STOVL<\/a> version. But even if that can be achieved and the money found somewhere, you still have the second predicament: opportunity cost.<\/p>\nUsing one of our two LHDs to provide intimate air-cover for a task force sounds great, but it\u2019d drastically cut the number of troops carried\u2014and that\u2019s the whole idea of the vessels. It would also halve operational flexibility (by restricting landings to simply one beachhead). The idea of converting one of our purpose-built Landing Helicopter Docks into a pathetically small and inefficient aircraft carrier, rather than using it to do the job it was bought for, just doesn’t make sense.<\/p>\n
There\u2019s another alternative, of course. If we wanted to operate a small air detachment, we could buy a third LHD. That one could be specifically designed to operate the F-35B and would provide all the good things that come with such vessels. But pause to think for a moment and you\u2019ll realise why that won\u2019t happen either.<\/p>\n
For a start, you\u2019d need a new version of the aircraft and another, different, type of ship. Neither of those bits of equipment would quite be orphans, but they wouldn\u2019t be part of the existing family either. Effectively we\u2019d be asking the taxpayer to pay for the acquisition of a new capacity. The last time we had a real carrier was almost 50 years ago. It would have to line up in the list of budget priorities and fight against all the other spending demands.<\/p>\n
I can hear the questions now: So we\u2019re not at war, you can\u2019t tell me what this capacity is for, or who we\u2019d be operating against\u2014you just think it might come in handy? Nice try, but we\u2019ll have a hospital\/tax cut instead, thanks.<\/p>\n
Put yourself in a politician\u2019s shoes. What are you going to buy\u2014a third LHD in case we need to provide air cover tomorrow or a hospital to serve one of today\u2019s quick-growing marginal electorates? I know where I\u2019d spend my money.<\/p>\n
John Howard’s government was urged by some to consider the possibility of a third LHD when it made the original decision. It chose instead to retain an option to build a fourth AWD. But the economic environment has changed. The government\u2019s commitment to return to spending 2% of GDP (at some unspecified date in the future) does indicate a willingness to spend on the military. However that doesn\u2019t mean it\u2019ll choose to prioritise a new capability such as this in the future\u2014particularly when it\u2019s suffering such political grief for cutting allowances today.<\/p>\n
In the Middle East, our Super Hornet pilots regularly operate on missions of more than 10 hours, topping up their aircraft once or even twice from the terrific KC-30A multi-role tankers of 35 Squadron. Operating out of Al Minhad wouldn\u2019t be anyone\u2019s first choice. Perhaps you might like to ask the government why we can\u2019t fly our aircraft from Iraq. Actually, perhaps not. That opens up a whole can of worms that nobody\u2019s keen to address. The point is, it\u2019s a long flight, but the pilots cope.<\/p>\n
There\u2019s a case for the F-35B but it has nothing to do with ships. What’s missing from this discussion is the increasing lethality and destructiveness of long-range missiles.<\/p>\n
The problem with the conventional version of the aircraft is that it requires a runway to take off from. That restricts its operations to locations with airstrips. But today\u2019s long-range missiles are deadly accurate. They might miss the JSFs, but they wouldn’t need to be tipped with nuclear devices to destroy the tarmac (or at least damage it enough to severely inhibit operations).<\/p>\n
The very trends in increasing missile accuracy that militate against the acquisition of any sort of carrier are also, over time, likely to have an inhibiting effect on where aircraft can be deployed. Missile range is increasing as costs decrease. It’s possible to make an argument for purchasing the F-35B along those lines by stressing their utility in forward operational areas.<\/p>\n
Still, I can’t help feeling that cost considerations will also consign that option to the same dustbin as the aircraft-carrier.<\/p>\n
There was, I believe, a good argument to be made for incorporating the STOVL version as a part of our original purchase of aircraft. That chance has gone. Finding the extra money needed to buy, operate and maintain the F-35B will now be impossible.<\/p>\n
Nic Stuart is a columnist with<\/em> The\u00a0Canberra Times. Edited image courtesy of Flickr user UK Ministry of Defence<\/a>.<\/i><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Yes, it\u2019s a good thing that the debate about the possibility of buying the F-35B has \u2018opened up\u2019. But that\u2019s simply because it\u2019s good to talk. Politics will prevent it from maturing beyond a completely …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":16,"featured_media":17235,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[44,429,33,26,1043,39,628],"class_list":["post-17230","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australian-defence-force","tag-adf","tag-capability","tag-defence-spending","tag-f-35b","tag-joint-strike-fighter","tag-lhd"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
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