{"id":17086,"date":"2014-11-27T06:00:50","date_gmt":"2014-11-26T19:00:50","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=17086"},"modified":"2014-12-02T07:13:24","modified_gmt":"2014-12-01T20:13:24","slug":"17086","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/17086\/","title":{"rendered":"Thinking about the future"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>The topic I was given at the recent Submarine Institute of Australia conference was \u2018The Strategic Environment in the period 2020-2050\u2019. That gave me a chance to reprise in part a lecture I gave in 2010 at the Australian National University, when I was asked to prognosticate about the Asian security environment in 2050.<\/p>\n As Neils Bohr is reputed to have said<\/a>, prediction is difficult, especially about the future. (He was half right, as we\u2019ll see below.) But at least this was a topic on which I wasn\u2019t handicapped by any pretence of being an expert, which would\u2019ve increased my chances of being wrong<\/a>. So I started off thinking about the lessons of history; how I would\u2019ve done had I been asked in 1910 to talk about the European security environment in 1950. I would\u2019ve started with the status quo; in 1910, the major powers would be those in the first column of the table below.<\/p>\n In 1910, I\u2019d know about aeroplanes and submarines\u2014and the experts of the time would assure me that while they\u2019ll likely be of some marginal utility in warfare, they\u2019ll be unlikely to replace, or even seriously rival, tried and tested military systems such as the newly commissioned HMS Dreadnought<\/a>. And I\u2019d know about the political and economic theory of Marx and Engels<\/a>. But even if I read widely, I\u2019d have no way of knowing about the atomic nucleus, the discovery of which was announced by Rutherford a year later.<\/p>\n By 1950, the power structure of Europe looked like the second column of the table, and the USA and USSR\u2014the latter now firmly a communist state\u2014were both nuclear powers. What had been a concert of European royal houses with complex and intertwined security guarantees and alliances had become a bipolar, politically charged nuclear-armed standoff. There\u2019s no reasonable prospect of being able to predict a change of that sort\u2014although H. G. Wells gave it a red hot go<\/a>.<\/p>\n Table: Key European players and security relationships in 1910 and 1950<\/strong><\/p>\n