{"id":14863,"date":"2014-07-23T06:00:56","date_gmt":"2014-07-22T20:00:56","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=14863"},"modified":"2014-07-24T12:25:50","modified_gmt":"2014-07-24T02:25:50","slug":"mh17-and-the-limits-of-russian-power","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/mh17-and-the-limits-of-russian-power\/","title":{"rendered":"MH17 and the limits of Russian power"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Private<\/a><\/p>\n

Following Russia\u2019s annexation of the Crimea in March this year, there was plenty of talk about \u2018the Bear\u2019s return\u2019 to great power status. Triumphant Russian politicians and media commentators crowed about their country\u2019s return to glory. Internationally, the theme of Russia\u2019s resurgence at the expense of the rules-based, Western order<\/a> was also common, fuelled by what many regarded as a weak Western response.<\/p>\n

But the tragic fate of flight MH17 is only the latest indication of the severe limitations on Russia\u2019s power. In reality, Russia\u2019s return to Cold War-era politics reflects the behaviour of a declining power. Indeed, it\u2019s increasingly obvious that Russia\u2019s short-term gains through its bellicose action in the Ukraine are negated by both immediate and long-term costs.<\/p>\n

Domestically, Russia is beset by enormous demographic and economic problems. High-levels of corruption, lack of reform and an overreliance on gas and oil exports have stymied economic growth. In fact, despite having been denounced as too soft, the US\u2019 and Europe\u2019s limited sanctions already have had a serious negative impact on the Russian economy<\/a>. In the wake of the MH17 disaster, major European powers, including Germany and France, are likely to consider even stronger sanctions. Consequently, as Lawrence Freedman<\/a> has concluded, \u2018Russia\u2019s claims to be a great power are increasingly geo-political rather than geo-economic\u2019.<\/p>\n

But Russia\u2019s geopolitical project doesn’t look especially promising either. While nice to have, nuclear weapons and a permanent seat at the UN Security Council aren\u2019t sufficient to circumvent Moscow\u2019s growing international isolation. Moreover, Putin\u2019s dream of restoring the Russian empire, including through an expansionist foreign policy doctrine<\/a>, is likely to go nowhere.<\/p>\n

Consider this: to the west, Russia faces a NATO of now 28 members, including many former Warsaw Pact countries. If anything, the annexation of the Crimea has provided new impetus for the alliance<\/a> to update its force structure, mobilisation scheme and doctrine for operations on its eastern flank. Watch NATO\u2019s upcoming Wales Summit for more to come. The EU also signed an association agreement<\/a> with the Ukraine (as well as Georgia and Moldova), something it had been reluctant to do so prior to the crisis.<\/p>\n

To the east, Russia faces a rising China. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Moscow is well aware about the limitations of its \u2018strategic partnership\u2019 with Beijing<\/a>, a partnership increasingly plagued by power disparities in China\u2019s favour. For example, the inability to secure its long land border with China is a serious headache for Russia\u2019s defence planners. Finally, Russia\u2019s southern flank is highly volatile and there\u2019s still uncertainty about the future cohesion of the Russian Federation.<\/p>\n

That\u2019s hardly a winning geopolitical design. And, as the shooting-down of MH17 shows, Putin\u2019s proxy war in the Ukraine is becoming more and more a strategic liability.<\/a> Pressure is growing on him to cooperate in the investigation and to end Russia\u2019s destabilising behaviour in Ukraine.<\/p>\n

From an Australian perspective, it\u2019s thus important to recognise that Russia is dealing from a position of relative weakness, not strength. That provides diplomatic opportunities. Russia has already supported this week\u2019s UN Security Council Resolution<\/a> calling for a \u2018full, thorough and independent international investigation\u2019 and bringing those responsible to justice. Behind closed doors, Australia and the international community should also use the momentum to pressure Putin to do his share to bring about a lasting cease-fire in Ukraine as a basis for political negotiations.<\/p>\n

But it\u2019s equally important to remember key principles of crisis management: keep communication channels open and refrain from making unacceptable demands. In this context, banning Putin from attending the G20 Summit in Brisbane wouldn\u2019t send the right signal after Moscow\u2019s supporting the UN Security Council Resolution. Further, demands of a return of the Crimea to the Ukraine are unrealistic\u2014no Russian president would survive such a move domestically. Instead, a key objective should be about negotiating special status for those provinces currently under control by the separatists whilst ending Russia\u2019s objections to Ukraine moving closer to the West. It\u2019s unclear whether Russia is prepared to go down that road but such an outcome could mean real progress for the geopolitical mess that is Ukraine today.<\/p>\n

Moreover, as the dynamics in the Ukraine crisis could increase the leverage of the West, calls<\/a> for immediate, even more serious sanctions should be resisted unless the Russian government fails to follow through on its pledge to punish those accountable or if Moscow continues to destabilise Ukraine. While some defence-industrial steps make sense (for example, France would be well-advised to cancel the sale of two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships<\/a>), further economic sanctions could lead only to a weaker Russia acting even more erratically. The isolation and humiliation of wounded powers has never been a good strategy in international relations. And whether we like it or not, we still have to find ways to work productively with Russia. It may not soon be the great power<\/a> it was in the Cold War, but it will still be able to cause serious problems in its near abroad and elsewhere.<\/p>\n

Benjamin Schreer is a senior analyst at ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr user World Economic Forum<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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