{"id":14540,"date":"2014-06-27T12:15:56","date_gmt":"2014-06-27T02:15:56","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=14540"},"modified":"2014-06-30T10:40:06","modified_gmt":"2014-06-30T00:40:06","slug":"sole-purpose-and-strategic-crises-wheres-the-beef","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sole-purpose-and-strategic-crises-wheres-the-beef\/","title":{"rendered":"Sole purpose and strategic crises: where\u2019s the beef?"},"content":{"rendered":"
I thank Crispin Rovere for his <\/span>thoughtful response<\/a> to my <\/span>original post on US declaratory nuclear policy<\/a>. But I must take issue with the guts of his argument in relation to the sole purpose issue. In particular, I want to touch upon his two specific cases: Russian conventional aggression against the Baltic states; and, some form of US\u2013China conflict close to the Chinese mainland.<\/span><\/p>\n Let\u2019s start with the Baltic. Crispin says the US simply won\u2019t use nuclear weapons to defend the Baltic states against Russian aggression, even though those states are members of NATO. After all, he notes, the Baltic territories were earlier occupied by the USSR for fifty years and no-one contemplated fighting a nuclear war over them. There\u2019s a logic to that position. But two points need to be made. First, President Obama has specifically stated that there\u2019s no difference between new NATO allies and old ones. And NATO\u2019s 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review states clearly that \u2018the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States\u2019. If that assurance turns out not to be true, it\u2019ll raise questions about the credibility of US extended nuclear assurances elsewhere, and not just in the rest of NATO.<\/p>\n Second, even if the US is pretty unlikely to use nukes to defend Lithuania (for example), does it really want to stand up in advance and promise Putin that, no matter what level of conventional force he uses to seize Lithuania, the US won\u2019t cross the threshold? That\u2019s what a sole purpose declaration does. Such a declaration says unequivocally that nuclear weapons exist only to deter other countries\u2019 use of nuclear weapons. Wouldn\u2019t we want a potentially pushy Putin to have even a small doubt in his mind about whether the US extended nuclear assurance to Lithuania might actually turn out to be real? I don\u2019t see how a sole-purpose declaration helps.<\/p>\n What then of the second case, the hypothetical US\u2013China conflict? Here Crispin says the US has a clear incentive to use nuclear weapons first against China, because of its nuclear advantage, especially once American ballistic missile defences are factored in. The implication is that a sole purpose declaration would make China less anxious, and so less inclined to pursue an expansion of its nuclear capabilities in ways that would make Asian neighbours nervous. Mate, China already<\/i> is expanding its arsenal. But it\u2019s not the growth of China\u2019s nuclear arsenal that most worries neighbours; it\u2019s the expansion of its conventional power\u2014which it\u2019s not shy of using.<\/p>\n Exactly the same argument applies here as in the Russian case; why would the US want to tell China that regardless of how it uses its conventional power, and regardless of the costs it imposes on US forces or those of its allies, such actions won\u2019t carry any risk of nuclear escalation? How, exactly, would that make US allies and partners in Asia feel safer?<\/p>\n At a time when hard power is increasingly pushing its way back to centre stage, it doesn\u2019t make sense for the US to declare that its nuclear arsenal is reserved solely for the deterrence of nuclear coercion. It\u2019s like owning a car, but declaring you\u2019ll only use it when other people use theirs.<\/p>\n Rod Lyon is a fellow at ASPI and executive editor of\u00a0<\/em><\/em>The Strategist.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" I thank Crispin Rovere for his thoughtful response to my original post on US declaratory nuclear policy. But I must take issue with the guts of his argument in relation to the sole purpose issue. …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,851,844,116,356,163,845,31],"class_list":["post-14540","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-lithuania","tag-no-first-use","tag-nuclear-deterrence","tag-nuclear-weapons","tag-russia","tag-sole-purpose","tag-united-states"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n