{"id":17549,"date":"2014-12-17T14:30:11","date_gmt":"2014-12-17T03:30:11","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=17549"},"modified":"2014-12-18T08:53:38","modified_gmt":"2014-12-17T21:53:38","slug":"forget-the-carrier-option-an-engineers-response","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/forget-the-carrier-option-an-engineers-response\/","title":{"rendered":"Forget the carrier option: an engineer\u2019s response"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"An<\/a><\/figure>\n

Nic Stuart\u2019s piece, \u2018Forget the carrier option\u2019<\/a>, makes a large and important judgment: that politics and defence funding won\u2019t allow the option of deploying F-35Bs on Australia\u2019s LHDs. But in making that case Nic repeats erroneous assumptions that are hindering a true exchange of views. It\u2019s vital that defence reviews are supported with facts\u2014and some of them bear repetition.<\/p>\n

First up, the technical facts. F-35B operations from LHDs are feasible. The F-35B is specifically designed not to drive major ship modifications. The LHD wouldn\u2019t need \u2018conversion\u2019 to take F-35Bs, although it would require minor modifications, similar to those being applied to the USN \u2018Wasp\u2019 class. The flight deck is capable of taking an F-35B. The F-35B won\u2019t require massive changes to the ships\u2019 air-traffic control facilities, assuming that they are already up to operating rotary-wing aircraft day or night in bad weather. It won\u2019t need huge changes to ship structure or facilities.<\/p>\n

Those modifications would\u2019nt \u2018cost a great deal\u2019, as Nic stated. And to repeat, giving the LHD an ability to operate F-35B doesn\u2019t mean turning it into a \u2018mini aircraft carrier\u2019.<\/p>\n

Next, remarkable assumptions are being made about what embarked F-35Bs would do. Nic\u2019s piece says that their role would be to provide \u2018intimate air-cover\u2019\u2014a new and intriguing term. With a range of over 300 nautical miles, the most \u2018intimate\u2019 aspect of an F-35B air defence would probably be the effect of an AIM-120 warhead on an incoming threat. But that misses the key point: putting F-35Bs on an LHD would allow more effective use of all the aircraft\u2019s capabilities, including precision-strike and ISTAR support, by putting the aircraft closer to the fight. As another article puts it, \u2018proximity equals capability\u2019. But be in no doubt, air cover will be a requirement for a task group operating anywhere near an enemy air threat. It won\u2019t, as the article somewhat dismissively puts it, be a \u2018nice to have\u2019.<\/p>\n

Nic assumes that the RAN would have to buy a third LHD (or a different ship optimised for F-35B) to make the exercise \u2018worthwhile\u2019. With this leap of logic, he argues that an F-35B option is unaffordable. But this is not a given. The two LHDs are highly capable and flexible assets\u2014their Air Groups will be adjusted to meet the demands of future situations. Yes, embarking F-35Bs will displace some of the planned Air Group. But Tailored Air Groups (TAGs) are a common-place and well-understood way of using small decks to best effect. And be in no doubt, the ADF will have to adjust the LHD Air Groups in the future.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s almost certain that whatever operational assumptions the LHDs were bought against will change, and change fast. And the way the LHDs will be equipped and operated will need to change. Will amphibious operations be ADF only? Would both LHDs be available? Would they be part of an international task group with USMC participation? Would they be required to go where there might be an enemy air threat? We don\u2019t know. But the ADF has to make the best use of the two ships they\u2019ve got. Sticking to the line that \u2018we can\u2019t do it because that would mean changing our defence planning assumptions\u2019 is guaranteed to make it worse.<\/p>\n

Nic\u2019s article also baldly states that F-35Bs on an LHD would be \u2018pathetically inefficient\u2019. That\u2019s a bold claim, and should be examined against the actual experience of the RN and the USMC\u2019s STOVL units over the last 30 years or so. (Actually, it\u2019s eerily familiar to the arguments against the Sea Harrier\/\u2019Invincible\u2019 class combination in the late 1970s. Those went away after what happened in the South Atlantic in 1982.) But it\u2019s quite true that the issue of \u2018efficiency\u2019 should be considered, particularly for long-range air operations.<\/p>\n

Nic asserts that \u2018our pilots can cope\u2019 with long flight times. Yes, of course they can, but that\u2019s not the issue. Burning \u2018more than 10 hours\u2019 of flight time to deliver around 25 minutes of \u2018air power\u2019 might not be especially \u2018efficient\u2019. Critics of the F-35B\/LHD option should do the maths on how many land-based aircraft (and tanker slots) are needed to provide continuous, reactive, air support at long range. Do some fuel-usage calculations. Now put 5 or 6 F-35Bs with the task group, on three-minute alert posture, 50 miles from the target and do the maths again. Now decide which option is \u2018inefficient\u2019. It\u2019s a simple effect of geography. Proponents of the F-35B\/LHD option aren\u2019t saying it\u2019s a replacement for land-based air power. It\u2019s for when land-based aircraft, for reasons of pure physics, can\u2019t do the job.<\/p>\n

Finally, the article says: \u2018There was\u2026a good argument to be made for incorporating the STOVL version as a part of our original purchase of aircraft\u2019. Agreed. It then says that \u2018That chance has gone\u2019. Not agreed. There\u2019s nothing stopping the ADF making a final buy of 28 aircraft the F-35B variant. Or even switching some of the existing planned buy from the A variant to Bs. It\u2019s a matter of political will.<\/p>\n

The divergent views around this debate show just how important it is that the F-35B issue is thoroughly (and independently) investigated so that decisions are supported by facts. The UK\u2019s failure to \u2018get the facts right\u2019 in their 2010 SDSR led to an F-35\/carrier related mess of epic proportions. Australia now has the chance to do the job properly.<\/p>\n

Steve George was an air engineer officer in the Royal Navy for 28 years, and served in HMS Invincible during the 1982 Falklands operation. During his career, he was closely involved with the Sea Harrier, and also with joint RN\/RAF Harrier operations. Retiring from the RN as a Commander, he joined the JSF programme to work on F-35B ship suitability. He is now an engineering consultant. Image courtesy of Flickr user Official US Navy Page<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Nic Stuart\u2019s piece, \u2018Forget the carrier option\u2019, makes a large and important judgment: that politics and defence funding won\u2019t allow the option of deploying F-35Bs on Australia\u2019s LHDs. But in making that case Nic repeats …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":243,"featured_media":17553,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[26,1043,628],"class_list":["post-17549","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-defence-spending","tag-f-35b","tag-lhd"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nForget the carrier option: an engineer\u2019s response | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/forget-the-carrier-option-an-engineers-response\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Forget the carrier option: an engineer\u2019s response | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Nic Stuart\u2019s piece, \u2018Forget the carrier option\u2019, makes a large and important judgment: that politics and defence funding won\u2019t allow the option of deploying F-35Bs on Australia\u2019s LHDs. 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