{"id":17939,"date":"2015-01-22T14:30:06","date_gmt":"2015-01-22T03:30:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=17939"},"modified":"2015-01-23T12:57:16","modified_gmt":"2015-01-23T01:57:16","slug":"why-australia-should-build-its-own-submarines-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/why-australia-should-build-its-own-submarines-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Australia should build its own submarines (2)"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Audacious<\/a>In my post\u00a0yesterday<\/a> I highlighted the stand-out attributes of submarines, Australia\u2019s need for a greater range\/endurance than is available off the shelf<\/a>, the difficulties of increasing the payload and mobility of an existing design and some of the issues of an overseas build, in particular Option J.<\/p>\n

How long do we need? Using the Collins program as an indicator, we have time to do it properly. The Collins contract was signed in 1987 and the first submarine was delivered in 1996. While there were issues to resolve, that was a nine-year design and build program for the first of class from a greenfield site. Today, we\u2019re in a much better position with submarine engineering and shipyard facilities than we were in 1987. The first FSM should fit into the Collins availability cycle, replacing the Collins that would have come out of Full Cycle Docking in 2028. Allowing for an extended first of class sea trials and fix period it should start sea trials in 2025.<\/p>\n

The complexity and critical national importance of the submarine capability demands dedicated, specialised management. I recommend the establishment of a Submarine Construction Authority, with appropriate industry and Defence expertise and authoritative leadership. Such an approach could build on the experience and lessons of Collins, avoid the mistakes of the air warfare destroyer alliance structure and repeat the success of the Anzac frigate and Huon minehunter projects.<\/p>\n

An Australian design environment would aim to achieve and sustain ownership of the design for future development. That would not mean that we would design the vessel. Rather, we would select a submarine designer to do so while we develop Australian expertise and specialist manpower in parallel. The goal would be to transfer the skills and intellectual property needed to perform the in-service design authority role.<\/p>\n

An objective look at the Collins program provides both valuable lessons and encouragement that the future submarine can be successfully built in Australia. The project was completed with an average schedule delay of about 26 months and within 3\u20134% of the original contract price, after allowing for inflation. The project\u2019s aim to expend at least 70% of funds in Australia was comfortably exceeded. Today, over 90% by value of in-service work is Australian. And construction standards, demonstrated by weld rejection rates and hull circularity, were excellent, exceeding international norms.<\/p>\n

Of course, there were a significant number of design and system defects requiring rectification in the newly built submarines. That work was done successfully by ASC, supported by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, the US Navy and industry.<\/p>\n

The submarine availability problems that have caused such poor ongoing public perception of the Collins arose from failures in in-service support arrangements rather than problems with the design and build. Moreover, the final report of the Coles review found a major improvement in Collins availability as a consequence of its recommendations being implemented.<\/p>\n

What about a hybrid approach? It\u2019s been suggested in the Japanese media that we should take a \u2018hybrid\u2019 approach, constructing the hull modules for the future submarine in Japan and assembling them in Australia. But doing so would entail all the complications of an overseas build, while precluding the optimal use of modern modular assembly, in which all major systems are installed and set to work on their shock- and noise-absorbing deck sections before those sections are slid into the open hull section, like oven trays. A hybrid construction approach would also complicate accountability for any problems injected into the build and deny Australian shipyards in Victoria and New South Wales the platform and module construction work that they performed so well for Collins.<\/p>\n

Moreover, we have an example of why an overseas build of modules is not a good idea: our experience with the bow and escape sections of the first Collins, which were built in Sweden. Both had a large number of weld defects, which took months of additional work in Australia and over $20\u00a0million to rectify. A hybrid build would likely increase, rather than reduce, cost and risk.<\/p>\n

By contrast, there\u2019d be substantial benefits from building the next generation of RAN submarines in Australia. Indeed, local construction is especially beneficial for submarines compared with surface ships, given the submarine\u2019s unique design and strategic importance. The benefits would include the following:<\/p>\n