{"id":18592,"date":"2015-02-25T13:01:06","date_gmt":"2015-02-25T02:01:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=18592"},"modified":"2015-02-25T16:16:27","modified_gmt":"2015-02-25T05:16:27","slug":"australia-and-indonesia-minimising-maximum-possible-losses","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-and-indonesia-minimising-maximum-possible-losses\/","title":{"rendered":"Australia and Indonesia: minimising maximum possible losses"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n Peter Jennings<\/a> and Peter McCawley<\/a> have both produced thoughtful and insightful posts on why Australia and Indonesia seem to be trapped in a classic \u2018prisoner\u2019s dilemma\u2019 game. In this post, I\u2019d like to further unpack why that\u2019s so, and why the outcome of the game seems to almost never vary.<\/p>\n Just to bring readers up to speed, the \u2018prisoner\u2019s dilemma\u2019 is a classic part of game theory. A sheriff separately interrogates two prisoners. He has sufficient evidence to charge each with a minor crime, but requires their testimony against each other to pursue convictions for a major crime. He tells each that if they testify against the other prisoner, they can receive a reward while the other goes to jail for five years. If both testify against each other, they\u2019ll both go to jail for three years. If neither testifies against the other, they\u2019ll both simply be convicted on minor charges and go to jail for a year.<\/p>\n The prisoner\u2019s choice is whether to testify or not. If he testifies and the other prisoner doesn\u2019t, he\u2019s rewarded. If he testifies and the other prisoner does too, he gets three years in the slammer. On the other hand, if he doesn\u2019t testify, and the other prisoner does, he\u2019s in for five years. If he doesn\u2019t talk, and his fellow prisoner doesn\u2019t either, they\u2019ll both serve relatively little jail time.<\/p>\n In game theory, the prisoner\u2019s dilemma provides an example of why players \u2018rationally\u2019 pursue non-cooperative strategies. They do so because\u2014with each player unable to trust his fellow player\u2014the rational course is to minimise the maximum possible loss. With the game played only once, the optimal strategy for each prisoner is to testify\u2014the maximum possible loss from testifying is three years in jail; from not testifying, it\u2019s five. While the two prisoners remain focused on minimising their maximum possible losses the outcome won\u2019t change.<\/p>\n But something happens in prisoner dilemma games when the game\u2019s played over and over<\/a>. It doesn\u2019t take the players long to devise strategies of cooperation and keep their mouths shut. Patterns begin to emerge as the games take on a politics of their own, typically coloured by cooperation though punctuated with occasional bursts of non-cooperation and retaliation.<\/p>\n So, let\u2019s turn to the Australia\u2013Indonesia relationship. How is it that after sixty-odd years since the Dutch recognition of Indonesian independence in 1949, we\u2019re still playing individual games of prisoner\u2019s dilemma and ending up with conflict strategies?<\/p>\n In one sense, the answer to that question\u2019s relatively straight-forward: we\u2019re both still insisting on minimising our maximum possible losses. While the players are loss-focused, they tend to overlook the benefits of cooperation. There\u2019s also a second theoretical explanation: the benefits of cooperation just might not seem sufficiently attractive to the players to drive a change of strategy.<\/p>\n But with the game played over and over between states, other variables also enter the game, in particular the rotating political leaderships of each country. Sometimes rotations are fast\u2014 Australia\u2019s had five prime ministers since New Year\u2019s Day in 2007. Sometimes they\u2019re slow: President Suharto ruled Indonesia between 1965 and 1998, while a string of Australian leaders succeeded to prime ministerial office. In short, the players keep changing.<\/p>\n Then there are politics and history; they also get in the way. It was always going to be hard work for Australia to develop close patterns of cooperation with a non-democratic Indonesia. Yes, we much preferred Suharto\u2019s New Order to Sukarno\u2019s Konfrontasi<\/em>. But in truth, opportunities for a genuinely close cooperation between Jakarta and Canberra have only really existed since 1998.<\/p>\n Actually, I think a close look at the past fifteen years does suggests that a pattern of cooperation is growing. But, as with the repetitive prisoner\u2019s dilemma games, we\u2019re still in the early phases of a transition towards cooperation. And the simple truth is that neither prioritises the relationship when considering policy options for deeply-felt problems. In both countries, domestic politics trump the bilateral relationship. Building a pattern of cooperation is going to take time, effort, and sustained political leadership.<\/p>\n Rod Lyon<\/em><\/a> is a fellow at ASPI and executive editor of\u00a0<\/em>The Strategist. Image courtesy of Flickr user Luca Rossato<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Peter Jennings and Peter McCawley have both produced thoughtful and insightful posts on why Australia and Indonesia seem to be trapped in a classic \u2018prisoner\u2019s dilemma\u2019 game. In this post, I\u2019d like to further unpack …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":18597,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[17,294,8,1146,821],"class_list":["post-18592","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australia","tag-diplomacy","tag-indonesia","tag-prisoners-dilemma","tag-security-cooperation"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n