{"id":15456,"date":"2014-08-28T06:00:24","date_gmt":"2014-08-27T20:00:24","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=15456"},"modified":"2014-08-29T11:57:28","modified_gmt":"2014-08-29T01:57:28","slug":"five-rules-when-negotiating-for-the-south-china-sea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/five-rules-when-negotiating-for-the-south-china-sea\/","title":{"rendered":"Five rules when negotiating for the South China Sea"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Five!\"<\/a><\/figure>\n

Seated across the table, China\u2019s representative railed against the Americans for a litany of offences. The Vietnamese, Philippines, and Indonesian representatives looked on, their thoughts obscured by a mix of smirks and smiles. This wasn\u2019t, however, a meeting at this month\u2019s ASEAN Regional Forum<\/a>\u00a0in Myanmar. Rather, it was a South China Sea simulation at Johns Hopkins University\u2019s School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.<\/p>\n

Divided into groups, attendees\u2014a mix of Asia hands and novices\u2014represented South China Sea claimants, along with the United States and not-quite-claimant<\/a>\u00a0Indonesia. Participants strove to hammer out a joint communiqu\u00e9 encompassing the parties\u2019 varied interests while absorbing conflict resolution and negotiating skills. Complicating the matter, the talks were set against the scenario-injected backdrop of the Chinese construction of an artificial island in Vietnam\u2019s claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Although I flatter myself as educated in the basics of the region\u2019s maritime disputes, the evening still proved educational. Readers of The Strategist <\/em>might be interested in five distilled rules:<\/p>\n

1. Chinese plays to Asian solidarity ring hollow<\/strong><\/p>\n

Assigned the role of a proud representative of Vietnam, I sought to halt construction of China\u2019s artificial island and secure assurances against future infringement of our national sovereignty under the recognised principles of international law. That was a non-starter for the Chinese negotiating team. However, they did attempt to buy me off through vague promises of infrastructure investment before launching into a lecture on the US. In their view, Americans were destabilising the region, were themselves unable to provide stability rom half a world away, didn\u2019t believe in international law, were interested only in a new breed of colonialism, and should acquiesce to a sphere of influence similar to their own dominance of the Caribbean<\/a>.<\/p>\n

I\u2019ve witnessed this attempt at building an exclusive Asian rapport at other forums<\/a>. Then, as in this instance, it was undermined by the accompanying mix of veiled threats and seeming indifference towards the neighbours\u2019 real concerns. My rebuttals to China\u2019s points\u2014that its investments often led to little local hiring and spawned resentment, and that Vietnam cared less whether a nation signed UNCLOS than if it followed the principles therein (ie not parking an oil rig in someone else\u2019s EEZ, for example)\u2014received sympathetic concurrence from other claimant states.<\/p>\n

2. Wild cards are unlikely to change the situation<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the run-up to the exercise I asked colleagues to suggest \u2018wild cards\u2019 that could be played to shake-up the negotiations. Unfortunately many of those turned out to be outside my bounds as a country representative (and I\u2019ve covered them in a CIMSEC post here<\/a>).<\/p>\n

In the event, it was revealed that the Indonesian moderator had been meeting and potentially dealing with China on the sidelines of the talks. Yet that did little to alter the negotiations. Similarly, I sought out \u2018win-win\u2019 proposals, with a bid for joint economic development deals, as in the Gulf of Tonkin<\/a>, after <\/em>a freeze on new construction, claims, and resource exploitation\u2014essentially the elusive ASEAN Code of Conduct and a reflection of Vietnam\u2019s real position. At the same time, I noted that, if the United States was having difficulty maintaining its vessels in the region, the deep-water port of Cam Ranh Bay<\/a>\u00a0could be refurbished for a renewed American presence. Unfortunately, the joint-development proposal was rebuffed by China, as most were in the course of negotiations. Rule four explains why those wild cards and proposals failed to change the calculus.<\/p>\n

3. Conflict transformation doesn\u2019t always work<\/strong><\/p>\n

Indonesia tried to tap into \u2018conflict transformation<\/a>‘\u00a0to propose parts of the disputed waters be made ecological or resort preserves. I suggested bringing in Australia and New Zealand as disinterested third parties to oversee a fishing-rights management scheme preserving stocks until a final resolution on the dispute was made. Those ideas, and the desire for our communiqu\u00e9 to contain language affirming regional commitment to the peaceful settling of disputes under the principles of international law, were all scuttled in turn.<\/p>\n

4. China has little to lose from torpedoing negotiations<\/strong><\/p>\n

The reason for those failures mostly stemmed from a single assessment. Because China didn\u2019t appear to face any negative repercussions for continuing its policies of tailored coercion<\/a>\u00a0and salami tactics<\/a>, it had the least incentive to alter the status quo. Therefore China had a strong position or, in negotiation theory, the\u00a0best alternative to a negotiated agreement<\/a>, should the negotiations fail. That meant China could effectively wield a veto due to its ability to walk away without fear of losing much. Little surprise that 5 of 6 teams failed to produce a substantive communiqu\u00e9.<\/p>\n

5. \u2018If at first you don\u2019t succeed\u2026<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2026change the definition of success.\u2019 After attempting to find \u2018small wins,\u2019 such as paying lip service to regional peace, the Indonesian moderator grew frustrated with Chinese vetoes of the rest of the agenda and decided to create a \u2018unanimous minus one\u2019 list of items all other negotiators agreed to.<\/p>\n

\u2026 agree to keep meeting.\u2019 Students of international relations will be heartened to learn that we did agree not only to meet again, but also to develop a new regional forum to focus solely on dispute resolution. After all, negotiators need to ensure they stay gainfully employed.<\/p>\n

Simulations such as this won\u2019t by themselves solve seemingly intractable issues. (For a look at lessons learned from the real-life negotiations between Indonesia and the Philippines over their maritime boundary, see this article<\/a> from The Diplomat<\/em>.) Nevertheless, simulations can serve a useful purpose by sparking novel approaches to well-worn squabbles.<\/p>\n

Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the US Navy Reserve and the founding director of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC). Image courtesy of Flickr user Martin Fisch<\/a>.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Seated across the table, China\u2019s representative railed against the Americans for a litany of offences. The Vietnamese, Philippines, and Indonesian representatives looked on, their thoughts obscured by a mix of smirks and smiles. 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