{"id":16484,"date":"2014-10-23T06:00:09","date_gmt":"2014-10-22T19:00:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=16484"},"modified":"2014-10-31T12:49:33","modified_gmt":"2014-10-31T01:49:33","slug":"revising-the-guidelines-for-us-japan-defence-cooperation-a-global-alliance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/revising-the-guidelines-for-us-japan-defence-cooperation-a-global-alliance\/","title":{"rendered":"Revising the guidelines for US\u2013Japan defence cooperation: a \u2018global\u2019 alliance?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>Recently, the US and Japan released the Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation<\/em><\/a> (PDF). The revision\u2019s the first since 1997 and occurs in the context of Asia-Pacific power shifts. So countries in the region are watching closely just how much the US\u2013<\/strong>Japan alliance is changing, both practically and conceptually. That includes the Australian government, which has long been supportive of a more \u2018active\u2019 Japanese security and defence policy at both the regional and global level. It\u2019s a line Japan\u2019s current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has also been pushing.<\/p>\n Indeed, the five-page interim report points to the prospect of a US\u2013<\/strong>Japan alliance moving beyond a narrow focus on the territorial defence of Japan against major aggression (from China or North Korea, for example). Instead, it\u2019s based on a \u2018strategic vision for a more expansive partnership\u2019 and the need to build the alliance as a \u2018platform for international cooperation that would continue to make positive contributions to the region and beyond\u2019. It stresses that among other things future bilateral defence cooperation would focus on:<\/p>\n Moreover, the report\u2019s interesting for what it doesn\u2019t say: in recognition of the expanding scope of geographical cooperation, the report doesn\u2019t mention \u2018situations in areas surrounding Japan\u2019, a phrase that underpinned the 1997 guidelines.<\/p>\n While the five-page document isn\u2019t specific on details, the report provides some ideas on what these three aforementioned headings might entail. When it comes to \u2018seamlessly\u2019 ensuring Japan\u2019s peace and security, it observes that there could be \u2018cases where swift and robust responses are required to secure the peace and security of Japan even when an armed attack against Japan is not involved<\/em> [italics mine]\u2019. In other words, in theory at least, Japan could be asked to provide protection for US forces in hostile environments beyond its immediate neighbourhood; for instance in the area of ship-based ballistic-missile defence.<\/p>\n Concerning increased \u2018cooperation for regional and global peace and security\u2019, the document notes that \u2018areas of cooperation to be described may include, but are not limited to\u2019: peacekeeping operations; international Humanitarian Assistance\/Disaster Relief; maritime security; capacity building; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; logistics support; and non-combatant evacuation operations. While the US continues to try to reassure Japan about its security commitments (for instance, the US Navy just announced plans to forward deploy three more ballistic-missile-defence-capable destroyers to Japan<\/a> over the next three years), Washington also sees the revised guidelines as a chance to move the alliance beyond Tokyo\u2019s preoccupation with the \u2018China threat\u2019.<\/p>\n How likely is the emergence of a more \u2018global\u2019 US\u2013<\/strong>Japan alliance? The good news is that Japanese officials involved in drafting the interim report agreed to the report\u2019s language, probably in anticipation of the Abe government\u2019s expectations. Moreover, Japan has been stepping up its Asia-Pacific defence engagement. For example, it agreed to provide both the Philippines<\/a> and Vietnam<\/a> with modern Coast Guard vessels. As well, Japan and India are in talks about the possible sale of Japanese amphibious aircraft. Lastly, there\u2019s still the prospect of a submarine deal with Australia.<\/p>\n But serious obstacles stand in the way of a truly global\u2014or even regionally more active\u2014US\u2013<\/strong>Japan alliance. For a start, Japan\u2019s new \u2018three conditions for the \u201cuse of force\u201d as measures for self-defense\u2019 still impose significant restrictions on the Self-Defense Forces in the exercise of Japan\u2019s right of collective self-defence. If Japan decides to support the US in a regional or global contingency, it\u2019ll probably remain strictly limited to tasks such as logistical support or minesweeping outside the area of actual combat. Moreover, despite much talk about Japan\u2019s \u2018remilitarisation\u2019, in reality there\u2019s no such thing. As Brad Glosserman and David Kang<\/a> have observed:<\/p>\n Japan\u2019s defense policies are evolving to keep pace with a changing regional environment, but the idea that Tokyo will be able to threaten its neighbors is just not credible. There is no will, nor the capability to do so.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n As I\u2019ve argued (here<\/a> and here<\/a>), Japan\u2019s defence policy remains fundamentally defensive in nature. As Alessio Patalano has shown<\/a> (paywalled), Japan\u2019s naval modernisation reflects a \u2018targeted enhancement\u2019 of capabilities required for the protection of its sea lanes, particularly in the area of anti-submarine warfare and basic expeditionary capabilities to safeguard its many islands. Moreover, security reform in Japan remains a cumbersome process<\/a>\u00a0(PDF)\u2014and there are already signs that attempts to flesh out at the legislative level what exactly the JSDF could or couldn\u2019t do in support of the US in a conflict mightn\u2019t come to fruition any time soon. Lastly, the Japanese side\u2019s apparently<\/a> frustrated that the interim report emphasises the alliance\u2019s global role but makes no mention of China.<\/p>\n We\u2019ll have to see what the final guidelines bring. But in any case, it\u2019s prudent to expect evolutionary, not revolutionary, changes in the US\u2013<\/strong>Japan alliance\u2014and in Japan\u2019s defence policy in particular.<\/p>\n Benjamin Schreer<\/em><\/a> is a senior analyst at ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr user U.S. Pacific Command<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Recently, the US and Japan released the Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation (PDF). The revision\u2019s the first since 1997 and occurs in the context of Asia-Pacific power shifts. …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":41,"featured_media":16486,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[118,1],"tags":[40,51,135,31],"class_list":["post-16484","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-australia-and-its-region","category-general","tag-alliance-2","tag-defence-cooperation","tag-japan","tag-united-states"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n\n