{"id":18382,"date":"2015-02-16T14:30:38","date_gmt":"2015-02-16T03:30:38","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=18382"},"modified":"2015-02-17T07:21:15","modified_gmt":"2015-02-16T20:21:15","slug":"the-new-us-national-security-strategy-china-and-the-asian-rebalance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/the-new-us-national-security-strategy-china-and-the-asian-rebalance\/","title":{"rendered":"The new US National Security Strategy, China, and the Asian rebalance"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>The Obama administration\u2019s new National Security Strategy<\/a> (NSS) aims to provide a comprehensive guide as to how the United States intends to secure its national interests and global position. It\u2019s long overdue given that the previous version<\/a> dates back to 2010. In the meantime, Russia\u2019s annexed the Crimea and supported Ukrainian separatists, the Islamic State\u2019s created havoc in the Middle East, and Iran\u2019s moved closer to a nuclear weapons breakout capability. From an Australian point of view, what the NSS says about America\u2019s future role and strategy for the Asia\u2013Pacific region is of particular interest. That\u2019s because China\u2019s growing power and its assertiveness in regards to territorial disputes have regional allies and partners wondering about Washington\u2019s staying power in Asia. In fact, how the US deals with the rise of China will do much to determine regional stability and the future of US leadership.<\/p>\n The NSS attempts to reassure Asia\u2013Pacific allies and partners that the US will \u2018advance our rebalance to Asia and the Pacific\u2019. It posits that American leadership in this part of the world \u2018will remain essential\u2019, a proposition most Australian observers would agree with. When it comes to China, it states that while the US welcomed the \u2018rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China\u2019, it would \u2018manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms\u2019. It\u2019s clear that Washington expects Sino-US competition to grow, in part because attempts to reach a mutual understanding about how to organise their relationship have so far proved elusive. The NSS signals to Beijing that the concept of a \u2018new type of great power relationship\u2019 promoted by President Xi\u2014and initially accepted by President Obama\u2014isn\u2019t a sustainable basis for the relationship. Both sides have divergent interpretations<\/a> of what it means, with China using it to justify the creation of \u2018spheres of influence\u2019 in the Western Pacific. That\u2019s rattled the nerves of US allies and partners, and threatened to erode US leadership credentials<\/a>.<\/p>\n Allies and partners should thus welcome the NSS\u2019s emphasis on US leadership in support of regional rules-based norms and behaviour. But it\u2019s also clear that the US expects allies and partners to carry a greater burden when it comes to dealing with certain elements of China\u2019s coercion. In his introduction to the document, President Obama states that the US remains \u2018alert to China\u2019s military modernization and reject[s] any role for intimidation in resolving territorial disputes.\u2019 But to \u2018reject\u2019 intimidation isn\u2019t the same as to \u2018resist\u2019 it. The NSS also states that \u2018[o]n territorial disputes, particularly in Asia, we denounce coercion and assertive behaviour that threaten escalation.\u2019 Yet again, \u2018denouncing\u2019 is the easy part; imposing real costs on Beijing quite another.<\/p>\n Doing so will fall to a greater extent on the allies and partners, and the NSS stressed the need to strengthen allied and partner \u2018capabilities to withstand coercion, imposing costs on those who threaten their neighbors or violate fundamental international norms\u2019. Arguably, from Washington\u2019s perspective, that particularly relates to coercion in so-called \u2018grey zones\u2019 in the South China Sea and East China Sea, where China typically uses lower levels of intimidation backed by PLA direct or indirect action. That\u2019s apparent in the way the NSS discusses the \u2018use of force\u2019. While its predecessor had dealt with this issue in more generic terms, the NSS 2015 states that the US \u2018will be principled and selective in the use of force\u2019. It goes on to argue that the \u2018threshold for military action is higher when our interests are not directly threatened. In such cases, we will seek to mobilize allies and partners to share the burden and achieve lasting outcomes.\u2019<\/p>\n In this context, the NSS seeks to enhance interactions among the US\u2019 primary allies Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines to \u2018ensure they are fully capable of responding to regional and global challenges\u2019. Obviously, as US power is declining in relative terms, allies and partners should be prepared to play a more active role in addressing the China challenge. But US ambivalence when it comes to \u2018grey zone incidents\u2019 is also problematic. While it’s understandable that Washington doesn’t want to be drawn into conflicts with China over \u2018some rocks\u2019 in the Western Pacific, regional perceptions about the Sino-US \u2018balance of resolve\u2019 and, ultimately, US leadership will be shaped by the degree to which the US is willing to confront China\u2019s attempts to create facts on the water through its creeping incrementalism<\/a>. Uncertainty about US willingness to do so has already led to friction within the US\u2013Japan alliance<\/a>. In that regard, the NSS represents a missed opportunity to formulate a clearer strategy for leadership in a more volatile Asia\u2013Pacific region.<\/p>\n Benjamin Schreer<\/em><\/a> is a senior analyst at ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr user\u00a0Barack Obama<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The Obama administration\u2019s new National Security Strategy (NSS) aims to provide a comprehensive guide as to how the United States intends to secure its national interests and global position. It\u2019s long overdue given that the …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":41,"featured_media":18409,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[40,143,52,308,378],"class_list":["post-18382","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-alliance-2","tag-asia-pacific","tag-china","tag-national-security-strategy","tag-rebalance"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n