{"id":16723,"date":"2014-11-04T06:00:12","date_gmt":"2014-11-03T19:00:12","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=16723"},"modified":"2014-11-06T10:58:26","modified_gmt":"2014-11-05T23:58:26","slug":"asian-security-responsible-orders-and-responsible-actors","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/asian-security-responsible-orders-and-responsible-actors\/","title":{"rendered":"Asian security: responsible orders and responsible actors"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>At the centre of Australian strategic policy lies a puzzle: how do we grow a responsibility-sharing order<\/a> in an Asia of rapidly shifting power relativities? The traditional answer has been to nurture new forms of regional security architecture that would embrace the full range of key players, strengthen the concept of a regional community, and articulate \u2018rules of the road\u2019 to codify regional strategic behaviour.<\/p>\n We\u2019ve pursued that strategy over a number of years as a complement to other strands of our policy, including maintaining our alliance with the US (hoping thereby to ensure continued US regional primacy), strengthening the self-reliant capabilities of the ADF, and attempting to grow what might be called \u2018critical mass\u2019 in Southeast Asia. We were ASEAN\u2019s first dialogue partner, we played a role in the design of APEC, we were a keen supporter of the emergence of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and we campaigned for an expansion of the East Asia Summit and its prioritisation within the range of regional architectures.<\/p>\n In a region characterised by nationalism and bilateralism we\u2019ve championed multilateralism as the principal vehicle not just to harness responsibility but to grow it. As Bob Carr wrote<\/a> back in July 2012:<\/p>\n The expansion of the EAS \u2026 creates an institution with the membership and mandate to help manage an increasingly crowded strategic landscape, ensure outward-looking regionalism continues as the bedrock of Asia-Pacific integration and foster habits of cooperation.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n That positive picture of regional institutions\u2014with all their managing, ensuring and fostering\u2014has typically been complemented by a negative one of the capacity of individual nations to be part of the solution. As Carr put it:<\/p>\n The strategic rationale for the expanded EAS remains as it was when the idea of such an Asia Pacific community was first promoted by the Australian Government. No national responses\u2014no matter how well crafted\u2014will be enough to resolve the range of challenges confronting us…<\/p><\/blockquote>\n But that way of thinking about the problem is changing. Policy hardheads have long argued that multilateral institutions can\u2019t do much of the heavy lifting. Yes, having an ARF and an EAS has value. But even with expanded memberships and greater diplomatic buy-in from key players, the structures meet too infrequently, and chase the low-hanging fruit too determinedly, to provide real confidence that they\u2019ll be effective shapers of the emerging Asia. So increasingly we\u2019re seeing Australian\u2014and regional\u2014policymakers fit another string to the bow.<\/p>\n In short, policymakers are increasingly trying to grow a responsible order in Asia by working more closely with those individual actors that they judge to be already<\/em> responsible. How do we separate regional actors, though, into those we think make \u2018responsible\u2019 contributions to the order and those who don\u2019t? All states do some<\/em> things that make them look responsible. And some we think of as responsible do things we don\u2019t like\u2014they hunt whales, for example. So a lot turns upon a state\u2019s specific level of commitment to a stable, liberal, prosperous order.<\/p>\n Growing responsibility at the regional level, then, doesn\u2019t just mean showing up for multilateral meetings, and devising new rules of the road. It includes empowering responsible actors vis-\u00e0-vis others and working with them, individually, to strengthen what we think are the principal features of the emerging regional order. Some of that work will risk being seen as strategic balancing because some of it is: we can\u2019t build a regional order that has rules on one side of the fulcrum and power on the other. Even responsible orders require defenders. But a commitment to building an order by bilateral spade-work frees us from our earlier mythology of believing that everyone has to belong to the same club. In a deep sense, that doesn\u2019t matter\u2014what matters is their willingness to row in time towards a common objective.<\/p>\n India and the NPT is a classic case. It can\u2019t join the NPT as a nuclear-weapon state, but it can behave in ways that mimic P5 behavioural traits, including by accepting a world of few nuclear states, the need for strict controls on nuclear materials, and the obligation of being a responsible, self-deterred great power. What\u2019s true for India and the NPT is also true for other countries and other regional order-building institutions: what matters isn\u2019t membership, but support for the principle of order-building. If the region\u2019s filled with responsible actors, it won\u2019t much matter what the architecture looks like.<\/p>\n If we\u2019re entering an age when more regional players head down that bilateral order-building route, we should expect to see a partial eclipse of the importance of regional institutions. In their place, we\u2019ll see larger roles played by strong-willed, extroverted national leaders prepared to push an order-building agenda. Over recent decades we\u2019ve become used to strong-willed national leaders in Asia\u2014but introverted ones. Extroverted leaders will be a new phenomenon. The order-building prizes will go the leaders who can do most both to enhance responsibility-sharing and to strengthen responsible partners in that environment.<\/p>\n Rod Lyon<\/em><\/a>\u00a0is a fellow at ASPI and executive editor of\u00a0<\/em>The Strategist. Edited image courtesy of Flickr user Fernando Garcia<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" At the centre of Australian strategic policy lies a puzzle: how do we grow a responsibility-sharing order in an Asia of rapidly shifting power relativities? The traditional answer has been to nurture new forms of …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":16728,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[767,189,143,473,69,206,142,305],"class_list":["post-16723","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-arf","tag-asean","tag-asia-pacific","tag-east-asia-summit","tag-india","tag-non-proliferation","tag-regional-security","tag-treaty"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n