2000 White Paper<\/a>\u2014which is still the exemplar of a Defence White Paper both in process and outcome\u2014Army undertook a review of its armoured vehicle fleet to ensure it was able to adhere to the government\u2019s direction that the Army would \u2018have the combat weight they need to achieve their missions without undue risk\u2019. I think that\u2019s strategic guidance.<\/p>\nThis wasn\u2019t about heavy or light; it was about threat, survivability and risk. The Leopard tank at the time was found wanting on the basis of all objective analysis, in particular in relation to survivability and cost. It\u2019d been the victim of chronic institutional underinvestment. Government, not Army, directed that alternatives be investigated. Defence then cast the net widely. Swiss and German Leopard tanks, British Challengers and US Abrams tanks were reviewed based on cost and survivability against the changing threat environment seen at that time in Iraq and reinforced since in Afghanistan and the broader Middle East. While I was sceptical to begin with, the Abrams came first not because of a small child\u2019s need to play with the big boys but on a clear and pragmatic evaluation of cost, capability, survivability and fleet scale, particularly in supply chain and ongoing R&D investment. Why haven\u2019t we deployed tanks when many of our partners have? I suspect it has more to do with an emotional Canberra policy myopia where tanks are concerned than a pragmatic force option consideration.<\/p>\n
To turn now to Land 400 Phase 2\u2014this is about replacing the ASLAV. It\u2019s not about force structure distortion or Korean peninsula stars in the eyes of the \u2018Iron Colonels\u2019. It\u2019s a pragmatic response to the ageing of a fleet which has been a workhorse of the ADF over nearly two decades and a changing threat environment. Army calls it democratisation of lethality, in the form of improvised explosive devices and widely available\u00a0hand-held\u00a0weapons; which means that the minimum level of protection with which governments would be willing to deploy soldiers includes a V-shaped hull and protection from small arms fire. It also includes, dependent on the task, the flexibility to add the equipment needed to impose one\u2019s will on any prospective adversary\u2014an element of soldiering Australians have become used to in Afghanistan.<\/p>\n
That brings us to the future phases of Land 400\u2014which I\u2019m sure will create the grounds for a fiery debate\u2014and the requirement to carry infantry into the most lethal parts of the battlefield. Just to frame that requirement a little, highly lethal combat is an ever-present threat; even a peacekeeping force deployed in the future might need to survive those highly lethal zones.<\/p>\n
Australian governments have become accustomed to the gravity of those types of decisions\u2014but if future soldiers are to be given the best opportunity to prevail in such clashes, there\u2019ll be a need for a close-combat system that includes tanks and the ability to move infantry in protected vehicles.<\/p>\n
Analysts spend a lot of time reviewing the specifics of aircraft and submarines, and are increasingly comfortable with the special forces community. But sadly there is much ground to be made up if there\u2019s to be a meaningful and informed debate about future phases of Land 400 and the type of force-structure options that governments would wish to see Army have in the coming decades. That\u2019s the strategic guidance bit.<\/p>\n
This is not about a recidivist Army. It is about an Army which understands risk, survivability and the operating environment it will need to respond to. ASPI and Army will be addressing just those issues in June during ASPI\u2019s Land Force Conference\u2014\u2018Army\u2019s Future Force Structure Options\u2019. In the meantime let\u2019s move the debate on.<\/p>\n
Michael Clifford is a senior fellow at ASPI. Image courtesy of Department of Defence<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"In a recent blog post my colleague Karl Claxton took the opportunity to frame the issues around the Defence Minister Kevin Andrew\u2019s recent Land 400 announcement. Sadly, Karl echoes an old complaint: Most commentators have …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":274,"featured_media":18720,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[44,488,606,1062],"class_list":["post-18719","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australian-defence-force","tag-australian-army","tag-defence-white-paper","tag-land-400"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
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