{"id":15215,"date":"2014-08-13T06:00:31","date_gmt":"2014-08-12T20:00:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=15215"},"modified":"2014-08-14T09:32:27","modified_gmt":"2014-08-13T23:32:27","slug":"the-future-of-the-us-australia-strategic-relationship","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-future-of-the-us-australia-strategic-relationship\/","title":{"rendered":"The future of the US\u2013Australia strategic relationship"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>With the annual Australia\u2013US Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) recently concluded in Sydney, it\u2019s a good time to reassess the broader Australian\u2013US strategic relationship. I want to frame that assessment here by employing a SWOT analysis. The methodology is clunky but simple enough to allow a set of insights about the relationship\u2019s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. I\u2019ve allowed myself three of each, as follows.<\/p>\n Three strengths: familial closeness, shared grand strategies, a solid foundation. First, closeness. The Anglosphere\u2019s our international family, and while it\u2019s easy to mock the importance of belonging to an international family, states that don\u2019t belong to one (like Japan) would beg to differ. Ties of blood and culture run deep. Second, grand strategy: the best long-term allies are those who essentially want the same thing. In grand strategy, Washington and Canberra both want a stable, liberal, prosperous global order. And that\u2019s a good basis for long-term cooperation\u2014because the tie isn\u2019t just of blood but of interest. Third, the foundation: we both enjoy an alliance that\u2019s over 60 years old and is as close today as it\u2019s ever been. Both allies are still looking for new ways to cooperate in order to make the alliance more relevant to the 21st century.<\/p>\n Three weaknesses: time, place, strategic personalities. After the Global War on Terror the US is a weary Titan. That effect might last another five to ten years, but\u2014over the longer haul\u2014US vigour will wax as well as wane. There\u2019s a second, longer-term \u2018time\u2019 factor, and that relates to the broader pattern of regional transformation: while the US rebalance to Asia is good, Washington\u2019s rebalancing at a time when Western influence in the region is slipping because of the rise of regional great powers. Second is geography. At the best of times, Australia\u2019s not Washington\u2019s top priority\u2014geographically we sit too far back from a strategic order essentially built along the Eurasian rimlands. True, the shift of strategic weight in Asia is changing that, to some degree\u2014but we\u2019re never going to be as relevant as front-line US partners. Finally, personalities: the US and Australia are two different strategic personality types: Americans are Extroverted, Intuitive and Feeling; Australians are Extroverted, Sensing and Thinking. In short, we\u2018re British empiricists, they\u2019re the City on the Hill. There\u2019s a messianic core to US strategic policy that isn\u2019t replicated in ours.<\/p>\n Three opportunities: a more receptive Asia, a US more interested in Southeast Asia, a treaty with an in-built capacity to engage. Evidence of the more receptive Asia abounds. Regional countries want to do more with both the US and Australia. Japan\u2019s the obvious example, but others aren\u2019t as far behind as some think. It wasn\u2019t always thus: remember, we couldn\u2019t do much more with Japan before Abe, nor much more with Indonesia before SBY. A second opportunity, a shifting US perception of Southeast Asia. Washington has traditionally seen that subregion as a set of sealanes, and after 9\/11 as a possible second front in the War on Terror, but it\u2019s finally coming to see it as a set of influential players at the intersection of two key oceans. Third, both the US and Australia are classic networkers. And the ANZUS treaty already gives them scope (in the unused Article 8<\/a>) to do more networking together in the regional context. I\u2019m amazed we aren\u2019t doing it.<\/p>\n Three threats: complacency, category mistake, distraction. Let\u2019s start with complacency, because that\u2019s the most insidious threat to the relationship. There\u2019s something of a danger on both sides of the Pacific that capitals will treat the relationship as \u2018business-as-usual\u2019. Oddly, the simple regularity of AUSMIN actually increases that danger, reducing high-level political commitment to the alliance to an annual ministerial meeting. We need to work to sustain a broader base of political engagement. Second, the threat of the category mistake: that we come to see ANZUS as a barrier to our closer engagement with Asia, rather than an enabler of such engagement. It\u2019s a simple mistake to slip into, and it typically follows from seeing ANZUS as a strategic hangover from a different era. And finally, there\u2019s the threat of distraction. Distraction can come to both capitals from a range of sources. Washington can easily be distracted by more urgent priorities, both domestic and international; but so too can Canberra. Despite the excitable tones in which the future of our strategic partnership with the US is sometimes debated, the real threat isn\u2019t that our relationship will be ruined by disastrous war, nor even that it\u2019ll be traded away to accommodate China: it\u2019s that the relationship will be eaten out from the inside, leaving a hollow, reactive partnership in the place of a substantive, proactive one.<\/p>\n