{"id":15915,"date":"2014-09-18T14:30:35","date_gmt":"2014-09-18T04:30:35","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=15915"},"modified":"2014-09-19T07:18:40","modified_gmt":"2014-09-18T21:18:40","slug":"back-to-iraq-the-first-problems-a-nail","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/back-to-iraq-the-first-problems-a-nail\/","title":{"rendered":"Back to Iraq: the first problem\u2019s a nail"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Nailed<\/a>As Australia dispatches half a squadron of fighter-bombers, a significant special forces contingent, and support elements ahead of likely coalition action against ISIL, most commentary falls into either the \u2018bomb the hell out of them<\/a>\u2019 or \u2018only fools rush in<\/a>\u2019 camps. Neither view is fully satisfying. To explain, we offer four observations on the implications for Australia of President Obama\u2019s four point plan<\/a> to destroy ISIL.<\/p>\n

Obama\u2019s strategy stressed the need for a \u2018broad coalition<\/a>\u2019 to pursue: (1) a systematic campaign of airstrikes in both Iraq and Syria; (2) support for forces fighting ISIL; (3) counter-terrorist measures to prevent attacks; and (4) assistance to those displaced by militants. Over the weekend, Australia received specific requests<\/a> from the US and Iraq to assist.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s hardly surprising that Prime Minister Abbott agreed to help but what does that mean for Australia?<\/p>\n

First, with the US a \u2018weary titan<\/a>,\u2019 forced to pivot simultaneously to meet rising Russian and Middle Eastern threats while projecting strength in the Asia-Pacific, we have an alliance interest in helping carry some of the weight. Given the caution<\/a> inherent in Obama\u2019s don\u2019t-do-stupid-stuff<\/a> doctrine and warning that \u2018just because we have the best hammer doesn\u2019t mean every problem is a nail<\/a>\u2019, it\u2019s doubtful we need to restrain US adventurism.<\/p>\n

Second, whereas our prodding of Russia has been criticised as talking loudly while carrying a small stick, we\u2019ve a direct stake in reducing Middle Eastern instability and some ability to assist. While some experts suggest we\u2019ll need to get used to the idea of a post-Iraq Middle East<\/a>, a rapid and bloody unravelling and partition could kill thousands and displace millions<\/a>. It would exacerbate the humanitarian disaster, further stress refugee camps (historically a recruiting ground for extremists), and leave vast swathes of ungoverned\u2014or ISIL-governed\u2014territory. Despite warnings that Australia may be spreading itself too thin<\/a> or could become distracted from important tasks in our own neighbourhood<\/a>, our interests don\u2019t stop at our shores. The ADF can and should make a proportionate contribution.<\/p>\n

Third, we need to keep in mind what success might look like, and the costs and risks of pursuing it. Lessons from Libya point to both the promise and limits of relying primarily on air power. There, the West faced a mainly uniformed, coherent adversary. While ISIL has some features of a state, it could revert to being a more conventional ideological terrorist group<\/a> if faced with military might; an idea is much harder to defeat than a state. Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen\u2014Obama\u2019s examples of success\u2014are still alive and kicking. We\u2019re more likely to be able to degrade ISIL than defeat it, especially if we\u2019re looking at success in terms of months rather than decades.<\/p>\n

Fourth, we should recognise the tension between a military imperative for boots-on-the-ground and a political imperative to minimise the same. As colleagues have noted, some advisers probably need to accompany the troops<\/a> they\u2019re mentoring to help them fight effectively. Such advisers could also reduce the likelihood that Shia militias operating alongside troops we\u2019re mentoring will indulge in bloodletting of their own. And they just might give those under ISIL\u2019s rule some confidence they could safely \u2018turn on their ferocious allies<\/a>\u2019 in another \u2018awakening\u2019. Additionally, an inclusive Iraqi government is vital to long-term success; our on-the-ground support encourages Baghdad to respond to that concern (PM al-Abadi\u2019s cabinet remains heavily Shia-dominated<\/a>),<\/p>\n

Furthermore, the mission\u2019s already bigger than politicians acknowledge, as the 1,600 American troops committed so far don\u2019t include the contractors and government civilians supporting the mission (during Afghanistan\u2019s 2013 fighting season there were 1.6 contractors<\/a> for every soldier). The US Defense Department put out a notice in August<\/a> to gauge interest in \u2018security assistance mentors for Iraq\u2019, some of whom will, no doubt, be Aussies.<\/p>\n

But the recent change in public sentiment from opposition<\/a> to support for military action\u2014driven by disgust and fury<\/a> at the beheadings of two American journalists and a British aid-worker\u2014may erode quickly. Forty-nine per cent of Americans<\/a> now think it was a mistake sending forces to Afghanistan, despite the searing impact of 9\/11. Public appetite for another \u2018long war\u2019 is unlikely to match the patience of an ideological \u2018death-cult<\/a>\u2019 in Iraq, or the desperation of those caught up in life-or-death struggles in the \u2018baddies-vs-baddies\u2019 cauldron of Syria. Public support could be tested once body bags start coming home and pictures of innocent casualties emerge, given the legacy of doubts about our previous role in Iraq and patchy results of protracted operations in Afghanistan. The government\u2019s doing much to dash expectations that this will be a quick, clean, or straight-forward mission\u2014but it should do even more.<\/p>\n

While particular caution is required in foreign policy ventures far from home, and it\u2019s unlikely ISIL can be defeated through military means alone<\/a>, Australia\u2019s right to join the coalition. Airstrikes and advisers are insufficient, but necessary.<\/p>\n

Karl Claxton<\/a><\/em> is an analyst at ASPI. Brieana Marticorena is a visiting fellow at ASPI. Edited image courtesy of Flickr user Bart<\/em><\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As Australia dispatches half a squadron of fighter-bombers, a significant special forces contingent, and support elements ahead of likely coalition action against ISIL, most commentary falls into either the \u2018bomb the hell out of them\u2019 …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":100,"featured_media":15917,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[225,128,191,895,274,31],"class_list":["post-15915","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-air-power","tag-counterinsurgency","tag-iraq","tag-islamic-state","tag-syria","tag-united-states"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nBack to Iraq: the first problem\u2019s a nail | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" 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