{"id":17825,"date":"2015-01-14T06:00:26","date_gmt":"2015-01-13T19:00:26","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=17825"},"modified":"2015-01-15T10:18:18","modified_gmt":"2015-01-14T23:18:18","slug":"australia-in-asia-time-for-a-dolphin-strategy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-in-asia-time-for-a-dolphin-strategy\/","title":{"rendered":"Australia in Asia: time for a \u2018dolphin\u2019 strategy"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>In 1989, when reflecting upon leadership strategies in a new information age, Dudley Lynch and Paul Kordis drew from typified animal behaviour to develop a new model of management. You don\u2019t need to be a \u2018shark\u2019, they said, to be a winner. Rather, be a \u2018dolphin\u2019: be smart, adaptive, responsive, and look further afield. Interestingly, they subtitled their book<\/a> \u2018Scoring a win in a chaotic world\u2019. They might as well have been writing about the challenges of an \u2018Asian century\u2019 for Australia\u2019s diplomacy.<\/p>\n For Australia, the rise of the Indo-Pacific reality has obliged it to look further afield.\u00a0A rising China is getting more explicit in contesting the regional security system,\u00a0while America continues to invest considerable attention and resources to its Asian \u2018pivot\u2019. Other regional powers, such as India and Japan, are looking more to the Southeast Asian region\u2014and beyond\u2014to further their foreign policy interests. Indonesia\u2019s ascent and Jokowi\u2019s concept of a \u2018global maritime axis\u2019 are simultaneously reinforcing the geostrategic significance of Australia\u2019s immediate neighbourhood; they also herald more complex diplomatic relations and power games between Canberra and Jakarta. Collectively, those dynamics push the nexus of regional politics and stability ever closer to Australia\u2019s shores.<\/p>\n Engaging Asia is therefore not a matter of choice, it\u2019s a necessity. Moreover, Lynch and Kordis\u2019 animal aphorisms, applied to the world of international relations, hold the promise of transcending such debates as whether Australia qualifies as a \u2018middle power\u2019, and whether \u2018middle-power diplomacy\u2019 is the best way to defend its interests in a transformational environment.<\/p>\n Lynch and Kordis argue that in an era of organisational change there are three type of leadership strategies, mirroring the behaviour of sharks, carps, and dolphins. Sharks are insecure. They see the world as a zero-sum game, and act accordingly. They focus on survival and rely on power, prestige and manipulation to secure it. Carps are insecure too. Unlike sharks, they avoid conflict and seek to leverage sympathy. Guardians of the status quo, they think themselves the \u2018eternal victims\u2019 of change. Dolphins, finally, are those who make the best out of organisational change. They display pragmatic coping and communications skills, guided by a long-term purpose. They see opportunities where sharks and carps see threats. Where sharks focus on power and carps on relationships, dolphins resort to both.<\/p>\n So far, the Australian recipe for success in the Asia-Pacific century seemed to have revolved around six main ingredients:<\/p>\n If we compare those features of Australian policy with Lynch and Kordis\u2019 typology, we might conclude that Australia qualifies as a \u2018dolphin\u2019, but incompletely. Out of the six variables highlighted in the table above, Australia\u2019s diplomatic behaviour fits the dolphin\u2019s strategy in three (perspective to policy; base for security; and relation to rising power). It hovers between carps and dolphins on its perspective vis-\u00e0-vis systemic change. It lacks a long-term purpose, and oscillates between status-seeking and sympathy-seeking policies, between sharks and carps, in its communication aims. Finally, the main tools it mobilises to attain its professed foreign policy goals don\u2019t fit easily in any one of the three categories.<\/p>\n That assessment requires considerable refinement, but a quick conclusion is that Australia\u2019s engagement of its Asian environment is dynamic and adaptive: it takes different forms according to the circumstances. More than a strategy, it is a reaction to far-reaching changes, and it takes place on different levels, with different logics at play. The Lynch-Kordis model has its limits. Still, it highlights some fundamentals of Australia\u2019s foreign identity and action that are useful in both academic and policy circles.<\/p>\n In an era of growing interconnectedness, moving constellations of power and fast-paced communications, Australia has adopted many of the dolphin\u2019s tools without the most important of them all: a long-term purpose, fitting its own identity and its relationship to Asian and Western partners. \u2018Dolphinhood\u2019, after all, isn\u2019t so much about leading the pack or being an indispensable partner; it\u2019s about being true to oneself, and comfortable endorsing change rather than fighting it.<\/p>\n Bruno Hellendorff is a research fellow at the\u00a0Group for Research and Information on Peace<\/a>\u00a0(GRIP), Brussels and Tanguy Struye de Swielande a professor in International Relations at University catholique of Louvain, Brussels. Image courtesy of Flickr user Willy Volk<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" In 1989, when reflecting upon leadership strategies in a new information age, Dudley Lynch and Paul Kordis drew from typified animal behaviour to develop a new model of management. You don\u2019t need to be a …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":297,"featured_media":17827,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[17,294,1100,603],"class_list":["post-17825","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australia","tag-diplomacy","tag-dolphin-strategy","tag-middle-power"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n\n
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\n IR factors<\/strong><\/td>\n Sharks<\/strong><\/td>\n Carps<\/strong><\/td>\n Dolphins<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n System change?<\/strong><\/td>\n Revisionist<\/td>\n Status quo<\/td>\n Accommodative<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Perspective to policy<\/strong><\/td>\n Zero-sum<\/td>\n Zero-sum<\/td>\n Positive-sum<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Security?<\/strong><\/td>\n Power<\/td>\n Relationships<\/td>\n Power and relationships<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Relation to rising power?<\/strong><\/td>\n Competition (balancing)<\/td>\n Submission (bandwagoning)<\/td>\n Cooperative (hedging)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Communication aims<\/strong><\/td>\n Status<\/td>\n Sympathy<\/td>\n Long-term purpose<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n \n Main tools<\/strong><\/td>\n Self-help<\/td>\n Collective complaint<\/td>\n Collaborative work<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n