{"id":14588,"date":"2014-07-03T06:00:32","date_gmt":"2014-07-02T20:00:32","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=14588"},"modified":"2014-07-04T11:30:51","modified_gmt":"2014-07-04T01:30:51","slug":"a-simple-australian-defence-acquisitionindustry-policy-framework","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/a-simple-australian-defence-acquisitionindustry-policy-framework\/","title":{"rendered":"A simple Australian Defence Acquisition\/Industry Policy framework"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>It\u2019s a truism that without industry capability, there can be no defence capability. Getting acquisition\/industry policy right is therefore essential to getting defence policy right. As the Australian Government prepares to deliver a new Defence White Paper\u2014and the associated Defence Capability Plan and Defence Industry Policy Statement\u2014a simple, clear framework is needed to guide its thinking about acquisition and industry policy.<\/p>\n Three core considerations underpin that policy:<\/p>\n Taken together, these three considerations lead to seven possible cases, depending on the capability being considered (Figure 1). While all considerations apply in all decisions there would clearly need to be a very strong case to overcome the \u2018best bang for buck\u2019 argument, given the need to maximise defence capability within funding available.<\/p>\n <\/a><\/p>\n Case A<\/b> \u2013 a capability that provides the \u2018best bang for buck\u2019 is \u2018needed for Defence self-reliance\u2019, and also provides a \u2018net benefit for the Australian economy\u2019.<\/p>\n This is the acquisition \u2018sweet spot\u2019 where all three factors align and so should result in a straightforward decision. But Australian industry needs to be healthy and cost-effective to deliver such an outcome\u2014a key focus of broader defence industry policy.<\/p>\n Regular maintenance and repair of Defence platforms is a useful example. Doing that work in Australia is both physically necessary and more cost effective than transporting systems overseas. It also represents a good outcome for the Australian economy by employing Australian workers in high-skilled areas.<\/p>\n Outcome \u2013 buy Australian.<\/i><\/p>\n Case B<\/b> \u2013 a capability that provides \u2018best bang for buck\u2019 but not<\/span> \u2018needed for Defence self-reliance\u2019 and not<\/span> a \u2018net benefit for the Australian economy\u2019.<\/p>\n Here, acquiring the capability overseas is the most cost-effective solution. Choosing the best solution from the world market provides the ADF with a wide range of options and avoids the costs and risks associated with being the \u2018parent\u2019 of a unique platform\/system.<\/p>\n One example is the acquisition of major military-off-the-shelf platforms such as the C-17 where there\u2019s little direct benefit in acquisition for the Australian economy, but there are benefits from sustainment funds spent in Australia.<\/p>\n Another example is the acquisition of the F-35 JSF where, although the majority of the acquisition funds are spent overseas, the global supply chain means that Australia benefits from firms such as Marand and Ferra delivering significant returns to the Australian economy. An effective industry policy would work to ensure maximum benefits to Australia even when buying from overseas, including through using Defence\u2019s \u2018buying power\u2019 to open doors for cost-effective Australian defence companies.<\/p>\n Outcome \u2013 buy from overseas supplier but ensure Australian industry is given the opportunity to provide necessary support and participate in global supply chain where cost effective.<\/i><\/p>\n Case C <\/b>\u2013\u2018best bang for buck\u2019 and \u2018needed for Defence self-reliance\u2019 but not<\/span> a \u2018net benefit for the Australian economy\u2019.<\/p>\n In this case an Australian company would provide the most cost-effective solution for Defence but overall\u2014surprisingly\u2014isn\u2019t a net benefit to the economy. That probably means the company\u2019s efforts have been diverted away from a more productive activity to satisfy the Defence need at a net cost to the economy.<\/p>\n An example would be a truly unique Australian defence requirement that can only be provided in-country and that diverts funds\/resources away from more productive activities. Arguably, supporting the F-111 at the end of its life fell into this category.<\/p>\n Outcome \u2013 buy Australian but avoid the situation wherever possible.<\/i><\/p>\n Case D<\/b> – \u2018best bang for buck\u2019 and \u2018net benefit for the Australian economy\u2019 but not<\/span> \u2018needed for Defence self-reliance\u2019.<\/p>\n In this case, Australian industry offers at least a significant part of the most cost-effective solution even in competition with world\u2019s best practice. Perhaps development and acquisition of the CEA CEAFAR radar falls into that category, although ongoing Defence support may be required to achieve a successful outcome.<\/p>\n Outcome \u2013 buy Australian but beware the \u2018long tail\u2019 of through-life costs for an Australian unique product or service.<\/i><\/p>\n Case E<\/b> \u2013 \u2018needed for Defence self-reliance\u2019 but not<\/span> \u2018best bang for buck\u2019 and not<\/span> a \u2018net benefit for the Australian economy\u2019.<\/p>\n Here a premium is paid to have the work done in Australia and while there\u2019ll be some benefit to the Australian economy there\u2019s no overall net<\/span> benefit, i.e. the opportunity cost to satisfy the Defence requirement means the premium paid isn\u2019t the best investment for the economy.<\/p>\n A possible example may be the in-country provision of specialist fuels where in-country capabilities\/resources are dedicated to meet low-demand Defence needs that could otherwise be doing more productive work.<\/p>\n Outcome \u2013 buy Australian but continue to work to improve cost effectiveness of the Australian supplier and work to avoid Defence-unique needs .<\/i><\/p>\n Case F<\/b> \u2013 a capability that provides a \u2018net benefit for the Australian economy\u2019 but is not<\/span> \u2018needed for Defence self-reliance\u2019 and does not<\/span> represent the \u2018best bang for buck\u2019.<\/p>\n In this case a premium is paid to have the work done in Australian even though it isn\u2019t needed for self-reliance reasons. A careful assessment of the balance between the opportunity cost associated with paying a premium and the potential multiplier effects in the economy would be required to justify such action. For a $10 billion project, would the government pay a $10 million (0.1%) premium to have the work\u2014or a significant part of it\u2014done in Australia? What about $100 million (1%) or even a $1 billion (10%) premium? What if a State paid the premium?<\/p>\n Consideration also needs to take into account that even though the capability itself might not need to be in-country, it may provide direct or indirect support for an industry capability that is<\/i> needed for self- reliance. The ongoing discussion about whether an in-country shipbuilding capability is required to support essential ship repairs and upgrades highlights the issue.<\/p>\n Outcome \u2013 buy Australian but only if<\/span> a detailed economic assessment supports the net benefit argument.<\/i><\/p>\n Case G<\/b> \u2013 a capability that\u2019s \u2018needed for defence self-reliance\u2019 and provides a \u2018net benefit for the Australian economy\u2019 but doesn\u2019t represent \u2018best bang for buck\u2019.<\/p>\n In this case, a premium needs to be paid for an in-country capability that meets self-reliance needs. That said, broader defence industry policy must address maximising the efficiency of Australian defence industry in those critical areas; for example, through training schemes and leveraging broader national investments in R&D to minimise the premium paid.<\/p>\n A possible example here would be, for sovereignty reasons, paying a premium to employ an Australia-based company with Australian nationals to secure Defence information networks and sensitive Australian data.<\/p>\n Outcome \u2013 buy Australian but continue to work to improve efficiency of Australian industry.<\/i><\/p>\n Conclusion<\/b><\/p>\n This brief analysis highlights some of the key issues to be considered in developing a Defence acquisition\/industry policy. The simple framework certainly doesn\u2019t resolve the issues but does provide a structured basis on which to start to address them.<\/p>\n John Harvey is a former chief of Capability Development Group and former program manager of New Air Combat Capability Group. Image courtesy of Department of Defence<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" It\u2019s a truism that without industry capability, there can be no defence capability. Getting acquisition\/industry policy right is therefore essential to getting defence policy right. As the Australian Government prepares to deliver a new Defence …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":241,"featured_media":14596,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[383,126],"class_list":["post-14588","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-acquisition","tag-defence-industry"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n\n