{"id":15160,"date":"2014-08-08T06:00:09","date_gmt":"2014-08-07T20:00:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=15160"},"modified":"2014-08-11T09:47:32","modified_gmt":"2014-08-10T23:47:32","slug":"moving-forward-japans-2014-defence-white-paper","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/moving-forward-japans-2014-defence-white-paper\/","title":{"rendered":"Moving forward? Japan\u2019s 2014 Defence White Paper"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Is<\/a><\/figure>\n

Earlier this week, Japan released its annual defence white paper<\/a>. It comes amidst a number of initiatives by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to adjust Japan\u2019s defence policy, including most recently a reinterpretation of the constitution<\/a> to allow the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to exercise the right of collective self-defence. In light of Abe\u2019s visit to Australia last month and the agreement to enhance bilateral defence cooperation, it\u2019s worth analysing this document.<\/p>\n

Overall, the white paper reaffirms both the Abe government\u2019s increased concern about China\u2019s strategic trajectory and changes to the JSDF\u2019s force posture already announced in other documents after Abe\u2019s re-election in December 2012. The 2013 defence white paper<\/a> was already noteworthy for its harsher tone against China<\/a>. The new version argues that \u2018security issues and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region including the area surrounding Japan are becoming more serious.\u2019 It directly criticises China\u2019s establishment of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in November 2013 as a \u2018profoundly dangerous\u2019 act designed to \u2018unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea\u2019. For the first time it also mentions the problem of \u2018gray-zone\u2019 situations which are \u2018neither purely peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests\u2019\u2014another reference to China\u2019s low-level maritime coercion activities in the East and South China Sea.<\/p>\n

China\u2019s growing military challenge is the biggest driver for JSDF modernisation, followed by North Korea\u2019s missile program. The new National Defense Program Guidelines<\/a> (NDPG) of December 2013 provided defence planning guidance for the next five years. They built on the 2010 NDPG which called for the development of a \u2018Dynamic Defense Force\u2019, that is, a more mobile force better capable of defending the Japanese archipelago against new emerging threats. The 2013 NDPG introduced the concept of a \u2018Dynamic Joint Defense Force\u2019 which paves the way for greater cooperation within a heretofore largely disjointed force. It also announced new capabilities to strengthen Japan\u2019s air-maritime denial capabilities:<\/p>\n