{"id":17267,"date":"2014-12-05T06:00:38","date_gmt":"2014-12-04T19:00:38","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=17267"},"modified":"2014-12-09T09:36:34","modified_gmt":"2014-12-08T22:36:34","slug":"graphs-of-the-week-f-35-costs-re-re-revisited","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/graphs-of-the-week-f-35-costs-re-re-revisited\/","title":{"rendered":"Graph(s) of the week: F-35 costs re-re-revisited"},"content":{"rendered":"
While the Australian Government has already made its decision to go ahead with procuring a total of 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, there’s still cause to watch the progress of the development program. Australia will most likely take delivery of the bulk of its aircraft about five years from now, which given the lead times for major components, means we’ll start paying for them around 2017 or so. But at the moment we don’t know what the final bill will be, so ASPI will continue to monitor the F-35 cost data.<\/p>\n
I’ve reported on F-35 costs and schedules a few times before on The Strategist<\/em>\u2014most recently<\/a> after the release of this year’s USAF budget papers. That contained some good news, pointing towards stability in program costs over the past few years. But the USAF is far from being a dispassionate observer of the F-35 program, as it’s in desperate need of new aircraft<\/a> to recapitalise its tactical fleet. So it’s worth looking at the data provided by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) as well.<\/p>\n The Pentagon and the GAO have often seen the F-35 program through quite different lenses. The GAO was especially critical of the management and performance of the program in the period 2002\u20132010, while the Pentagon tended to play down the problems. The verdict of history is pretty unequivocal on that one: the GAO was right, and after the program breached a Congressional threshold for cost overruns<\/a> in 2010 it was subjected to a major re-baselining.<\/p>\n