{"id":18511,"date":"2015-02-20T12:30:47","date_gmt":"2015-02-20T01:30:47","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=18511"},"modified":"2015-02-20T14:13:46","modified_gmt":"2015-02-20T03:13:46","slug":"land-400-equipping-australias-army","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/land-400-equipping-australias-army\/","title":{"rendered":"LAND 400\u2014equipping Australia\u2019s Army"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a>Defence Minister Kevin Andrews\u2019 confirmation<\/a> on Monday that tenders were finally about to open for LAND 400\u2014a $10 billion project to replace Army\u2019s thousand or so M113<\/a>, ASLAV<\/a>, and Bushmaster<\/a> combat vehicles\u2014sparked considerable interest from industry<\/a> and Premiers<\/a> but little from analysts. His announcement<\/a> yesterday that Government has given the project first pass approval and released a request for tenders is likely to attract greater attention. The first tender will be to replace our ASLAVs, due for retirement around 2021. Specifications for their heavier and lighter counterparts are to be confirmed in the coming white paper<\/a>.<\/p>\n Most commentators have been hostile toward the project from its inception<\/a> a decade ago. The key complaint arises from a disconnect<\/a> between strategic guidance in the 2000, 2009 and 2013 white papers, directing that equipment acquisitions be prioritised around what\u2019s needed to prevent attacks against Australia and contribute to stability in our immediate region, and LAND 400\u2019s focus on platforms for high-intensity contemporary and future operations including amphibious assault.<\/p>\n Hugh White worries<\/a> about the opportunity costs of such combat power. He\u2019s also concerned the intended levels of protection, mobility and firepower seem designed for just the sort of major war in Asia that Army would be the least apt of the Services to fight; and that the project could deliver inappropriate kit for likely demands in our own neighbourhood. (Lighter, highly-deployable mobile forces might suit some nearby countries\u2019 fragile infrastructure<\/a> and low-threat environments.) Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith warn<\/a> against LAND 400\u2019s departure from the Defence of Australia (DoA) policy framework for disciplining priority-setting and spending. They caution it detracts from higher Army modernisation imperatives\u2014particularly to operationalise<\/a> true amphibiosity<\/a> and consolidate Plan Beersheba<\/a> for improving force generation and combined-arms effects via three similar multi-role combat brigades.<\/p>\n So how has such a high price-tag project\u2014wags might call it LAND 10,000,000,000\u2014managed to clank forward through that sniping, and a thicket of political minefields<\/a>, without much public supporting fire? Sceptics will point to ministers\u2019 reluctance to say no to an ADF with troops in harm\u2019s way; a who\u2019s-who of vested-interests (not least national, state and local leaders keen to make up for job losses in the car industry); and the Services\u2019 disinclination to directly oppose<\/a> each other\u2019s most-prized projects. But deeper considerations are at work too.<\/p>\n An idea that the true (small-d) defence of Australia uses Army as \u2018an instrument of national power<\/a>\u2019 to protect sovereignty and all the nation\u2019s interests rather than just its continental landmass<\/a> appears central to the case for high-end land power for offshore deployments. That seems both a fudge (what couldn\u2019t be a task for Army under such an elastic conception?) and a statement of fact. Two of Chief of Army Lieutenant-General David Morrison\u2019s favourite tropes help.<\/p>\n First, he argues that Army must be able to survive against peer competitors<\/a> and potent irregular enemies alike. Although Navy and the RAAF also \u2018get used\u2019\u2014witness the latter in Iraq\u2014Army is \u2018the essential service<\/a>\u2019 that most often delivers the main effect of joint operations\u2014frequently outside the approved theatres of strategic theology. In doing so, its strategic tasks<\/a> of shaping environments, countering threats and protecting populations translate into a spectrum of missions, ranging from non-combatant evacuations, to stabilisation-missions (RAMSI or East Timor-redux), proportionate contributions to Coalition operations, and even providing a basis for national mobilisation. That breadth of duties (and the impact of IED-armed insurgents in the Middle East) have spurred a drive for professional mastery measured against all-comers. And there, a force designed to go up against our most capable potential adversaries (or allies during exercises) will be better able to overmatch a sophisticated terrorist group<\/a> with hi-tech weaponry or a rowdy mob jostling our deployed troops than one tailored just for lower-level contingencies.<\/p>\n For LAND 400, that means \u2018the days of soldiers being transported in vehicles made of tin and canvas<\/a> are long gone\u2019. Platforms once known as \u2018armoured personnel carriers\u2019 won\u2019t be contemporary \u2018infantry fighting vehicles\u2019 but \u2018mounted combat reconnaissance capability\u2019. That updated jargon<\/a> signals that vehicles able to operate in complex, lethal, and networked future environments won\u2019t be your grandpa\u2019s battle-taxis<\/a>.<\/p>\n Second, Morrison argues \u2018we can’t benchmark<\/a> ourselves against the Taliban\u2019. Although that reinforces his peer\u2013competitor axiom, our inability so far to prevail strategically, for all Army\u2019s valour and sacrifice in Afghanistan, points to the Service\u2019s unique combination of usefulness and limitation. At some point in every domain, quantity has a quality all its own, but the force-multipliers of a technological edge and skill at arms probably falter first against sheer numbers on land.<\/p>\n That LAND 400\u2019s no longer described as a $19 billion<\/a> project stems mainly from discussing acquisition rather than through-life costs. But it may also reflect some scaling-back of expectations in recognition that, while Army helped check the PLA in Korea over 60 years ago, its capacity to decisively influence a large Asian power is finite.<\/p>\n As we\u2019ll have to wait for the white paper to see the scope of the M113-replacement, yesterday\u2019s announcement doesn\u2019t provide many clues whether there\u2019s still further stretch in \u2018DoA Plus Plus<\/a>\u2019. Few in Army would mourn DoA\u2019s passing. But the impact on sound Army planning might be mixed.<\/p>\n Karl Claxton<\/em><\/a> is an analyst at ASPI. Image courtesy of Department of Defence<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Defence Minister Kevin Andrews\u2019 confirmation on Monday that tenders were finally about to open for LAND 400\u2014a $10 billion project to replace Army\u2019s thousand or so M113, ASLAV, and Bushmaster combat vehicles\u2014sparked considerable interest from …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":100,"featured_media":18515,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[33,48,112,1062,824,1147],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n