{"id":17910,"date":"2015-01-21T06:00:50","date_gmt":"2015-01-20T19:00:50","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=17910"},"modified":"2015-01-22T07:06:57","modified_gmt":"2015-01-21T20:06:57","slug":"why-australia-should-build-its-own-submarines-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/why-australia-should-build-its-own-submarines-1\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Australia should build its own submarines (1)"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Submarine\"<\/a>The case for building the next generation of RAN submarines in Australia begins with the stand-out attributes that make submarines so important for us: they must be able to operate in areas a long way from home, without air or sea control, to watch, listen, evaluate and act when necessary. Australia\u2019s future submarine will be a unique platform, giving early warning of an adversary\u2019s intentions and providing an excellent antisubmarine and anti-surface ship capability.<\/p>\n

As discussed in an earlier post<\/a>, these capabilities are based on the submarine\u2019s key attribute\u2014stealth<\/em>\u2014which enables access to sensitive or critical areas denied to other vehicles and surveillance systems<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In simple terms, a submarine has to have sufficient buoyancy to support its payload when it\u2019s underwater (that is, to be neutrally buoyant). If you add more fuel (or any other payload), you have to either take out an equivalent weight or increase the vessel\u2019s volume. Simply lengthening an existing design by adding hull sections to increase volume works only so far. As the ratio of the vessel\u2019s length to its diameter grows, it becomes noisier, less agile and less efficient.<\/p>\n

At some point, increasing the volume of a submarine requires an increased hull diameter. But once that threshold is crossed, you\u2019re no longer dealing with the same design. It\u2019s safer to put all the parameters on the table and design a submarine with the volume to carry the payloads required for the desired capability.<\/p>\n

The recent discussion in the press on the possible acquisition of Japanese submarines by Australia (dubbed \u2018Option J\u2019) raises a number of issues. Despite what\u2019s been surmised based on the relatively large submerged displacement of the Soryu class, the current Japanese submarine appears to have less payload, endurance and mobility than the Collins. That isn\u2019t surprising\u2014Japan\u2019s requirements are different from ours.<\/p>\n

So any Japanese boat is likely to require modification to meet Australia\u2019s requirements, particularly for long-ocean transits and patrols. Australia\u2019s also certain to want to install a US combat system, communications fit-out and weapons suite. Those changes will carry cost, performance and schedule risks that are best handled as a developmental project rather than as an off-the-shelf acquisition.<\/p>\n

Quite apart from the suitability of the design, a Japanese purchase would entail particular risks. The prospects for difficulties arising from cultural differences with Japan are significant. Accessing all the relevant technologies during the course of an overseas build of a complex vessel and understanding the design intent (critical to supporting the submarine) would be extraordinarily ambitious and inherently risky. And Japan has no experience with foreign customers for military exports.<\/p>\n

The lure of having submarines built overseas rests upon the assumption that it\u2019d be more expensive to build them here. But design and construction are only one-third of the cost of ownership. The balance arises when the boat is in service.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s worth looking at how other countries approach the problem of maintaining a cost-effective submarine force. Germany, France, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the US all have national designers and builders for their submarine programs. Common characteristics of their approaches include the following:<\/p>\n