/a>, a move which could see the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) strengthen its military reach into the SCS through the deployment of shorter-range tactical aircraft. That comes amidst ongoing tensions between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal, as well as growing concerns in Malaysia and Indonesia about China\u2019s territorial ambitions<\/a>.<\/p>\n Let\u2019s face it: China\u2019s determined to push Southeast Asian countries into accepting what it perceives as its rightful territorial claims within the \u2018nine dash line\u2019<\/a>. Scott Snyder<\/a> isn\u2019t alone in concluding that under President Xi Jinping\u2019s leadership \u2018China\u2019s ability to exert its own sphere of influence in Asia is regarded as an expected benefit that will naturally accrue, regardless of the impact on the neighbourhood.\u2019 The New York Times<\/i> editorial board<\/a> has also expressed concern about China\u2019s \u2018power grab\u2019 in the SCS.<\/p>\n Chinese leaders seem to believe that the price for their consistent violation of established norms of behaviour in maritime disputes won\u2019t outweigh the benefits. They likely base that judgment on at least three assumptions:<\/p>\n The situation poses a serious challenge for Australia\u2019s strategic policy. It\u2019s tempting for Australia to leave it to the US and others to balance China\u2019s maritime assertiveness in the SCS. Why should Canberra engage more strongly if ASEAN states aren\u2019t willing to stand up to Beijing? After all, Australia is an external middle power with a strong interest in stable economic relations with China.<\/p>\n No doubt, those are strong arguments. But China\u2019s strategy to change the maritime order in Southeast Asia challenges other, potentially even more important, Australian interests. It undermines the core principles of a rules-based order in maritime Asia. That affects not just values but the central tenets of maritime trade upon which Australia\u2019s economy depends. Moreover, if successful, Beijing\u2019s quest for maritime hegemony in the SCS would erode our ally\u2019s position in the region, thereby also undermining a key pillar of Australian defence policy, namely that no potentially hostile power should dominate that area. While China isn\u2019t an enemy of Australia, there are doubts over its future strategic trajectory.<\/p>\n In sum, Australia has a fundamental interest in supporting a stronger regional response to China\u2019s maritime coercion in the SCS. The question is, how? Two things come to mind. First, more is required to deconstruct China\u2019s strategic narrative regarding its claim in the \u2018nine-dashed line\u2019. The US recently took the step of publicly calling those claims \u2018fundamentally flawed\u2019<\/a> to undermine China\u2019s \u2018lawfare\u2019<\/a>\u00a0strategies. At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, Australian Defence Minister David Johnston<\/a> joined the US and Japan in criticising China\u2019s \u2018destabilising\u2019 behaviour in the SCS. A further step would be to renew calls on all claimant states, including China, to shelf their claims and to engage in joint resource exploitation. Such an arrangement has been critical in managing the Taiwanese\u2013Japanese dispute over the Senkaku\/Diaoyutai\/Diaoyu island<\/a>. Joint exploration and the shelving of disputes have also featured previously in official Chinese policy<\/a>\u2014and Chinese officials should be asked to explain the problems with such an approach in the SCS.<\/p>\n Second, the government should think about ways to quietly strengthen the capabilities of Southeast Asian countries to counter China\u2019s maritime coercion, which often involves an integrated approach using civilian, paramilitary and military forces. Most Southeast Asian countries are poorly equipped to deal with that challenge, despite some efforts, for example by the Philippines<\/a>, to rectify deficiencies. Australia\u2019s regional defence engagement strategy should focus on capability areas which are critical for their ability to monitor and counter Chinese maritime harassment. That doesn’t necessarily imply highly-sophisticated military hardware which would probably overwhelm those countries\u2019 ability to operate and sustain such systems, and be provocative to China. Rather, it could include training in maritime law enforcement, as well as strengthening maritime surveillance and coast guard capabilities.<\/p>\n\n