{"id":16509,"date":"2014-10-22T15:47:47","date_gmt":"2014-10-22T04:47:47","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=16509"},"modified":"2014-10-23T08:26:23","modified_gmt":"2014-10-22T21:26:23","slug":"goughs-remaking-of-foreign-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/goughs-remaking-of-foreign-policy\/","title":{"rendered":"Gough\u2019s remaking of foreign policy"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>Gough Whitlam helped Australia think about finding its security in<\/em> Asia, not to seek security from<\/em> Asia.<\/p>\n Not least of Whitlam\u2019s achievements was to make Australia colour-blind, in both word and deed. Harold Holt\u2019s government, in 1966, started a quiet\u2014almost covert\u2014dismantling of the White Australia policy with camouflage language about \u2018flexibility\u2019. Whitlam\u2019s government used trumpets and drums to kill the White Australia policy as loudly as possible. To the enduring chagrin of Liberals, Labor has claimed the policy honours, based on Whitlam\u2019s characteristically emphatic and emotionally-charged embrace of non-discriminatory immigration.<\/p>\n As the Vietnam War edged to its bloody end, Whitlam\u2019s thinking didn\u2019t retreat from the region along with Australia\u2019s troops. He wrote in his memoirs that \u2018forward defence\u2019 was based on the \u2018xenophobic belief that Australia was best defended from Asia\u2019. That \u2018defended from Asia\u2019 line reflected several layers of Oz nightmare.<\/p>\n Whitlam\u2019s dismantling of immigration xenophobia was mirrored in his language on defence:<\/p>\n We do not see Southeast Asia as a frontier where we might fight nameless Asian enemies as far to the north of our own shores as possible\u2014in other people’s backyards.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n In his policy speech for the 1972 election, Whitlam committed to diplomatic recognition of China, an end to military conscription and the maintenance of the alliance with the US as one of Australia\u2019s \u2018two great associations\u2019 (the other was the Commonwealth). Whitlam made four foreign policy commitments \u2018commensurate to our power and resources\u2019:<\/p>\n Whitlam set a pattern for Australian commitment to the region and Australian support for regionalism that has been sustained by every subsequent government. No less an authority than John Howard nominates Whitlam as the foundational leader for the Great Asia Project<\/a> that has united every leader since 1972.<\/p>\n Whitlam\u2019s regionalist wins were minor (Australia as ASEAN\u2019s first dialogue partner) compared to later achievements, especially the Hawke government\u2019s creation of APEC and the Howard government\u2019s seat at the East Asia Summit.<\/p>\n But the language and the orientation Hawke used and Howard utilised drew directly from Whitlam\u2019s effort in his first days in office to create an Asia Pacific forum. That forum idea was quickly killed off by Indonesia, in an early demonstration of the veto ASEAN could wield over regional initiatives from Canberra.<\/p>\n Outlining his Asia forum idea in January, 1973, Whitlam said he didn\u2019t want to change and enlarge ASEAN, but to create a broader regional association for Asia and the Pacific, to develop ‘a truly representative regional community\u2019. That grouping should include all of ASEAN and, in line with ASEAN language, Whitlam said it would ‘insulate the region against ideological interference from the great powers\u2019.<\/p>\n The following month, Whitlam flew to Jakarta \u2018to demonstrate the political and economic interest that Australia would now take in the region\u2019. Whitlam later remarked that Suharto was \u2018frank\u2019; indeed he was. Indonesia\u2019s President said there weren\u2019t enough common interests within Asia for Whitlam\u2019s forum to be practicable. The Australian record quoted Suharto as doubting the \u2018usefulness of a formal conference or organisation. This would only aggravate conflicting interests. ASEAN also needed to be consolidated beforehand\u2019. Suharto said he wouldn\u2019t want India as a member of an Asia Pacific grouping and there\u2019d be questions about Chinese participation. We\u2019ve all come a long way since then, and the journey has reflected Whitlam\u2019s vision, not Suharto\u2019s fears.<\/p>\n Whitlam\u2019s final-and-forever embedding of a non-discriminatory immigration policy stands as a supreme achievement, domestically and internationally. It was as foundational in its meaning for Australian foreign policy as the opening to China, so well described by Ross Terrill<\/a>.<\/p>\n Whitlam\u2019s embrace of Indonesia was equally fundamental; Tony Abbott\u2019s presence at the inauguration of Indonesia\u2019s President testifies to the continuing strength of this policy strand. Ironically, Whitlam\u2019s successful embrace of Suharto became his foreign policy nemesis\u2014East Timor.<\/p>\n Whitlam put two points to Suharto in September, 1974. First, East Timor should become part of Indonesia. Second, incorporation \u2018should happen in accordance with the properly expressed wishes of the people of Portuguese Timor\u2019. As the head of Foreign Affairs, Alan Renouf, later wrote, Whitlam changed Australia\u2019s position to a two-pronged policy when the two points were irreconcilable. Suharto embraced Whitlam\u2019s first point and ignored the second. It took 25 years to undo the damage to Australia-Indonesia relations and the deadly costs for East Timor.<\/p>\n Whitlam\u2019s East Timor blunder stemmed from his ambitions for Australia in Asia. The Timor stain touches the edge of the Whitlam toga, but it doesn\u2019t gainsay that he was a big man who dreamed big dreams of Australia\u2019s role in its own region. Gough Whitlam did much to launch Australia\u2019s Great Asia Project and much that he dreamed has come to pass.<\/p>\n\n