{"id":17661,"date":"2015-01-02T06:00:45","date_gmt":"2015-01-01T19:00:45","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=17661"},"modified":"2015-01-05T13:08:59","modified_gmt":"2015-01-05T02:08:59","slug":"editors-picks-for-2014-what-australia-should-do-in-the-south-china-sea-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/editors-picks-for-2014-what-australia-should-do-in-the-south-china-sea-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Editors’ picks for 2014 ‘What Australia should do in the South China Sea’"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"The<\/a><\/figure>\n

Originally published 26 June 2014. (We’ll be publishing new material on Monday 5 January)<\/strong><\/p>\n

China continues to try changing the status quo in the South China Sea (SCS) through bullying its smaller neighbours and creating more facts on the ground. After moving an oil rig into an area contested by both China and Vietnam last month, Beijing is apparently planning<\/a> to send a second one into the area. Meanwhile, it\u2019s apparently constructing an airstrip and sea port on Fiery Cross Reef<\/a>, a move which could see the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) strengthen its military reach into the SCS through the deployment of shorter-range tactical aircraft. That comes amidst ongoing tensions between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal, as well as growing concerns in Malaysia and Indonesia about China\u2019s territorial ambitions<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Let\u2019s face it: China\u2019s determined to push Southeast Asian countries into accepting what it perceives as its rightful territorial claims within the \u2018nine dash line\u2019<\/a>. Scott Snyder<\/a> isn\u2019t alone in concluding that under President Xi Jinping\u2019s leadership \u2018China\u2019s ability to exert its own sphere of influence in Asia is regarded as an expected benefit that will naturally accrue, regardless of the impact on the neighbourhood.\u2019 The New York Times<\/i> editorial board<\/a> has also expressed concern about China\u2019s \u2018power grab\u2019 in the SCS.<\/p>\n

Chinese leaders seem to believe that the price for their consistent violation of established norms of behaviour in maritime disputes won\u2019t outweigh the benefits. They likely base that judgment on at least three assumptions:<\/span><\/p>\n