{"id":1520,"date":"2012-10-04T14:35:28","date_gmt":"2012-10-04T04:35:28","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=1520"},"modified":"2012-10-05T19:06:32","modified_gmt":"2012-10-05T09:06:32","slug":"air-combat-capability-the-good-news-and-the-bad-news","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/air-combat-capability-the-good-news-and-the-bad-news\/","title":{"rendered":"Air combat capability: the good news and the bad news"},"content":{"rendered":"
The Australian National Audit Office last week released a pair of related audit reports, on the acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter<\/a> and the management of the current fast jet fleet<\/a>. The reports are worthwhile reading\u2014not because they are sensational, but because they aren\u2019t. The audit office has done a fine job of shedding some light into the corners of the very complex business that is managing the current air combat capability while simultaneously developing its successor. And it does so in a dispassionate and balanced way.<\/p>\n Not surprisingly, they find that there are some real risks emerging about the timeline for acquiring the F-35. The current plan for retiring the \u2018classic\u2019 Hornets, 71 of which form the lion\u2019s share of the fast jet fleet, is to have them withdrawn from service in 2020. The ANAO note that the difficulties arise from a combination of development issues in the United States (over which the Australian Government has no control) and decisions made locally to delay earlier F-35 delivery intentions. Together, these make the \u2018planned transition to an F\u201035\u2010based air combat capability in the required timeframe, so that a capability gap does not arise between the withdrawal from service of the F\/A\u201018A\/B fleet and the achievement of full operational capability for the F\u201035\u2019 a real challenge.<\/p>\n