{"id":15805,"date":"2014-09-16T06:00:24","date_gmt":"2014-09-15T20:00:24","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=15805"},"modified":"2014-09-17T09:50:47","modified_gmt":"2014-09-16T23:50:47","slug":"islamic-state-not-unique","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/islamic-state-not-unique\/","title":{"rendered":"Islamic State: not unique"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/09\/Flag_of_the_Islamic_State.svg_.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter wp-image-15813 size-full\" title=\"Flag of the Islamic State\" src=\"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/09\/Flag_of_the_Islamic_State.svg_.png\" alt=\"Flag of the Islamic State\" width=\"800\" height=\"600\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/09\/Flag_of_the_Islamic_State.svg_.png 800w, https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/09\/Flag_of_the_Islamic_State.svg_-205x154.png 205w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px\" \/><\/a>Listening to the hyperbole that characterises much of the commentary on the rise of the Islamic State (IS), one would be forgiven for thinking that the world is witnessing an historical aberration in the Middle East\u2019s \u2018fertile crescent\u2019. That broad sentiment is captured by the exasperated words of US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel: <a href=\"http:\/\/www.defense.gov\/utility\/printitem.aspx?print=http:\/\/www.defense.gov\/transcripts\/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5491\" target=\"_blank\">\u2018Oh, this is beyond anything that we\u2019ve seen\u2019.<\/a> I disagree. In his address outlining the US strategy against IS, President Obama declared: <a href=\"http:\/\/www.npr.org\/2014\/09\/10\/347515100\/transcript-president-obama-on-how-u-s-will-address-islamic-state\" target=\"_blank\">\u2018ISIL is a terrorist organization, pure and simple. And it has no vision other than the slaughter of all who stand in its way\u2019.<\/a> I don\u2019t think that\u2019s entirely accurate either.<\/p>\n<p>Fundamentally, the IS playbook reflects the application of core principles of modern insurgency thinking. One need only read the works of Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh and a litany of others to find broad agreement on the \u2018strategic essentials\u2019 of guerrilla warfare:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>small wars are contests for meaning and control;<\/li>\n<li>centralised \u2018information operations\u2019 (IO) are the mechanism through which to frame politico-military activities; and<\/li>\n<li>sacrificing territory for time is key to winning the population\u2019s support as part of a phased strategy culminating in the insurgency\u2019s \u2018conventionalisation\u2019.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p>There\u2019s some comfort in believing that IS is simply a barbaric horde with one tool\u2014violence\u2014at its disposal. The reality is that IS has adopted and adapted these core principles of modern insurgency thinking.<\/p>\n<p>Modern insurgency strategy is built on a simple foundation: that small wars are contests for meaning and control. The latter is obvious: small wars are a competition to implement what <a href=\"http:\/\/www.au.af.mil\/au\/awc\/awcgate\/navy\/art5-w98.htm\" target=\"_blank\">Bernard Fall<\/a> describes as a \u2018competitive system of control\u2019 over a contested population. Sure, coercion is an important tool for implementing IS\u2019s competitive system. But IS offers its \u2018citizens\u2019, especially those in Raqqa and Mosul, a broad range of services supported by what appears to be a pretty comprehensive bureaucracy. As one would expect, <a href=\"http:\/\/jihadology.net\/2014\/06\/07\/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-magazine-islamic-state-report-2\/\" target=\"_blank\">IS law enforcement officials patrol the streets, courts enforce criminal and civil codes<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/azelin.files.wordpress.com\/2014\/06\/islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shc481m-e2809cislamic-state-report-2e280b3.pdf\">taxes are collected<\/a>. Moreover, IS offers <a href=\"http:\/\/jihadology.net\/2014\/05\/31\/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-state-news-1\/\" target=\"_blank\">medical services, social welfare programs and schools<\/a> whilst <a href=\"http:\/\/jihadology.net\/2014\/06\/05\/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-state-news-2\/\" target=\"_blank\">reopened shops and restaurants<\/a> are monitored by a <a href=\"https:\/\/azelin.files.wordpress.com\/2014\/06\/islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shc481m-22islamic-state-report-122.pdf\" target=\"_blank\">consumer affairs unit<\/a>. In early September, <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/TheSyrianWar\/status\/507606291154345984\" target=\"_blank\">IS authorities apparently even began issuing parking tickets.<\/a> Indeed, IS has published an <a href=\"https:\/\/azelin.files.wordpress.com\/2014\/04\/al-binc481-magazine-1.pdf\" target=\"_blank\">annual report<\/a> tracking its progress. But its \u2018system of control\u2019 provides only half the picture.<\/p>\n<p>Modern insurgency thought stresses the importance of propagating a narrative\u2014a \u2018competitive system of meaning\u2019\u2014which shapes how contested populations understand and evaluate the conflict and its actors. Like other modern insurgencies (e.g. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.isn.ethz.ch\/Digital-Library\/Articles\/Detail\/?lng=en&amp;id=180191\" target=\"_blank\">the Afghan Taliban<\/a>), IS seeks to shape how those populations perceive the conflict by placing strategic primacy on IO as a mechanism to both shape perceptions of the conflict and frame its politico-military activities.<\/p>\n<p>While the world is transfixed by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=aCRwtcYZhhg\" target=\"_blank\">the \u2018military\u2019 dimension of its messaging<\/a>, IS devotes a large proportion of its IO campaign to promoting its governance and welfare initiatives. IS\u2019s media unit, <em>Al Hayat<\/em>, has produced a range of multilingual online publications reporting on developments in the Islamic State (e.g. <a href=\"http:\/\/jihadology.net\/2014\/06\/05\/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-state-news-2\/\" target=\"_blank\"><em>Islamic State News<\/em><\/a> and <a href=\"http:\/\/jihadology.net\/2014\/06\/13\/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-magazine-islamic-state-report-3\/\" target=\"_blank\"><em>Islamic State Report<\/em><\/a>). <a href=\"https:\/\/azelin.files.wordpress.com\/2014\/07\/islamic-state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-2e280b3.pdf\" target=\"_blank\"><em>Dabiq<\/em><\/a>, IS\u2019s more recent offering, adopts a magazine format similar to AQAP\u2019s <em>Inspire <\/em>and the Taliban in Khurasan\u2019s <em>Azan<\/em>. <em>Al Hayat<\/em> also produces an impressive array of video productions, from a series of short <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=qh6ZwB_R1BQ\" target=\"_blank\"><em>mujatweet<\/em><\/a> videos that offer insights into life in the Islamic State to longer pieces that typically promote a certain event (e.g. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=DjKCfyaxbIs\" target=\"_blank\">\u2018destruction\u2019 of the Syria-Iraq border<\/a>) or appeal to a certain audience (e.g. <a href=\"http:\/\/jihadology.net\/2014\/07\/22\/al-%E1%B8%A5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-join-the-ranks\/\" target=\"_blank\">Indonesian Muslims<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>While the production design is slick, it\u2019s also the most superficial aspect of IS\u2019s IO. The true potency of the IS narrative lies in how adroitly it attaches perceptions of crisis to out-group identities (i.e. anyone not a Sunni Muslim) and links solutions to the in-group (i.e. Sunni Muslims). Actions in the field\u2014from beheadings to social welfare programs\u2014are presented as materialisations of that narrative and challenges to its opponents. IS seeks to synchronise narrative and action to shape perceptions and polarise the populace\u2019s support.<\/p>\n<p>When IS took Mosul it declared that: <a href=\"http:\/\/jihadology.net\/2014\/06\/13\/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-magazine-islamic-state-report-3\/\" target=\"_blank\">\u2018This followed a shift in the Islamic State\u2019s strategy, which now saw its forces leaving its desert strongholds in Iraq and making their way into the cities\u2019<\/a>. That echoes Mao\u2019s maxim that space must be sacrificed for time to win the population\u2019s support. IS has a \u2018boom-and-bust\u2019 history of rapid and extraordinary successes and failures (e.g. AQI\u2019s rise and fall post-Awakening\/Surge, ISIS military operations last year in Syria). That reflects a perpetual problem for burgeoning insurgencies: what\u2019s the threshold of support and time necessary to enable a recalibration onto territory and conventionalisation? Recognising IS as an insurgency reveals a paradox belying its recent success: it\u2019s susceptible because it\u2019s fighting a multi-front war, across large swathes of territory, using primarily conventional military manoeuvring, whilst simultaneously implementing a resource-intensive system of governance.<\/p>\n<p>While IS\u2019s IO shouldn\u2019t be conflated with reality, it\u2019s equally erroneous to dismiss the full-spectrum of IS activities as <a href=\"http:\/\/www.huffingtonpost.com\/2014\/08\/11\/isis-iraq-numbers_n_5659239.html\" target=\"_blank\">inconsequential<\/a> or propaganda. IS constitutes an insurgency and what it\u2019s attempting to do by applying those strategic principles matters. Still, this is only the top-down view of the IS phenomenon. The bottom-up perspective requires an understanding of what motivates their supporters\u2014and that\u2019s the subject of a future post.<\/p>\n<p><em>Haroro J. Ingram is a research fellow with the School of International, Political and Strategic Studies (ANU). His ARC-funded project, \u2018Through Their Eyes\u2019, analyses insurgent \u2018information operations\u2019 and explores their role as a determining factor in the success of insurgent movements. I<em>mage courtesy of <a href=\"http:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Flag_of_the_Islamic_State.svg\" target=\"_blank\">Wikimedia Commons<\/a>.<\/em><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Listening to the hyperbole that characterises much of the commentary on the rise of the Islamic State (IS), one would be forgiven for thinking that the world is witnessing an historical aberration in the Middle &#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":272,"featured_media":15813,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[176,895,21,127,31],"class_list":["post-15805","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-barack-obama","tag-islamic-state","tag-strategy-2","tag-terrorism","tag-united-states"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v19.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Islamic State: not unique | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/islamic-state-not-unique\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Islamic State: not unique | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Listening to the hyperbole that characterises much of the commentary on the rise of the Islamic State (IS), one would be forgiven for thinking that the world is witnessing an historical aberration in the Middle ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/islamic-state-not-unique\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2014-09-15T20:00:24+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2014-09-16T23:50:47+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/09\/Flag_of_the_Islamic_State.svg_.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"800\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"600\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Haroro J. 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