{"id":16425,"date":"2014-10-20T14:30:59","date_gmt":"2014-10-20T03:30:59","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=16425"},"modified":"2014-10-21T08:13:43","modified_gmt":"2014-10-20T21:13:43","slug":"is-australias-influence-over-papua-new-guinea-declining","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/is-australias-influence-over-papua-new-guinea-declining\/","title":{"rendered":"Is Australia\u2019s influence over Papua New Guinea declining?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>Australian Defence white papers have long identified the strategic import of \u2018a secure South Pacific and Timor-Leste\u2019<\/a>. As renowned strategic thinker T.B. Millar once reflected<\/a>, Papua New Guinea is an \u2018an exposed and vulnerable front door\u2019, as if it was in \u2018hostile hands\u2019 it would \u2018make attacks on our east coast much easier\u2014Port Moresby, after all, is closer to Sydney than Darwin is\u2019.<\/p>\n Australia is Papua New Guinea\u2019s largest aid and military donor (primarily via the Defence Cooperation Program and the Pacific Patrol Boat program), and trade \u00a0and investment \u00a0partner<\/a>. Australia also effectively gave PNG a security guarantee under the 1987 Joint Declaration of Principles<\/em><\/a>, as reaffirmed in the 2000 Defence White Paper<\/a> (PDF). Consequently, Australia has been able to exercise considerable influence over Papua New Guinea for much of the period since its independence.<\/p>\n This situation is changing. Papua New Guinea now has new opportunities which are eroding Australia\u2019s influence.<\/p>\n First, changes to the broader Asia-Pacific power structure have generated geopolitical opportunities. The \u2018rise\u2019 of China has motivated the United States to \u2018pivot\u2019 or \u2018rebalance\u2019 to the Asia-Pacific. While there is only a minimal risk that China and the United States will engage in zero-sum competition for military influence<\/a>, both powers have engaged more extensively with Papua New Guinea in the diplomatic, aid and economic realms. Japan, Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia, Iran, Cuba, Russia and the United Arab Emirates are also becoming involved as aid donors and diplomatic partners. As Papua New Guinea has more choice of external partners, it no longer necessarily needs to identify itself as falling within an uncontested Australia and New Zealand sphere of influence.<\/p>\n Second, that increased choice has opened up regional opportunities. Since 1971, the dominant regional political institution has been the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), comprising all independent regional states, along with Australia and New Zealand. Empowered by their greater choice of partners and encouraged by an emboldened Fiji, Papua New Guinea and other regional states are creating, or strengthening, alternative regional and sub-regional institutions and organisations such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group<\/a> and Pacific Islands Development Forum<\/a> that exclude Australia, New Zealand and other traditional partners.<\/p>\n Papua New Guinea is also a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and is seeking full membership of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which it currently has observer status. Papua New Guinea, along with Fiji and Vanuatu, has also joined the Non-Aligned Movement. Fiji has encouraged South Pacific states to form an alternative caucus grouping at the United Nations, the \u2018Pacific Small Island Developing States\u2019 (PSIDS) group, which has effectively replaced the PIF in this role.<\/p>\n Papua New Guinea\u2019s growing confidence has been enhanced by its economic opportunities. Its Southern Highlands are home to the massive Exxon-Mobil LNG project, which it is predicted will generate total revenue for the government of about US$31bn to 2040<\/a>. \u00a0It also receives revenue from several other natural resource projects, including the $1.5bn Ramu nickel mine, in which Chinese companies have invested, and has the potential for deep-sea mining.<\/p>\n As a result of its opportunities, Papua New Guinea is less likely to be susceptible to Australian influence in the future.<\/p>\n The most notable recent example of Australia\u2019s declining influence are the circumstances surrounding the arrangements to process and resettle asylum seekers in Papua New Guinea. These arrangements have their antecedents in the 2001 \u2018Pacific Solution\u2019, which introduced processing of asylum seekers in Papua New Guinea and Nauru (it ended in 2008). In exchange, Australia made no additional development assistance payments to Papua New Guinea.<\/p>\n In contrast, under the 2013 arrangements<\/a>, Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Peter O\u2019Neill demanded\u2014and received\u2014a total re-alignment of Australia\u2019s aid program<\/a> to support his government\u2019s priorities. Australia has agreed to provide<\/a> an extra $420m of development assistance, on top of the projected $507.2m in assistance budgeted for Papua New Guinea in 2013\u201314.<\/p>\n Moreover, when the arrangement was agreed, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd indicated his understanding that most refugees would be resettled in Papua New Guinea<\/a>. This belief was shared by Tony Abbott<\/a>. In March 2014, O\u2019Neill contradicted both Rudd and Abbott by announcing that Papua New Guinea will only resettle \u2018some\u2019 people whose claims are recognised<\/a>. While O\u2019Neill recanted that statement<\/a> in April 2014, the fact that he felt empowered to openly contradict two Australian prime ministers suggests a growing degree of confidence in Papua New Guinea\u2019s attitude to Australia.<\/p>\n Australia may find itself with less influence over its relationship with Papua New Guinea in the future, which will have important strategic implications. Unfortunately, it\u2019s not yet clear that the Australian government has come to this realisation.<\/p>\n Joanne Wallis<\/a> is a lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, where she also convenes the Asia-Pacific Security program. The journal article on which this post is based was recently published in Security Challenges and is available <\/em>here<\/a>. Image courtesy of Flickr user Global Panorama<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Australian Defence white papers have long identified the strategic import of \u2018a secure South Pacific and Timor-Leste\u2019. As renowned strategic thinker T.B. Millar once reflected, Papua New Guinea is an \u2018an exposed and vulnerable front …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":26,"featured_media":16434,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[118],"tags":[17,123,894,717,757,357,99],"class_list":["post-16425","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-australia-and-its-region","tag-australia","tag-development-aid","tag-international-relations","tag-pacific-islands-forum","tag-pacific-patrol-boat","tag-papua-new-guinea","tag-south-pacific"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n